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“How do you do it?” asked the Moon 
“How do you keep on track?” 
“I keep it simple”, said the Sun 
“And I keep coming back!” 
 
- Lemn Sissay 
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 Abstract  
Cross-Sectoral partnerships constitute an increasingly practiced yet less understood 
phenomenon. The mechanisms are studied through different disciplines in quite 
disparate manners, which has led to a lack of holistic understanding of how they 
function in real-life. Especially, their embeddedness in national contexts in 
developing countries has been less explored. This study sets out to generate an in-
depth understanding of how actors interact in and around cross-sectoral partnership 
mechanisms in developing country settings. To this end, it undertakes a case study of 
the Global Fund’s Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) in Ethiopia. 
The study draws on the critical realism research paradigm, whereby it actively seeks 
to unravel the causal, contextual factors that underlie observed ways of interactions 
between actors. In this regard, the study deploys a guiding theoretical framework that 
directs the focus of the study towards understanding the interplay between actors’ 
agency and the 2-layered context of interaction, which is represented by the CCM’s 
regulatory frameworks and the deeper frames of reference in the Ethiopian setting. 
This qualitative study employed multiple methods of data collection including in-
depth interviews with 43 policy makers, non-participant observation, and document 
review. The data is analysed through the thematic analysis method whereby themes 
are developed both apriori in view of the theoretical framework of the study and 
through identification and interpretation of emerging themes from the data.  
The findings reveal the contextual and process related factors that influence 
interactions between actors in and around the CCM in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the 
findings of the study expose the power relationships that underlie observed ways of 
interactions in the setting. By combining the context and process-orientated 
perspectives, the study offers a holistic account of how cross-sectoral interactions 
occur in a developing country setting. The analytical logics offered by the study, in 
terms of how the contextual and process related factors influence cross-sectoral 
interactions, provide testable propositions for future studies of cross-sectoral 
partnerships in developing country settings.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction to the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
	  
This chapter introduces the study. It starts by providing a brief background to the 
subject under study. Following, the aim of the study and specific research questions 
that the study sets of to satisfy are presented. Finally, it presents an outline of the 
content of the different chapters that follow the introduction chapter.  
1.2 Background to the study 
	  
The subject of interest for this thesis relates to cross-sectoral partnerships in public 
health governance in developing countries. Particularly, the interest of the thesis is 
focused on understanding the real-life experiences of actors in the process of 
‘partnering’ across different sectors, in developing country settings. Here, it is 
crucial that the use of the term ‘partnership’ is clarified. It is widely acknowledged 
that there lies a lack of clarity in the way the term partnership is used (Barringer and 
Harrison 2000, Googins and Rochlin 2000, Osborne 2000, Selsky and Parker 2005, 
Bryson, Crosby et al. 2006, Biermann, Man-san Chan et al. 2007, Buse and Harmer 
2007, Mol 2007; p. 2, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011). Mol (2007; p. 224) 
observes that different terms are often used to describe mechanisms that more or less 
represent the same thing:  
civil partnership, cross- sectoral collaborative alliances, cross-sector 
organizational collaboration, cross-sectoral partnership, local partnership, 
multisectoral network, multi- stakeholder initiative, new social partnership, 
strategic partnership and social partnership organization. 
While such plurality of terminologies and definitions is typical of a ‘new and 
evolving field’ (Selsky and Parker 2005; p. 850) and  ‘adds richness’ to the field of 
study, it also ‘impedes its rigor and cumulativeness’ and ‘makes it almost impossible 
to judge and evaluate the functioning’ of partnerships (Mol 2007; p. 223, Thomson, 
Perry et al. 2009; p. 5). For instance, while it is commonly quoted that there are 
around 80 to 100 global public-private partnerships (GPPPs) in global health, Buse 
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and Harmer (2007) could only find 23 GPPPs that meet their inclusion criteria 
(Schäferhoff, Campe et al. 2009). Hence, it is important to clarify here how the term 
is understood and used within this study. 
Different authors have similarly adopted a particular definition of partnerships in 
their studies (Bartsch 2003, Börzel and Risse 2005, Bull and McNeill 2007, Buse 
and Harmer 2007, Meadowcroft 2007, Mol 2007, Schäferhoff, Campe et al. 2009, 
Glasbergen 2011). Before presenting the definition that is adopted in this study, it 
would be useful to discuss how the topic of research was identified in the first place 
so as to argue the selection of the particular definition adopted in the study, within 
the context of the rationale and aim of the study. The topic of interest actually arose 
from interests related to understanding interactions between actors in policy-making 
processes in developing countries. Subsequently, it was thought that a partnership 
mechanism would present a good opportunity to study actors as they interact within 
a clearly defined interactional arena. Hence, undertaking a case study of a cross-
sectional partnership mechanism was chosen as the method of choice in order to 
illuminate on the research aim and objectives related to how actors interact. The 
global Fund’s Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) was chosen as the case to 
be studied within this study with the aim of generating an in-depth understanding of 
how actors interact in real-life in a developing country setting.  
Hence, the choice of definition of cross-sectoral partnerships that is adopted in this 
study is influenced by considerations of the type of mechanisms this study intends to 
generate knowledge about and the key features of the case under study. The type of 
mechanisms that this study sets out to generate knowledge about are cross-sectoral 
sectoral partnerships that function at the national level in developing countries. In 
this regard, the definitions of partnerships that are seen to be pertinent to the subject 
of interest in this study and the case under study are found to emphasise 3 main 
aspects. Firstly, some definitions put a qualification that arrangements that are 
considered to constitute a partnership are ‘relatively institutionalised’ entities, and 
not just mere instances of cooperation between actors (Börzel and Risse 2005, Buse 
and Harmer 2007, Schäferhoff, Campe et al. 2009, Glasbergen 2011). Secondly, 
most definition emphasise the presence of a public good or some form of common 
objective that is pursued by the partnership (Selsky and Parker 2005, Bull and 
McNeill 2007, Buse and Harmer 2007, Schäferhoff, Campe et al. 2009) Lastly, the 
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reviewed definitions explain that multi-sectorality embodies the ‘three traditionally 
defined ‘sectors’ of modern life – state, economy and society’ (Bartsch 2003, Selsky 
and Parker 2005, Bull and McNeill 2007, Meadowcroft 2007; p. 209, Schäferhoff, 
Campe et al. 2009). Drawing on these features of the reviewed definitions, the 
following working definition of multi-sectoral partnerships has been adopted in this 
study. While the different concepts embodied in the definition are reflected across 
the different literature highlighted above, the phrases and terminologies included in 
the definition are adopted mainly from Buse and Harmer (2007), Bull and McNeill 
(2007), Schaferhof et al (2009) and Selsky and Parker (2005): 
Relatively institutionalised mechanisms in which State and non-State actors 
participate in collective decision-making processes to undertake specific 
tasks, which are in some way identified with a public policy agenda item, and 
to share risks, responsibilities and resources 
Clarifying the working definition that is adopted in the study is critical for guiding 
the literature review undertaken as part of the study as well as for the purposes of 
clearly demarcating the contributions of the study. One additional aspect that needs 
clarifying relates to the use of the word ‘sector’ in this study. It is known that the 
term is used interchangeably to refer to thematic areas of work as in ‘the health 
sector’, ‘water and sanitation sector’, and so on ‘agriculture sector’ on the one hand, 
and to refer to types of social actors such as ‘public sector’, ‘private sector’ and (civil 
society organisations (CSOs)’, on the other. The use of the term within this study 
relates to the latter application of the term where it is used to refer to categories of 
the term. Accordingly, when referring to thematic areas such as ‘health’, the study 
uses the term, ‘health field’. 
Cross-sectoral partnerships between State and non-State actors are increasingly 
becoming predominant features of public policy processes at the levels of global 
health governance as well as national level policy processes. In this regard, goal 
number 8 of the millennium development goals focuses on developing a ‘global 
partnership for development’ (UN 2015). Specifically, targets 8E and 8F specifically 
focus on cross-sectoral partnerships in order to attain specific objectives (UN 2015): 
	  
 
16	  
Target 8E: 
In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable 
essential drugs in developing countries 
Target 8F: 
In cooperation with the private sector, make available benefits of new 
technologies, especially information and communications 
This emphasis on working through cross-sectoral partnership approaches is bound to 
continue into the future, whereby it is reflected in deliberations on the post-2015 
agenda: 
The implementation of the post - 2015 development agenda should include a 
multi - stakeholder approach, effectively engaging civil society, business 
sector, philanthropic organizations and other actors. (UN 2014) 
Another substantive indication as to the growing importance of cross-sectoral 
partnership arrangements comes from reviews that indicate their growing role in 
development assistance for health. As figure 1 demonstrates, the contribution of 
these new public-private partnership based mechanisms is growing relative to 
traditional players in the field of global health governance (Murray, Anderson et al. 
2011):  
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Figure 1: Development assistance for health by channel of assistance, 1990 – 2010  
Source: Murray et al (Murray, Anderson et al. 2011) 
	  
1.3 The aim of the study and the research questions 
	  
The aim of the study is to develop an in-depth understanding of cross-sectoral 
interactions between actors, in and around partnership mechanisms, in developing 
country settings.  
The following research questions were formulated in view of this aim: 
1. How are the factors that influence actors’ interactions in and around cross-
sectoral partnership mechanisms conceptualised in the literature? 
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2. How do actors interact in and around cross-sectoral partnership mechanisms 
in a developing country setting? 
3. Why do actors interact in observed manners of interactions?  
The third research question is further broken down into the following sub-
questions: 
a. What is the role of context in influencing these interactions? 
b. What is the role of factors related to the partnering process in 
influencing the manner of cross-sectoral interactions between actors? 
1.4 Outline of the thesis  
	  
The thesis is organised into 8 chapters. The first chapter introduces the key features 
of the study including the background of the study, the rationale of the study, the aim 
and objectives and the way the thesis has been organised. Hereunder, a brief 
description of the ensuing chapters is provided. 
Chapter two presents a discussion of the conceptual understanding and empirical 
evidence in relation to cross-sectoral partnerships. In this regard, the chapter 
discusses the evidence as to how the mechanisms function in different settings: in 
advanced countries, at the level of global governance and in developing countries. 
By drawing on the evidence from these different settings, the study chapter seeks to 
highlight the particular issues that are of relevance to this study. In other words, it 
attempts to delineate and situate this study of cross-sectoral partnerships at the 
national level in a developing country setting, within the wider literature on global 
health governance. The particular issues that are of relevance to national actors in 
developing countries are drawn out, in reference to the understanding of broader 
issues in contemporary global governance. Finally, the existing empirical evidence 
on how cross-sectoral partnerships in developing countries function in real-life is 
discussed, both drawing on the existing evidence on CCMs and wider evidence of 
cross-sectoral partnerships that function in developing countries.  
Chapter three presents the research paradigm of the study and the methods employed 
to in order to collect and analyse the data. The chapter starts with discussion of the 
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research paradigm of the study, ‘critical realism’, and how this has influenced the 
methodological choices made in the study. The chapter then presents a discussion of 
the theoretical framework deployed by the study to guide the analysis of data. The 
chapter then moves on to a detailed discussion of the case study approach adopted in 
the study, including the methods employed for data collection (in-depth interviews, 
observation and document review) and the data analysis method (thematic analysis). 
Finally, the chapter ends with some methodological reflections and discussion of the 
researcher’s positionality.  
Chapter four presents a description of the case, namely, the Global Fund’s Country 
Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) in Ethiopia. To this end, the chapter presents a 
description of the Global Fund’s structures and where the CCMs sit within this 
global structure, the key guidance principles of the Fund, and the particular guidance 
for CCMs. Following this, the chapter discusses the key features of the Ethiopian 
CCM in reference to the overall aid coordination structure in the country. Finally, the 
chapter presents a discussion of key features of the Ethiopian setting. Here, the social, 
political and economic situation is described, along with a description of the national 
government and administrative systems. Finally the population health status and the 
national health system are described, including the key governance mechanisms that 
are in place.   
Chapter five is the first of the empirical chapters. The chapter sets out to satisfy the 
research questions related to how actors interact in and around cross-sectoral 
partnerships and why they interact in observed manners. In terms of the latter, it 
attempts to offer explanations from analysis of the context of the interactional setting. 
Following the theoretical framework of the study the chapter presents a discussion of 
the critical themes that represent the ways in which actors interact in the setting, 
along with an explanation of the same, with reference to the structured-context (the 
CCM regulatory frameworks and the deeper frames of reference in the setting). 
Chapter six follows this with a focus on the exploring the process related factors that 
influence cross-sectoral interactions between actors in and around the CCM. In doing 
so, the chapter sets out to contribute to answering the research question related to 
why actors interact in observed manners of interactions but drawing on the findings 
related to the partnering process.  
	  
 
20	  
Chapter seven focuses on exposing the manifestations of power within interactions 
in the CCM. To this end the chapter adopts a multi-layered conceptualisation of 
power that is commensurate with the theoretical framework adopted in this study. 
Accordingly, the chapter discusses how the two forms of power (active and potential) 
are mobilised at the relational (actors’ agency), dispositional (CCM regulatory 
frameworks) and the structural  (deeper frames of reference) levels, in actors’ 
interactions in the setting. Furthermore, the chapter discusses findings that signify 
the dynamic character of power, that is, how actors’ involvement within the CCM 
affects their power relationships with actors in the setting. 
Chapter eight presents the discussion and conclusion chapter. The chapter draws out 
the key contributions of the study by discussing the findings in reference to existing 
understanding in the field. The chapter starts out by reflecting on the 
conceptualisation of cross-sectoral partnership mechanisms that are instigated 
globally to function at the national level in developing countries. Based on the 
findings of the study, the chapter highlights the issues that warrant particular 
attention in conceptualisations of such mechanisms, which are seen to act as 
interface between the national and global levels of governance. The chapter then 
discusses the findings in the study that relate to the role of contextual factors against 
existing conceptual understandings and empirical evidence. Similarly, the chapter 
discusses the findings related to process related factors vis-à-vis the reviewed 
empirical evidence in the area. Following this, the chapter uses the findings of the 
study to reflect on theories of the interplay between actors’ agency and structure. The 
chapter then discusses the potential contributions of the thesis, the potential 
limitations and the implications for policy and practice. Finally, some concluding 
remarks are forwarded in view of the preceding discussion.  
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
	  
This chapter presents a review of the existing body of literature in relation to cross-
sectoral partnerships. Specifically, it focuses on how cross-sectoral partnerships are 
conceptualised in the literature and the evidence regarding factors that influence 
interactions between actors in and around partnerships. The chapter contributes to 
the research aim by answering the following research question:  
How are cross-sectoral interactions in and around partnerships conceptualised 
in the literature? 
In turn, in order to satisfy this question, the chapter sets out to generate findings 
along the following inquiries? 
1. How is the emergence of cross-sectoral partnerships understood in different 
settings: high-income country settings and at the level of global governance? 
2. What are the factors that are seen to be critical for actors’ interactions in and 
around partnerships, in developing country settings? 
Accordingly, the first part (sections 2.2 – 2.4) discuss the emergence of cross 
sectoral partnerships within the realm of the broader set of changes that are known to 
underlie the proliferation of cross-sectoral partnerships globally (2.2), the 
implications entailed by these changes on national level actors and policy processes 
in developing countries (2.3), and the particular issues pertinent to the emergence of 
cross-sectoral partnerships in the health field (2.4). The second part (sections 2.5 – 
2.7) then discuss the understanding of cross sectoral interactions between actors in 
and around partnership mechanisms (2.5), ‘power’ as a neglected concept within 
these conceptualisations (2.6), and the factors that are known to influence cross-
sectoral interactions between actors in and around partnerships in developing country 
settings (2.7). 
This literature review followed a systematic search of the literature using key terms 
such as cross-sectoral interactions, cross-sectoral partnerships, partnerships, public-
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private partnerships, global public-private partnerships, global health partnerships, 
and global health initiatives. Decisions regarding inclusion of particular papers and 
book chapters were made in view of their relevance to the research questions. 
Moreover, relevant literature were traced and included through citation search of the 
reviewed literature. 
2.2 Evolution of cross-sectoral partnerships in high income country 
settings and at the global governance level  
	  
The conceptualisation of cross-sectoral partnerships is said to be riddled with lack of 
clarity of definitions, lack of a unified theoretical underpinning, lack of consensus on 
demarcations of what type of collaborations count as ‘partnerships’ and a shortage of 
shared categorisations of the different types of partnerships (Barringer and Harrison 
2000, Googins and Rochlin 2000, Osborne 2000, Selsky and Parker 2005, Bryson, 
Crosby et al. 2006, Biermann, Man-san Chan et al. 2007, Mol 2007; p. 2, 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011). Still, the distinction between the different types 
of partnerships is critically important as different meta-types of partnerships ‘face 
different sets of questions, criteria and problems’ (Biermann, Mol et al. 2007; p. 292). 
In this regard, Biermann et al (2007; p. 292) emphasise the critical importance of the 
distinction between ‘the local and national level, on the one hand, and those at the 
transnational, if not global level’.  
This section presents a review of how these different meta-types are understood in 
the literature: partnerships in high-income country settings and at the transnational or 
global level. By drawing out the key issues related to the evolution of partnerships in 
these settings, where the conceptualisation of partnerships is known to be far richer 
than the case of developing countries (Hein 2003, Marques 2014), the section 
provides background for the ensuing discussion of the evidence on cross-sectoral 
partnerships at the national level in developing countries. The section situates the 
emergence of cross-sectoral partnerships within broader changes that occurred in 
global governance.  
In the case of high-income country settings, cross-sectoral partnerships between 
public and private sectors are understood to represent deeper changes in socio-
economic relations in these settings (Glasbergen 2007). Particularly, they are said to 
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be manifestations of an increasingly complex, interdependent and networked society 
that has multiple power centres rather than the traditional state based system of 
government (Bryson and Crosby 1992, Klijn and Teisman 2000). The complex 
interdependence of actors within the network society, whereby the knowledge and 
resources necessary for achieving set outcomes are distributed across public and 
private actors, creates ‘a world in which nobody is in charge’ (Bryson and Crosby 
1992, Klijn and Teisman 2000). In other words, in high income countries, 
‘partnerships fit into a context in which they are incontrovertible’ (Glasbergen 2007; 
p. 4), whereby: 
Public choices have to be made in a multi-actor context, in which private 
actors from the market and civil society need to, and are able to, take 
responsibility for public issues as well (Glasbergen 2011; p.2) 
This turn towards public-private partnerships as public governance mechanisms can 
be traced back to the 1980s, where the systems of governance in the modern 
democratic welfare states experimented with ways of governing that included formal 
and informal networks of public and private actors (Rosenau 2000, Börzel and Risse 
2005). Especially, in the Anglo-American public policy fields, ‘joined up 
government’ and ‘interorganisational collaboration’ were championed as innovative 
public governance solutions by the ‘third way’ politics and the ‘Communitarian Turn’ 
(Kennett 2010; p. 23).  As Rhodes (1996; p. 658) notes:  
As British government creates agencies, bypasses local government, uses 
special purpose to deliver services, and encourages public-private 
partnerships, so networks become increasingly prominent among British 
governing structures’ 
Crucially, these changes are mainly seen as a manifestation of the triumph of 
neoliberalism in these settings in the 1980s, which sought to remedy the perceived 
inefficiencies of the public sector (Klijn and Teisman 2000, Kjaer 2004, Börzel and 
Risse 2005, Kennett 2010). The efficiency argument is considered a deeply political 
one in this regard, whereby it carries the assumption that the ‘private sector’s 
managerial ‘good practice’ will rub off on what are seen as the more inefficient 
public agencies’ (Huxham 1996; p. 3). The aim, according to this ‘neoliberal 
argument’, constitutes one of capitalising on the efficiency of free enterprise for the 
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production and delivery of public goods under the watchful eye of, and legitimacy 
derived from the State (Börzel and Risse 2005). 
These reform agenda in the global north are considered to have made their way to 
global governance processes and to the public policy making realms of developing 
countries through the regulatory policies of the international financial institutions, 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As Kjaer (2004; 
p. 26) observes, they were transferred ‘with little consideration as to whether they 
could be adapted to another cultural, social and economic setting’. Fundamentally, 
the transfer of these policies to the global level is considered to be inevitable. As 
Borzel and Risse (2005) argue, the transfer of these modalities to global governance 
represents a logical sequence of events:  
If the modern welfare-state is no longer autonomous vis-à-vis its own society, 
why should this be different beyond the nation-state? Besides, the degree of 
state autonomy and the ability of states to formulate and attain their own 
goals internally and externally has always varied tremendously in the 
international system. Apart from the great powers, very few states have ever 
enjoyed the privilege to attain complete control and autonomy over their 
internal and external environments (Börzel and Risse 2005; p. 12 - 13). 
The effect has been a transition from what is called a ‘westephelian system of 
international relations’, covering the period running from the end of the second 
world war up to the late 1980s, to the ‘global governance system’ that is said to have 
phased in around the early 1990s (Kickbusch and de Leeuw 1999, Dodgson R, Lee K 
et al. 2002, Bartsch, Hein et al. 2007, McCoy, Chand et al. 2009, Hein and 
Kickbusch 2010; p.15, Kennett 2010, de Leeuw, Townsend et al. 2013). In the case 
of the former, nation states are said to have had exclusive reign over public policy 
processes, within clearly demarcated territorial spaces, whereby they enjoyed an 
‘internal monopoly of legitimate violence’ (Kennett 2010; p 20), and interacted 
externally through international state-centric agencies (Dodgson R, Lee K et al. 2002, 
Hein and Kickbusch 2010, Kennett 2010). In contrast, the era of ‘global governance’ 
heralded a shift from this hierarchical system to a process that is visibly crowded and 
contested, whereby the boundaries between public and private sectors have become 
blurred and governments’ undisputed reign over the policy process has been 
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challenged (Stoker 1998, Dodgson R, Lee K et al. 2002, Hein and Kickbusch 2010, 
Kennett 2010).  
The former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (Annan 2000; p. 8), 
described this transformation and the underlying cause (globalisation) as follows: 
While the post-war multilateral system made it possible for the new 
globalisation to emerge and flourish, globalisation in turn has progressively 
rendered its designs antiquated. Simply put, our post war institutions were 
built for a post war world, but now we live in a global world.  
The new global governance field is accordingly typified by an enhanced 
participation of non-State actors in ‘mixed public/private policy networks’ (Mayntz 
2002; p. 21, Börzel and Risse 2005; p. 2). According to Andonova (2006), the main 
explanations for this proliferation of cross-sectoral partnerships at the global level 
could be categorised into ‘functionalist’ and ‘political’ arguments. The functionalist 
argument holds that cross-sectoral partnerships between governmental agencies, 
multilateral organisations and transnational corporations are necessary to plug 
governance gaps in the traditional state-centric international system (Ruggie 2003, 
Andonova 2006, Bryson, Crosby et al. 2006). This functionalist argument in turn 
invokes the notion of ‘collaborative advantage’, which predicates cross-sectoral 
partnerships on the presence of complex challenges that could not be tackled by any 
one actor. In other words, ‘something has to be achieved that could not have been 
achieved by any one of the partners acting alone’ (Huxham and Vangen 2005, 
Glasbergen 2007; p.5).  
This functionalist perspective emphasises the complexity of challenges and the need 
to pool resources from across different sectors (Kooiman 1993): 
No single actor, public or private, has all knowledge and information 
required to solve complex, dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has 
sufficient overview to make the application of needed instrument effective; no 
single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally in a 
particular governing model (Kooiman 1993; p. 4) 
The political argument on the other hand emphasises the growing power and 
influence of transnational corporations and the voice of an increasingly assertive 
	  
 
26	  
global civil society (Reinicke Wolfgang and Deng 2000, Andonova 2006). Either 
way, the effect has been a global governance system that ‘represents a highly 
contested terrain’, where large numbers of non-state actors have joined in on the 
global pursuit of public goods, wielding variable influence and power (Deacon 2007; 
p. 15, Kennett 2010; p. 28). The underlying driver of these changes is said to be the 
global hegemony of neoliberalism, which is in turn considered to constitute ‘the 
spirit of globalisation’ (Woods 2002, Barnett and Duvall 2005; p. 5). Deacon (2007; 
p. 16)  aptly describes the pervasiveness of the ideology globally as: ‘we live in, and 
against a neoliberal world order’.  
These changes also meant that global public goods would be pursued in ways that 
challenge the sovereignty of nation states. Specifically, the changes meant that 
global public goods and collective threats would be defined and pursued outside of 
the traditional, state centric structures (Fidler 2003, Ruggie 2004, de Leeuw, 
Townsend et al. 2013). As Hein notes, ‘specific aims of global governance 
particularly in the field of welfare policies do not content themselves with 
negotiating global regimes as a means of ‘pooling the sovereignty of nation states’ 
but directly aim at results at the local and individual level’ (Hein 2003; p. 38). In this 
regard, one can look at the way health has been operationalised as a global public 
good, within the set of global targets institutionalised under the rubric of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Hein 2003). As de Leeuw et al (2013) 
note, the provision of public goods is no more an exclusive government affair, but 
involves interactions of government with private and civil society actors.  
This reorientation of the roles of the different types of actors, the pluralisation of 
decision making spaces, and the rise in prominence of networks and partnerships, 
begs the question, ‘what of the role and influence of the nation state?’ This of course 
leads to ideological debates whereby liberalist and neo-marxist conceptions argue 
that interdependence between states and non-state actors has effectively rendered 
obsolete, the neo-realist conception of states as the most important or unitary actors 
(Kjaer 2004). After all, the concept of ‘governance’ itself distinguishes itself from 
‘government’, whereby the former signifies the importance of ‘public-private policy 
networks’ rather than a hierarchical state centred system (Mayntz 2002, Börzel and 
Risse 2005). It constitutes the liberalist perspective that rejects the notion that 
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‘authority is state based’ as it seeks to embrace the ‘increasingly complex and multi-
layered nature of transnational relations’ (Rosenau 2000, Kjaer 2004). 
Still, this does not signify a simple formulation of ‘demise of the state’ and ‘rise of 
private actors/civil society actors’ (Börzel and Risse 2005; p. 1, Kennett 2010; p. 31). 
The state is instead said to have become ‘reconstituted’ (Kennett 2010; p. 31) or 
‘reconfigured’ (Stone 2008; p. 12), whereby there still remain critical roles for the 
nation state (Stone 2008, Kennett 2010). However, this ‘restructured playing field’ 
(Stone 2008) allows non-state actors, who have appropriated authority through 
participating in global public policy, to shape the ‘values, discourses, symbols, 
norms, institutions and practices’ of the playing field (Arthurs 2001; p. 89). 
The picture is more akin with a reorientation of the governance system from the all 
importance of nation states to ‘multi level governance’, in turn representing a system 
of self organising networks at all levels (Bartsch, Hein et al. 2007). In this regard, the 
different levels of governance (global, national and local) are undergoing continuous 
restructuring and the global level is seen to be pertinent at all levels (Bartsch, Hein et 
al. 2007). As Ruggie (2004; p. 400) states, ‘the very systems of States is becoming 
embedded in a broader, albeit still thin and partial, institutionalised arena concerned 
with the production of global public goods’. Also referred to as ‘embedded 
transnationalism’ (Yeates 2008), it refers to ‘interlocking’ of the national public 
domain of countries and the globalisation of public goods such as health (SARS and 
HIV), human rights, labour standards and so on (Kaul, Conceicao et al. 2003). It 
signifies the primacy of these global public goods over and beyond state sovereignty, 
in stark contrast to the traditional organisation of transnational structures around 
state sovereignties (Hein 2003). 
Diane Stone (Stone 2008) describes these sovereignty challenging features of global 
governance by adopting the notion of ‘agora’, which in ancient Greek refers to ‘a 
market place as well as the heart of intellectual life and public discourse’: 
… the global agora is a social and political space – generated by 
globalisation – rather than a physical place…The global agora is also a 
domain of relative disorder and uncertainty where institutions are 
underdeveloped and political authority unclear, and dispersed through 
multiplying institutions and networks. Similar to Plato’s Athenian agora 
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when political discussions took place in the dwelling of a resident foreigner, 
the sovereignty challenging features of global decision-making in semi-
private or quasi-public networks are increasingly apparent.  
 
The section has discussed the emergence of cross-sectoral partnerships in high-
income countries and at the level of global governance. In so doing, the discussion 
situates the evolution of cross-sectoral partnerships within broader set of changes in 
ideological, political, social and economic relations. In terms of global governance, 
the changes have meant that the traditional state based systems of governance have 
been challenged, with contemporary global governance structures and processes 
assuming enhanced roles in the pursuit of public goods within national borders.  
2.3 Implications for national level actors in developing countries 
 
As discussed above, in the multilevel governance system (Van Kersbergen and 
Waarden 2001, Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004), the context for national level 
interactions does not merely constitute the national social, political, economic, 
technological and cultural context, but global governance processes as well (Bartsch, 
Hein et al. 2007; p. 36). In other words, rather than a strict distinction between what 
constitutes the ‘national’ and the ‘global’, ‘the global and national are co-present, 
and interact and intersect in a range of ways’ (Holton 2008; p. 46, Kennett 2010; p. 
21). As Bartsch (2007; p. 23) observes: ‘…[national] actors and their activities are 
shaped by structural economic, political and socio-cultural conditions…for example, 
the world market with its disparities as well as the global political and military field 
of power relations … as frameworks of the actors’ interactions and as the origins of 
their sources of power’. International relations scholars refer to this trend as a 
‘pattern of glocalisation’ in this age of global governance, whereby the boundary 
between ‘national’ and ‘global’ levels of governance is becoming less and less 
distinct (Hein 2002, Rosenau 2002). 
 
The implication of these trends for in-country (national) actors in developing 
countries concerns one of having to live with and adjust to ‘claims generated and 
commitments produced by global health governance processes’ (Hein 2003, de 
Leeuw, Townsend et al. 2013; p. 118). For national actors in developing countries, 
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the ‘more urgent problem’ appears to constitute ‘conflicts’ and ‘adaptive needs’ 
emanating from the integration of the nation and the global; which in turn is far from 
a ‘harmonious process of cooperation’(Hein 2003; p. 38 - 39). In this regard, the 
global Fund’s guiding principles, such as the performance based funding system, are 
said to exemplify the case of global governance mechanisms exerting demands on 
national level policy processes in developing countries (Hein 2002). Moreover, the 
country coordinating mechanisms (CCMs) instituted at the national level in 
developing countries represent instances of critical ‘interfaces’ between the national 
sphere and the global; as interfaces between these levels are said to occur through 
‘concrete projects of development cooperation… [including]  modalities of financial 
support’ (Hein 2003; p. 47).  
The above described situation entails that studies of national level governance 
processes need to take into account these globally instigated demands, through a 
methodological approach that has come to be known as  ‘methodological glocalism’ 
(Holton 2008; p. 46, Kennett 2010; p. 21). In the case of this study, this issue is ever 
more pertinent as CCMs essentially represent one of the critical interfaces between 
the ‘national’ and the ‘global’. Hence, the demands generated by global governance 
structures and processes on national actors and governance processes would need to 
be given due attention in this study.  
The next section discusses the changes discussed in relation to global governance 
structures and processes from the point of view of the health field. 
2.4 Health as a global public good in global governance 
	  
Global health represents one of the fields where the neoliberal agenda was pursued 
with intensity through the international development banks (World Bank and IMF), 
which were growing in prominence in the global development scene in the 1980s. 
Through policy prescriptions that are infamously known as structural adjustment 
programmes, these institutions pushed for market based reforms, which in turn 
championed a greater role for the private sector (Lloyd-Sherlock 2005, Koivusalo 
and Ollila 2008). The push for global public-private partnerships was also predicated 
on rectifying the inefficiencies and bureaucratic traditions of multilateral UN 
agencies in transnational action, by tapping into the knowledge, resources and 
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efficient ways of private foundations and transnational corporations (Ngoasong 
2009). At the same time, with the appointment of Director General Gro Harlem 
Bruntlandt in 1998, the World Health Organisation (WHO) had started to make 
reforms that were considered as being equivalent to aligning itself with ‘the World 
Bank’s health care policies’ (Lloyd-Sherlock 2005, Koivusalo and Ollila 2008).  
Ngoasong (2009; p. 952) describes the emergence of Global Public-Private 
Partnerships (GPPPs) for health in the 1990s as constituting a conflation of 
contrasting narratives related to allaying global ills: ‘public health (WHO), human 
rights (UNCHR), economistic (WTO and World Bank) and counter-narratives to 
dominant views (carried by the emerging global civil society)’. This tension between 
the legitimacy claims of these different sectors is exemplified in a speech made by 
the then Director General of WHO, Gro Harlem Brundtland, to the Executive Board 
of the WHO in 2000, where she framed the challenges of ensuring access to 
medicine as: ‘a moral problem, a political problem and a problem of credibility for 
the global market system’ (Brundtland 2000, Ngoasong 2009).  
In any case, this era represented an unprecedented level of openness to partnerships 
with the private sector, on the part of WHO, for the treatment of particular treatments 
(vertical approach), which is in turn seen as an abandonment of its long upheld 
commitments to ‘Health for All’ (horizontal approach) (Koivusalo and Ollila 2008; p. 
169). This transformation can be traced in the change in the discourse in key public 
health declarations. While the Alma-Ata declaration on primary health care (1978) 
focused on the interface between government institutions and the community as a 
means for advancing health for all, the Commission on Social Determinants of 
Health report (CSDH, 2008) stressed a multi-actor engagement, beyond nation states, 
to alleviate global health equity concerns (de Leeuw, Townsend et al. 2013). In this 
regard, Maciocco and Stefanini (2007; p. 486) state that the establishment of the 
Global Fund exemplifies these shifts from a publicly funded health for all approach 
to a ‘private influenced’ vertical approach to diseases. Hein makes a similar claim in 
reference to Global Health Public-Private Partnerships in general: 
The Global Health Public private Partnerships era reflects a deeper 
transformation of the global governance era; abandonment of the health for 
all agenda, a re-orientation towards fighting specific diseases, a new 
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narrative of health as a global public good and a tendency towards 
demonstrating measurable results at the local levels. (Hein 2003; p. 47) 
The latter half of the 20th century also represents a period where the dominance of 
the biomedical model was countered by the ‘social model of health’, breaking the 
monopoly of medical professionals on the field globally and opening it up for 
involvement of non traditional actors (de Leeuw, Townsend et al. 2013). Hence, the 
transformation towards global health and the proliferation of new actors also 
encompasses a leap towards inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary approaches (de 
Leeuw, Townsend et al. 2013). 
This section provides an account of how the proliferation of cross-sectoral 
partnerships is understood within the health field. Accordingly, global public-private 
partnerships are understood to represent deeper changes in global health, such as the 
triumph of selective, vertical approaches over horizontal, health for all commitments. 
The proliferation of global public-private partnerships also reflects the ways in 
which traditionally prominent players such as the WHO ceded control to the Global 
financial institutions and other emerging actors, such as the Global Fund. The 
pluralisation of global health governance spaces also reflects increasing tendencies to 
multi-disciplinary approaches, in a field that has long been heavily dominated by the 
biomedical approach. 
Now the chapter moves to discussing the conceptualisation of cross-sectoral 
partnerships and the factors that are understood to influence cross-sectoral 
interactions between actors in and around partnerships.  
2.5 Conceptualisations of cross-sectoral partnerships  
	  
The conceptualisation of cross-sectoral partnerships is said to be characterised by 
what has been aptly coined as a ‘halo-effect’, whereby conceptualisations of 
partnerships are seen to be likely to appraise partnerships positively rather than 
adopting a more critical outlook (Barringer and Harrison 2000, Buse and Harmer 
2004). This trend is very prominent that some authors have suggested using less 
‘value-laden’ terms than ‘partnerships’, such as ‘public private interactions’ (Buse 
and Harmer 2004, Richter 2004). Indeed, ‘many authors celebrate public-private 
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partnerships as a significant solution to a whole variety of problems of governance 
beyond the nation-state...’ (Börzel and Risse 2005; p.1).  
At the global level, partnerships are generally seen as embodying promises of 
rectifying existing imbalances in levels of participation between the more powerful 
and the less powerful, the resource rich and the resource poor, and northern and 
southern actors; thereby carrying ‘an explicit egalitarian agenda’ (Contu and Girei 
2013). They are also said ‘… to increase both the effectiveness (problem solving 
capacity) and the legitimacy of international governance in terms of democratic 
participation and accountability’ (Börzel and Risse 2005; p. 1). Most importantly, as 
discussed in the previous sections, they are seen as timely, multi-sectoral responses 
to complex and multidimensional social problems, both at national and global levels 
(Andonova 2006, McQuaid 2010). 
There is also a clear push from governments in the global north and funding agencies 
towards adoption of partnership approaches, even when there is little evidence that 
they will work or that they constitute an appropriate modality for the task at hand 
(Barringer and Harrison 2000, Ostrower 2005, Bryson, Crosby et al. 2006). However, 
a ‘clear hiatus’ exists between ‘the promise and practice of partnerships’ across these 
effectiveness, inclusiveness and egalitarian claims (Brinkerhoff 2002, Contu and 
Girei 2013). Generally, partnerships are said to represent ‘an increasingly practised 
but poorly understood phenomenon’ (Googins and Rochlin 2000, Selsky and Parker 
2005). 
In terms of how these mechanisms are studied, the functionalist understanding of 
partnerships has meant that studies overwhelmingly ‘discuss them in functional, 
normative and managerial terms’ (Selsky and Parker 2005; p. 866). This in turn 
renders studies of partnerships to be bereft of analysis of the ‘underlying institutional 
dynamics, including power’, and leaves the ‘political dimension’ of such interactions 
largely unexplored (Selsky and Parker 2005; p. 867, Bull and McNeill 2007). 
Particularly, the understanding of the ‘embeddedness’ of partnerships in national 
contexts is less explored (Selsky and Parker 2005; p. 866). Consequently, the designs 
of the different global partnership approaches and models are seldom seen to reflect 
the contextual uniqueness of the host, developing countries; instead reflecting the 
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contrasting approaches of the different donors that are involved in the partnership 
mechanisms (Brinkerhoff 2002).   
At the theoretical level, the study of partnerships represents a highly disparate field 
of study, whereby there is critical lack of convergence of conceptual understandings 
as well as lack of consensus on the critical issues of importance (Barringer and 
Harrison 2000, Osborne 2000, Selsky and Parker 2005, Bryson, Crosby et al. 2006). 
Cross-sectoral partnerships constitute real-world phenomenon that naturally cut 
across organisational and sectoral boundaries, and are hence studied through 
different disciplines, including: ‘organisation studies, public policy and 
administration, economics, nonprofit management, health care, education and the 
natural environment’ (Selsky and Parker 2005). They are studied across different 
disciplines in quite disparate manners (McQuaid 2000, Brinkerhoff 2002, Bryson, 
Crosby et al. 2006, Biermann, Mol et al. 2007). Accordingly, there has been lack of a 
unified theory to explain how partnerships behave and function, as well as to guide 
empirical analysis in the area. For instance while sociological approaches focus on 
institutional factors, the public management literature has largely been engaged with 
process related issues (Bryson, Crosby et al. 2006). 
At the other end, ‘the empirical literature on the subject [of Global Public Private 
Partnerships] is not well developed and sometimes rather imprecise’ (Börzel and 
Risse 2005; p. 1). While many case studies exist on partnerships in general, the 
‘more general theoretical basis for understanding and analysing them remains poorly 
developed’(McQuaid 2000; p. 9). This weakness is reflective of a much broader 
symptom of the study of public policy issues, whereby Schlager (1999) observed:  
the field of policy studies is characterized by ‘mountain islands of theoretical 
structure, intermingled with and occasionally attached together by foothills 
of shared methods and concepts, and empirical work, all of which is 
surrounded by oceans of descriptive work not attached (Schlager 1999; p. 
14), as quoted in Walt et al. (Walt, Shiffman et al. 2008; p. 315) and Sabatier 
(Sabatier 2007; p. 323) 
Accordingly, the critical issues to be addressed regarding the study of cross-sectoral 
partnerships relate to how studies can capture the ‘messiness of partnership practice 
in more complex models’ and how they can be ‘theoretically precise’ while doing 
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this (Selsky and Parker 2005, Bryson, Crosby et al. 2006). In other words, analytical 
approaches need to recognise that public-private partnerships are complex entities 
whose conduct is an outcome of the dynamic interactions between the participating 
actors and the particular context in which they are embedded (Huxham and Vangen 
1996, Osborne and Murray 2000). Analytical approaches also need to be weary of, 
and eschew terms that reflect the normative presumptions of partnerships, such as 
‘equitable’ contribution by all stakeholders and so on (Schäferhoff, Campe et al. 
2009). Empirical studies should rather be testing such claims through scrutiny of 
real-life practices (Schäferhoff, Campe et al. 2009). 
In summary, conceptualisations of cross-sectoral partnerships are known to be 
uncritical as they are influenced by the virtuous attributes implied by collaboration of 
actors within cross-sectoral partnerships. The mechanisms are also studied across 
different disciplines in quite disparate manners, whereby there is lack of a holistic 
understanding of the mechanisms and a cumulative enrichment of our theoretical 
understanding in the area. The functionalist approach to partnerships has also 
resulted in the neglect of how partnerships interact with the wider context and how 
critical concepts such as power influence interactions between actors. 
The next section focuses on the neglect of power in conceptualisations of cross-
sectoral partnerships. 
2.6 The neglect of ‘power’ in conceptualisations of cross-sectoral 
partnerships  
	  
While it is widely recognised that analysis of the power relationship between actors 
is critical for understanding cross-sectoral partnership mechanisms, power remains a 
highly neglected, under-researched concept within the body of literature studying 
cross-sectoral partnerships in particular, and governance mechanisms in general 
(Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004; p. 340, Barnett and Duvall 2005, Huxham and 
Vangen 2005, Bartsch, Hein et al. 2007; p. 30). As Buse and Harmer (2004; P. 50) 
observe, ‘…questions of power go to the heart of much that is contentious about PPP 
[Public-Private Partnerships]…’.  Barnett and Duvall (2005) describe this neglect as 
follows:  ‘With only slight exaggeration, much of the scholarship on global 
governance proceeds as if power either does not exist or is of minor importance’. 
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The neglect of ‘power’ is a pervasive problem that manifests in the field of health 
policy analysis in general (Walt and Gilson 1994, Buse 2007, Gilson and Raphaely 
2008, Walt, Shiffman et al. 2008). 
The neglect of power is said to be a reflection of new conceptualisations that have 
sought to capture the pluralisation and increasing complexity of public policy 
processes (Kennett 2010). As Kennett (2010; p. 25) observes, ‘‘… there has been a 
shift from direct forms of governance to a process of governance exercised through a 
plurality of actors, sites, spatial scales, and processes, with an increasing reliance by 
governments on informal forms of power and influence rather than on formal 
authority’. Indeed, the word governance itself is a recent introduction into the 
lexicon of international relations and development, which further signifies that the 
change has been whole encompassing (Rosenau 2002).  
The shift has even resulted in formation of new fields of studies: ‘Global 
Governance’ (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992, Rosenau 2002), ‘Global Public Policy’ 
(Stone 2008)’, ‘Global Social Policy’ (Deacon 2007) and ‘Global Health 
Governance’(Kickbusch and de Leeuw 1999, Dodgson R, Lee K et al. 2002, McCoy, 
Chand et al. 2009, Hein and Kickbusch 2010). These new fields of study are 
essentially seeking to make sense of the interaction of ‘multiple and fluid regimes 
and  ... the role of actors, events, laws, and policies that fall outside the traditional 
boundaries of the state’, (MacRae 2006; p. 527, Kennett 2010; p. 20). The objects of 
study are accordingly conceived as constituting a ‘cooperative government’ as 
opposed to an ‘interventionist’ one, and an enhanced participation of non state actors 
in ‘mixed public/private policy networks’ (Mayntz 2002; p. 21, Börzel and Risse 
2005; p. 2). 
These have in turn resulted in an infusion of new concepts, theories and 
terminologies at the expense of concepts that had traditionally formed the mainstay 
of academic and professional discourse, such as ‘power’ and ‘government’. Arts and 
Van Tatenhove (2004; P. 339) translated Hajer’s (2003; p. 39) description of these 
changes from an article written in Dutch:  
During the last decade, terms of ‘governance’, ‘institutional capacity’, 
‘networks’, ‘complexity’, ‘discourses’, ‘trust’, ‘deliberation’ and 
‘interdependence’ have captured our analytic imagination, whereas terms as 
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‘state’, ‘government’, ‘power’ and ‘authority’, ‘loyalty’, ‘sovereignty’, 
‘participation’ and ‘interest groups’ have obviously lost their attractiveness. 
In the case of cross-sectoral partnerships, the pursuit of common goals and the 
‘presumption of cooperation’ entailed by partnership arrangements are seen as 
deflecting the attention away from ‘power’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005, Huxham and 
Vangen 2005; p. 174). In such collaborative contexts, ‘politics (and policy) is often 
portrayed as being situated between ‘power’ and ‘rationality’, between the furthering 
of crude interests and substantive argumentation’(Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004; p. 
339). In addition, the neglect of power is also related to the inherent shortcomings of 
contemporary analytical tools and theoretical perspectives, which have not 
effectively incorporated the concept of power, as in the case of actor network theory 
(ANT) (Potvin and Clavier 2013) and neo-institutionalist theories (Arts and Van 
Tatenhove 2004). 
2.7 Factors that influence cross-sectoral interactions in developing 
countries 
 
This section presents a review of the factors that are highlighted in the literature as 
critical for the conduct of cross-sectoral partnerships in real-life. In this regard, both 
the conceptual and empirical evidence on factors that influence cross-sectoral 
interactions in and around partnerships are presented. The section focuses on cross-
sectoral interactions that occur in developing country settings. Accordingly, section 
2.7.1 discusses the evidence related to the role of the State in terms of how cross-
sectoral partnerships function, while sections 2.7.2, 2.7.3 and 2.7.4 discuss the 
evidence related to the role and positions of CSOs, donor agencies and the private 
sector, respectively. Finally section 2.9.5 discusses the process related factors that 
are cited in the literature as influencing cross-sectoral interactions between actors in 
and around partnership mechanisms.  
2.7.1 Domination by the State 
	  
The role of the State within cross-sectoral partnership mechanisms constitutes an 
under-conceptualised issue, mainly due to the emphasis given to ‘networks, flows 
and fluids’ as ‘organizing principles’ in the post modernist literature (Arts and Van 
Tatenhove 2004, Mol 2007; P. 226). In this regard, the role of nation states in 
	  
 
37	  
developing countries represents one of the least understood issues in the study of 
cross-sectoral partnerships (Hein 2003, Marques 2014). 
However, the reviewed empirical evidence on cross-sectoral partnership mechanisms 
in developing countries overwhelmingly indicates that these mechanisms are 
dominated by the public sector. Based on the body of evidence coming from the 
study of CCMs, public sectors, specifically, Ministry of Health offices, are seen to 
dominate these cross-sectoral interactions (Brugha, Donoghue et al. 2004, Grace 
2004, Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005, Stillman and Bennett 2005, Banteyerga, Kidanu et al. 
2006, Biesma, Brugha et al. 2009, Spicer, Aleshkina et al. 2010). In a study 
assessing the sector wide effects of the Global Fund in 3 countries (Benin, Ethiopia 
and Malawi), Stillman and Bennett (2005) report that the partnerships were 
dominated by the government. They  (Stillman and Bennett 2005; p. xx) further 
explain that this was down to the ‘mistrust’ and ‘tension’ between governments on 
the one hand, and CSOs and the private sector on the other, which they said was 
‘most acute in Ethiopia’ 
Similarly, in a study that set out to track the conduct of the Global Fund shortly after 
its establishment, Brugha et al (2004) documented a trend of dominance of the public 
sector within CCMs instituted in 3 out of the 4 countries of study. Specifically, in 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, the public sector was seen to be ‘overly dominant’ in 
the CCM, going as far as involving in the selection of representatives from other 
sectors, while in Mozambique, the relationships were said to be ‘reasonably equal 
between constituent groups’ (Brugha, Donoghue et al. 2004; p. 97). It was reported 
that ‘public airing of views after a contentious CCM process’ had contributed to ‘a 
new willingness of all partners to work together’ in the case of Mozambique (Brugha, 
Donoghue et al. 2004). Based on another multi-country Global Fund tracking study, 
Brugha et al (2005) highlight nuanced differences across study countries regarding 
the relationship between state and non-state actors. They state that, ‘overt criticism 
of government was seen as less acceptable in Zambia and Tanzania, in contrast to 
Uganda’ (Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005; p. 11). Reasons for the inter-country differences 
were not offered in the study.  
A multi-country study conducted across 8 countries with the aim of assessing the 
effect of Global Health Initiatives (GHIs) such as the Global Fund, PEPFAR 
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(President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) and GAVI (the Global Vaccine 
Alliance) on HIV/AIDS programmes’ coordination mechanisms found that the CCM 
had enhanced the participation of non-State actors and public sector offices outside 
of the Ministry of Health (MoH) (Spicer, Aleshkina et al. 2010). However, the study 
further points out that the CCMs were still dominated by the MoH, whereby the role 
of non-health ministries and non-State actors in national and sub-national 
coordination structures ‘remained relatively modest’ (Spicer, Aleshkina et al. 2010; p. 
9).  
Similarly, based on their study of multi-stakeholder partnerships for water and 
sanitation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Stewart and Gray (2006; P. 375) concluded that, 
‘rather than offering genuine partnership with full participation, they [partnerships] 
tend to give governments a privileged position as partners, while other stakeholders 
have a voice but are not considered as equal partners’. Based on case studies of 
international partnerships, Visseren-Hamakers et al (2007; p. 166) also conclude that 
the international partnership mechanisms had ‘reinforced existing power 
asymmetries’; more so amongst the different sectors within the developing countries 
partaking in the international partnership mechanism than vertically between in-
country and global actors. Their observation is that governments in the developing 
countries dominated the other in-country actors participating in the international 
partnership arrangement.  
Conversely, Miraftab (2004) concludes from a case study in South Africa that it is 
not necessarily the State that dominates such cross-sectoral partnership mechanisms 
in developing countries, but the actor that happens to have more influence and power 
in the particular situation and field of action. In the case of their study of a cross-
sectoral partnership mechanism instituted in relation to a national housing 
programme for the poor in South Africa (Miraftab 2004), it is private sector interests 
that represent the powerful voice, thereby dominating the partnership mechanism. 
Miraftab (2004) attributed this domination by the private sector to the absence of a 
strong mediation role from the State due to concomitant decentralisation processes 
that effectively precluded interventions from the regulatory authorities of the central 
government.  
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In terms of the factors that underlie this relationship of domination, Brugha et al 
(2005; p.11) make an observation, through their multi-country Global Fund tracking 
studies, that the tension between CSOs and the public sectors in the countries of 
study emanated from ‘conflicting views around the meaning of partnership [which in 
turn] reflect fundamental ideological differences around legitimacy and the role of 
government’. For Miraftab (2004; p. 92), the most important issue determining the 
power relationships within partnerships relates to the way the partnership mechanism 
‘originates’, specifically, the question of ‘who initiated the process and sought 
partnership with the other sectors’.  
Some of the empirical studies on cross-sectoral partnerships in developing countries 
have reflected on whether partnerships have an equalising effect on power 
imbalances between different actors: public, private and civil society. In this regard, 
the empirical evidence seems to support conceptualisations that assert that 
partnerships actually ‘reproduce or even intensify’ existing inequalities in 
relationships between actors (Lister 1999, Bartsch and Kohlmorgen 2006, Biermann, 
Man-san Chan et al. 2007; p. 254). Visseren-Hamakers et al (2007; P. 165) conclude 
that it is ‘extremely difficult to change power imbalances through partnerships’. In 
Global Health Partnerships, Bartsch and Kohlmorgen (2006) note that participation 
of governments and CSOs from the south does not translate into relocation of power 
away from powerful northern states and transnational corporations. This ineptness of 
partnership mechanisms to affect existing power relationships has caused some 
authors to describe cross-sectoral partnerships as ‘inadequate and halfway 
governance innovations’ (Bäckstrand 2006, Mol 2007; p. 225).  
In summary, although the role of the State in cross-sectoral partnerships in 
developing countries is under conceptualised, the overwhelming evidence from 
empirical investigations of partnerships in developing countries indicates that the 
mechanisms are highly dominated by governments. Upon reflecting on whether 
partnerships have an equalising effect on the imbalance of power between actors, the 
studies confirm conceptualisations that claim that partnerships have no effect on 
power relationships, and that they could rather intensify existing imbalances. While 
the factors that underlie these relationships of domination have not been explored 
well, some of the studies suggest that this could be due to ideological differences, 
lack of trust and the way partnerships are designed. It terms of the role of the design 
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of partnerships, the studies have emphasised the importance of who gets to invite 
others into the partnerships, suggesting that the actor that gets to initiate the 
partnership is bound to be primed to play a powerful role in due interactions. 
2.7.2 The Role and position of CSOs in cross-sectoral partnerships 
	  
The inclusion of civil society in governance mechanisms is believed to enhance the 
legitimacy and moral authority of the mechanisms by facilitating the communication 
between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’ (Reinicke Wolfgang and Deng 2000, Börzel and 
Risse 2005). The term is often used as a catch-phrase to enhance the credibility and 
good virtues of governance mechanisms (Börzel and Risse 2005). In reality however, 
they present a more complicated picture as they are said to suffer from an inherent 
legitimacy crisis. In this regard, CSOs draw their legitimacy from claims of 
involvement in tackling social ills and from legal recognitions extended to them by 
governments, rather than through popular representation such as through elections 
(Börzel and Risse 2005). In addition, their participation in the ‘alms bazaar’ (raising 
funds from donors) is said to compromise their claims of moral authority (Doyle and 
Patel 2008, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011; p. 5). 
 
They also suffer from a range of complications owing to the heterogeneity of what 
the term ‘civil society organisations’ represents. This heterogeneity includes: 
differences in levels of participation between those who make it into governance 
mechanisms and those who do not (‘participatory gap’); difference in influence 
between the highly resourced northern CSOs and their southern counterparts 
(thereby replicating existing inequalities between the two worlds, leading some to 
consider CSOs as part of the neoliberal hegemony); and domination of some CSOs 
by elites, instead of them being governed by representatives of the wider public 
(Reinicke Wolfgang and Deng 2000, Keohane and Nye 2001, Börzel and Risse 
2005). For CSOs, partnerships are also considered to entail the risk of co-optation by 
the public sector, as close working relationships remove confrontational stances 
instead leading to cosy settlements (Meadowcroft 2007).  
The common thread across the reviewed empirical studies on cross-sectoral 
partnerships in developing countries highlights the lack of capacity on the part of 
CSOs in developing countries, to engage effectively in partnership mechanisms 
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(Lister and Nyamugasira 2003, Spicer, Harmer et al. 2011, Harmer, Spicer et al. 
2013). Regarding whether participating in partnership mechanisms boosts the 
position of CSOs, the case study of the international partnership mechanism 
discussed in section 2.7.1 (Visseren-Hamakers, Arts et al. 2007; p. 166) concluded: 
‘… the existing weak position of the Southern NGOs in local intersectoral relations 
has been incorporated in and reinforced by the partnerships’. They further note that it 
is ‘extremely difficult’ for partnerships to ‘emancipate civil society in the South’ 
unless the partnership ‘is proactively managed with this emancipatory goal in mind’ 
(Visseren-Hamakers, Arts et al. 2007; p. 166).  
Still, studies have documented that CSOs, despite any difficulties they may be facing 
or however subordinate their positions may be in partnerships, value the long-term 
effects entailed by their involvements in partnership mechanisms, specifically, in 
terms of building trust with the public sector. The study of the Global Fund’s system 
wide effects in Ethiopia, Benin and Malawi (Stillman and Bennett 2005) had 
reported back in 2005 that: 
While it is probably too early to say, in both Benin and Ethiopia, some 
respondents felt that there was the prospect that the new forms of 
public/private partnership fostered by GF support might have a lasting 
impact, in terms of improved trust and cooperation between public and 
private sectors. 
Similarly, Harmer et al (2013; p. 105) report that the interactions within the CCM 
had in fact enhanced relationships between CSOs and the public sector and had 
helped ‘to erode the stereotypes each sector has of the other’. A DFID commissioned 
study that assessed the experiences of 5 countries in the first round of funding from 
the Global Fund (Grace 2004; p. 24) reported a peculiar finding that in one of the 
countries of study (country unnamed), the proposal writing process had improved the 
relationship between CSOs and the government, only for relationships to ‘regress 
again’ after the grants were secured.  
Furthermore, studies have documented that the way CSOs are recruited into CCMs 
could sow divisions amongst constituencies due to competition for resources 
(Cáceres, Girón et al. 2010, Spicer, Harmer et al. 2011) and because those who make 
it into partnerships are then seen as having access to and connections with public 
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sector officials (Doyle and Patel 2008, Kapilashrami and O'Brien 2012). In addition, 
the empirical evidence suggests that the organisation and constellation of civil 
society actors is also influenced by demands emanating from partnership 
mechanisms. Through case studies looking at interactions between the regulatory 
regimes of the Global Fund and CSOs in India, Kapilashrami and O’Brien (2012; p. 
448) observe that, ‘the imposition of global structures and ideas on local systems 
facilitates a reconfiguration of non-state actors around newer forms of expertise and 
power centres’. Specifically, the effect of the demands from the Global Fund are 
reported as having selective impacts whereby it was seen to have offered some 
networks ‘greater visibility and leverage’, while it had ‘threatened the existence of 
others’ (Kapilashrami and O'Brien 2012; p. 442). 
Harmer et al also captured the variable experiences of different CSOs with the CCM 
as they note:  
‘[on the one hand] interviewees regarded the CCM as an important platform 
for advocacy; on the other, many respondents still regarded the CCM as a 
government-controlled institution, and thus inimical to CSO advocacy efforts’ 
(Harmer, Spicer et al. 2013; p.105).  
Hence, while the involvement of CSOs is generally seen in good light and is 
considered to engender a sense of accountability into cross-sectoral partnerships,  
CSOs are known to suffer from inherent challenges related to their constitution and 
make-up. The reviewed empirical evidence has mainly documented the capacity 
challenges that CSOs face in their efforts to engage effectively in partnership 
mechanisms. Partnership mechanisms are further seen as affecting the constitution of 
CSOs as they place different demands that affect different CSOs differentially. 
Despite the challenges, the partnership mechanisms are seen as inspiring hope for 
CSOs in terms of improving their relationship with the public sector.  
2.7.3 The role of donors in cross-sectoral partnerships 
	  
While the empirical evidence on cross-sectoral partnerships has little to say about the 
role and positions of donors in CCMs and other partnership mechanisms in 
developing countries, there is some evidence that CSOs have generally been calling 
for an enhanced involvement from donors to moderate the influence of the public 
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sector. In this regard, it has been document that CSOs have implored the Global 
Fund to assume a more proactive stance to curb the trend of ‘government ownership’ 
in the name of ‘country ownership’ (Bartsch 2007; P. 156). The multi-country 
Global Fund tracking study (Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005; p. 11) had also noted that the 
Fund had often been criticised for having an ‘excessively light touch’ in terms of 
enforcing the guidelines outlining the composition and relative role of actors in 
countries of operation. With this in mind, the study recommended that in-country 
donors get involved more in order to ‘support government and civil society forge 
partnerships …’(Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005).  
2.7.4 The role of the private sector in cross-sectoral partnerships 
	  
Similarly, the evidence on the role and position of the private sector in developing 
countries is quite sparse. Generally, the evidence indicates that private sector actors 
occupy the lowest position within CCMs in developing countries. A review of the 
conduct of global health initiatives (GHIs) in developing countries (Biesma, Brugha 
et al. 2009) reports that government dominated CCMs in developing countries 
appear to be particularly inimical to the ‘private for profit sector’. The study 
assessing the system wide effects of the Global Fund in 3 countries (Benin, Ethiopia, 
and Malawi)(Stillman and Bennett 2005) indicated that the position of the private for 
profit sector is particularly precarious in Ethiopia, compared to the other countries of 
study: 
However, in countries where there was a lack of trust between public and 
private sectors, government-dominated CCMs had been reluctant to include 
strong private for-profit stakeholders. This was particularly the case in 
Ethiopia… (Stillman and Bennett 2005; p. 36) 
2.7.5 Process related factors 
	  
The reviewed empirical evidence on partnerships have documented a range of 
process related factors that are considered to influence cross-sectoral interactions in 
and around partnership mechanisms in developing countries. The factors that are 
cited in the literature in this regard are related to the different stages of the 
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partnership process, that is, spanning the lifecycle of partnerships, from 
establishment of partnership mechanisms through to the decision-making processes.  
Regarding the initial establishment stage, studies of partnership processes have 
highlighted that the way stakeholder categories are defined and the question of who 
gets to be designated as a stakeholder often constitute ‘contentious steps that are 
often based on elusive processes and arbitrary choices’ (Schäferhoff, Campe et al. 
2009; P. 455). These decisions have ramifications for the power relationships 
between those included in the partnerships and those who fail to make the cut based 
on the requirements placed by the partnership mechanisms (Börzel and Risse 2005, 
Doyle and Patel 2008, Spicer, Harmer et al. 2011, Kapilashrami and O'Brien 2012).  
The other pertinent process related factor relates to the processes of deliberations 
established within partnerships. As Schaferhoff notes, the level of participation of 
actors is adjudicated on the basis of whether stakeholders are ‘formally included in 
the decision-making processes’ and whether the ‘included actors have equal 
opportunities to participate’ (Schäferhoff, Campe et al. 2009; p. 464). Regarding the 
latter, deliberative processes are said to be prone to being influenced by power 
imbalances within partnership arrangements. Accordingly, Brown (2010) states that 
constitutional safeguards would need to be actively designed with the goal of 
‘[insulating] (as much as possible) the process of deliberation from asymmetric 
influences and ‘colonisation’ usually associated with power and wealth’ (Brown 
2010; p. 512). Based on the study of the Global Fund’s decision making processes at 
the Board level, Brown (2010) explains that the procedural safeguards of the Board 
could not ensure ‘genuine deliberation’, due to the ability of donors to ‘blackmail’ 
members from developing countries on the basis of future funding (Brown 2010).  
The other factor that is cited in the partnership studies in developing countries relates 
to the capacity of actors. In this regard, capacity challenges are said to be related to 
the usage of the language of interaction, other skills such as advocacy skills and lack 
of resources in general. Based on his study of the deliberation processes at the 
Global Fund’s Board of Directors, Brown (2010; p. 529) observes that … ‘cultural 
and linguistic differences and inequalities’ threaten the achievement of ‘genuine 
deliberation’. A survey of CCM members in 13 countries (Doupe and Flavell 2004) 
reports that use of the English language has become problematic for local PLWHA 
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association representatives. In their report of a multi-country study of national and 
sub-national HIV/AIDS coordination mechanisms, Spicer et al (2010; p. 10) 
highlight factors that hamper optimal participation of CSOs, including, ‘limited 
experience among most CSOs of engaging in strategic or political decision making’.  
Similarly, a DFID multi-country study assessing the experiences of countries in the 
first round of funding from the Global Fund (Grace 2004) found that the lack of 
capacity amongst some actors involved not just their understanding of technical 
issues but knowledge of ‘the fundamental operations of government’. Harmer et al 
(2013; p. 306) call upon the Global Fund to put aside funds for building the 
capacities of CSOs to engage with the public sector effectively, while Doupe and 
Flavell (Doupe and Flavell 2004) outline the specific areas in which PLWHA 
representatives would require capacity building support. Harmer et al (2013) 
similarly identified the lack of ‘evidence gathering skills’ amongst CSOs as one of 
the impediments to their advocacy efforts and engagements with the public sector. 
The other process related factor concerns challenges related to the task of effectively 
representing constituencies in cross-sectoral partnerships (Huxham and Vangen 
1996). Beyond the practical challenges related to relaying information between the 
decision-making processes and constituencies, representatives are said to face 
dilemma between the interests of their constituencies, their own organisation and that 
of the partnership (Meadowcroft 2007, Potvin and Clavier 2013). Multi-country 
CCM case studies have highlighted the challenges associated with the task of 
effective representing one’s constituencies (Brugha, Donoghue et al. 2004, Brugha, 
Cliff et al. 2005). Brugha et al (2004) quote a multi-lateral representative to 
exemplify the challenges that are inherent to the task of representing one’s 
constituencies: “The CCM consists of individuals. There are no structures for within-
constituency representativeness and consultation” (Brugha, Donoghue et al. 2004; p. 
97). In the other multi-country Global Fund tracking study (Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005), 
Brugha et al highlight allegations of conflicts of interests of CCM members; thereby 
emphasising the tension that lies between representing constituencies and advancing 
the interests of one’s own organisation within the CCM.  
Leaders of cross-sectoral partnerships are said have a significant role in influencing 
how partnerships are run, ‘constrained though they may be’ (Bryson, Crosby et al. 
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2006P; 52, Biermann, Man-san Chan et al. 2007). However, the empirical evidence 
in this regard is seen to be very scanty. Only one study, a Global Fund multi-country 
CCM assessment highlighted the critical role played by CCM chairpersons (GFATM 
2008). In this regard, the report specifically underscored the importance of the 
personal qualities of the chairpersons, over and beyond their sectoral affiliations: ‘It 
was less important whether the chair was from government, civil society or NGOs; 
his or her personal qualities alone determined efficacious CCM 
functioning’(GFATM 2008; p. 5). 
Within studies of CCMs, another prominent process related factor concerns the role-
played by consultants in the country proposal development process. The DFID 
commissioned study that documents the experiences of 5 countries in the first round 
of funding from the Global Fund (Grace 2004) highlighted that some countries had 
relied  heavily on external consultants and that the ‘contextual appropriateness’ of 
the external inputs were questionable. This is confirmed by a case study of the CCM 
in Tanzania (Starling, Brugha et al. 2005, Biesma, Brugha et al. 2009) (part of the 
multi-country Global Fund tracking study (Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005)), which found 
that the influence of WHO consultants had made the country apply for support for 
ART programme, while the locally identified need lay with getting support for work 
on orphans and vulnerable children. The DFID study (Grace 2004) goes on to 
explain that the competitive bidding process for Global Fund grants fuelled this 
quest for external inputs.  
Another process related factor that was predominantly reported across the different 
studies on CCMs relates to the time bound nature of the country proposal 
development process. Banteyerga et al’s (2006) study of the Ethiopian CCM 
highlights that the time constraints had in effect resulted in the routinisation of easy 
to accomplish tasks such as procurement of drugs in the action plans of the country 
proposals prepared for successive grants. Other country experiences resonate with 
this finding (The Alliance 2002, Brugha, Donoghue et al. 2004, Doupe and Flavell 
2004, Grace 2004, Spicer, Aleshkina et al. 2010). For instance, Brugha et al (2004; p. 
97) state that: ‘CCM members in Tanzania and Uganda reported … they had only 
48hrs to review draft proposals’. The DFID multi-country study assessing the 
experiences of 5 countries with the first round of funding from the Global Fund 
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(Grace 2004) noted that the time pressure had affected the participation of CSOs and 
the private sector. 
2.8 Chapter Summary 
	  
This chapter has presented a review of the literature in relation to the conceptual 
understanding of cross-sectoral partnerships and the empirical evidence regarding 
the factors that influence the conduct of cross-sectoral partnerships in developing 
country settings. In this regard, the first part of the chapter has presented how cross-
sectoral partnerships are understood to have evolved in high-income country settings 
and at the level of global governance. In so doing, the chapter has attempted to 
situate the evolution of cross-sectoral partnerships within the broader set of political, 
social and economic changes that underlie the proliferation of these mechanisms. 
Accordingly, the proliferation of cross-sectoral partnerships is understood to be 
reflective of the triumph of the neoliberal ideology in high-income settings and 
globally. As such, the mandate of nation states for the provision of public goods is 
progressively challenged with the push towards an enhanced involvement of non-
State actors (private sectors and CSOs) in public policy processes. 
At the global level, the state centric system of international relations has been 
transformed by global governance processes that increasingly feature cross-sectoral 
partnership mechanisms between state and non-state actors. Consequently, the global 
governance structures and processes pose a challenge to the sovereignty of national 
policy-making processes. Global governance structures and processes are said to 
influence national policy making processes. This in turn calls for studies of policy 
making processes in developing countries to account for the influence of global 
processes at the national level; an approach known as ‘methodological glocalism’. 
This approach seen to be highly pertinent to this study and is reflected in the 
theoretical framework adopted in the study (chapter 3). 
The study of cross-sectoral partnerships is characterised by a normative functionalist 
orientation that precludes exploration of the role of broader institutional factors in 
terms of how actors interact in and around partnerships.  The mechanisms are studied 
through different disciplines in quite disparate manners whereby a holistic approach 
that explores both institutional and process related factors is often lacking. The post-
	  
 
48	  
modernist turn and the focus on networks and discursive practices has further 
relegated some key concepts to the background. Specifically, studies of partnerships 
seldom explore the power relationships between actors. Hence, this study seeks to 
make contributions across these highlighted gaps by undertaking a holistic 
exploration of the cross-sectoral partnership under study, from the perspective 
institutional (contextual) factors and process related factors. In addition, the study 
commits to exposing the role of power in actors’ interactions. 
The reviewed literature has also revealed different factors that are seen as critical for 
the conduct of cross-sectoral partnerships in developing countries. The first set of 
factors relate to the role and position of different actors. While the role of 
governments constitutes a highly under-conceptualised issue, especially in 
developing country contexts, the empirical evidence is awash with reports of 
domination of cross-sectoral partnerships by public sectors in developing countries. 
In this regard, the empirical evidence is seen to be lacking in terms of accounting for 
the reasons behind the patterns of domination observed in cross-sectoral partnerships 
in developing countries.  
CSOs are widely reported to play subordinate positions in cross sectoral partnerships 
in developing countries and this is mainly said to be related to their lack of capacity 
to engage effectively in the partnership process and the inherent challenges related to 
the fluidity of their constitution. The evidence on the role of donors and the private 
sector is quite sparse, although in both cases available evidence suggests low level of 
involvements in cross-sectoral partnerships in developing countries. This study is 
accordingly motivated by prospects of adding to this body of evidence, specifically 
by providing an in-depth account of why the different actors in the study behave in 
observed ways. 
Finally, the reviewed literature offers relatively richer evidence in relation to the 
process related factors that influence cross-sectoral interactions between actors in 
and around partnerships. In this regard, most of the evidence comes from studies of 
CCMs and the highlighted factors spawn the different stages of the partnership 
process, from recruitment of members to different decision-making processes (CCM 
deliberations and proposal development process). The process related factors studied 
within this study will be contrasted with this evidence base to show comparability of 
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the Ethiopian specific findings with that of other countries. Furthermore, this study 
seeks to add to this evidence base by offering situated explanations (in context) for 
process related factors identified in the study, thereby providing answers from the 
context as to why specific process related factors are prominent in the setting. 
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Chapter Three 
The Research Paradigm, Methodology and Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
	  
This chapter presents and discusses the methodology adopted and methods used in 
this study. Section 3.2 discusses the paradigmatic orientation of the study, while 
section 3.3 presents the theoretical framework adopted in the study. Section 3.4 then 
describes the methods applied in this study, including a discussion on reflections on 
the design and execution of the study. Prior to these, the aim of the study and the 
research questions will be restated here to facilitate the subsequent discussions 
regarding the rationale for choice of methodology and methods: 
Aim of the study: 
The aim of the study is to develop an in-depth understanding of cross-sectoral 
interactions between actors, in and around partnership mechanisms, in developing 
country settings.  
The following research questions were formulated in view of this aim: 
1. How are the factors that influence actors’ interactions in and around cross-
sectoral partnership mechanisms conceptualised in the literature? 
2. How do actors interact in and around cross-sectoral partnership mechanisms 
in a developing country setting? 
3. Why do actors interact in observed manners of interactions?  
The third research question is further broken down into the following sub-
questions: 
a. What is the role of context in influencing these interactions? 
b. What is the role of factors related to the partnering process in 
influencing the manner of cross-sectoral interactions between actors? 
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3.2 The research paradigm 
 
It becomes important here to explicitly state the philosophical orientations or 
paradigms of the study. These are related to the ontological and epistemological 
considerations that underlie the study. These in turn relate to the vital questions of 
“what kind of things are there in the world?’ and ‘what is the character of our 
knowledge of the world?’ respectively (Hughes and Sharrock 1980; p. 5). These 
questions are inextricably linked to the choice of methods, which is ‘embedded in 
commitments to particular versions of the world and to knowing that world’ (Hughes 
and Sharrock 1980; p.11).  
Barring clear-cut categorisations, quantitative methodologies are commonly 
associated with the ‘positivist’ paradigm whereas qualitative methodologies mainly 
draw upon an ‘interpretivist’ paradigm (Snape and Spencer 2003, Denzin and 
Lincoln 2011).  Broadly speaking, positivism essentially holds that social inquiries 
must adhere to standards adopted in the natural sciences, that is, ‘objective and value 
free research’ (Ritchie and Spencer 1994; p. 23). Interpretivist perspectives stand in 
opposition to this, claiming that the social world can only be understood through the 
perspectives of participants and that of researchers (Ritchie and Spencer 1994; p. 23). 
It is up to the researcher to identify their inclinations within this spectrum of 
philosophical orientations and consider the implications of the philosophical choices 
to the research practice at hand (Snape and Spencer 2003).  
The epistemological orientation adopted within this study, critical realism, is one that 
is considered to lie midway on the continuum between the extreme ends of ‘naive 
positivism’ and ‘post-structuralism’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2011). While critical 
realism agrees with positivism regarding the existence of a ‘world of events’ that is 
‘independent of human consciousness’ and on the emphasis on seeking to ‘explain’ 
this reality, it departs from a positivist outlook by emphasising the ‘feeling, thinking 
human beings’ that make up the social world and the need to understand ‘their 
[human beings’]’ interpretations of the world’ (May 2001, Snape and Spencer 2003, 
Denzin and Lincoln 2011; p. 11). In other words, while critical realism takes from 
positivism the notion of a real world ‘in which we act and interact’, it takes from 
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interpretivism the understanding that ‘human social life is meaningful’, which in turn 
needs to be taken into account in our explanations (Altheide and Johnson 2011; p. 
581 - 582). 
Another distinctive feature constitutes the understanding that reality is multi-layered, 
which in turn entails a commitment to explaining the structural mechanisms that 
underlie social phenomenon (Sayer 2000, May 2001, Hay 2002, Denzin and Lincoln 
2011). In this regard, critical realism seeks to ‘gaze beyond the superficial realm of 
appearances’ to understand the ‘causal logics’ that underlie the social phenomenon 
being observed (Hay 2002; p. 122). The focus is to go beyond simply analysing 
‘conversations and interactions between people’ to unravel the ‘structures of social 
relations’ that underlie these (May 2001; p. 12).  May (2001; p. 13) explains that the 
conception of a stratified social reality into ‘individual, interactive and institutional’ 
is at the heart of a critical realist thinking, whereby the critical realist researcher’s 
task then becomes one of explaining how these different layers ‘affect [people’s] 
actions in a  situation of dialogue and cooperation’. Sobh (2006; p. 1201) quotes the 
following useful description of the implication of a realist paradigm to social inquiry 
from Easton (1995; p. 79, 81):  
the researcher [has] to identify the contingent causal powers that are 
operating in the particular situations under research and the ways they 
combine and interact in order to create the particular events observed...to 
seek for the underlying reality through the dark veil that hides it 
 
Another important aspect of a critical realist approach is the use of theoretical 
frameworks to guide analysis and explanation of the underlying structures (Sayer 
2000, Sobh and Perry 2006). To understand the multiple ‘components and forces’ 
that influence the objects of investigation, which can be, ‘wars, discourses, 
institutions, economic activities, identities, kinship or whatever’ occurring within 
‘complex and messy’ social systems, one would need to rely on ‘abstraction and 
conceptualisation’ to guide, interpret and infer causal relationships (Sayer 2000; p. 
19). In other words, critical realists seek to explain the underlying structures that 
give rise to the particular ways in which actors interact, by deploying theoretical 
frameworks ‘as a sensitising device to reveal the structured reality beneath the 
surface’ (May 2001; p. 12, Hay 2002; p. 122). Rather than being used to generate 
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testable propositions that the empirical study seeks to falsify, as would be the case in 
a positivist approach, theory is used as a way of ‘constructing a narrative that helps 
us identify and explain the underlying structural relationships’ (Marsh and Smith 
2000; p. 532). In so doing, one is able to contextualise the observed social 
phenomenon, thereby demonstrating ‘how the phenomenon is related to [the] whole’ 
(Marsh and Smith 2000, Sayer 2000; p. 25).  
Finally, it would be worthwhile to highlight here that this commitment to focusing 
on the interrelationship between the object of study and the wider context is 
nowadays widely supported in the health policy and systems research field. 
Traditionally, the field of health policy and systems research was seen as 
predominantly indulging in the analysis of content, at the expense of a holistic 
approach that also considers policy context, actors and processes (Walt and Gilson 
1994, Araújo Jr and Maciel Filho 2001, Walt, Shiffman et al. 2008). While the field 
of international health has long upheld the importance of a holistic approach through 
declarations and international commitments such as the Alma Ata Declaration of 
Primary Health Care in 1978, these concepts have not been well developed to guide 
research and action in the field (Walt and Gilson 1994). In light of this, researchers 
in the field of study have since been increasingly calling for a holistic approach that 
considers context as an integral part of health policy analysis, rather than being 
‘reduced to an isolated and detached introduction to the real analysis of the problems’ 
(Collins, Green et al. 1998; p. 10, Gilson and Raphaely 2008, Roberts, Hsiao et al. 
2008, Walt, Shiffman et al. 2008, van Olmen J, Criel B et al. 2010, Gilson, Hanson 
et al. 2011, Sheikh, Gilson et al. 2011, de Leeuw, Townsend et al. 2013). For 
instance, a recent commentary by influential scholars in the field of health policy and 
system research (Gilson, Hanson et al. 2011; p. 2) observes: 
…investigation of HPS [Health Policy Systems] issues demands research that 
seeks to understand and explain experiences by reference to the many layers 
of their context, whilst acknowledging the often quite different interpretations 
of experience across people. 
The next section lays out the theoretical framework adopted in this study with the 
aim of enabling the interpretation and explanation of interactions between actors in 
and around the CCM with reference to the ‘many layers of context’. 
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3.3 The theoretical framework 
	  
Beyond reflecting a critical realist approach, a theory-driven study constitutes a 
widely supported approach in health policy analysis. One of the arguments that 
justify the deployment of theory-driven studies in the field of health policy analysis 
is related to the sheer complexity of policy processes. As Sabatier (2007; p. 4) 
observes: 
Given the staggering complexity of the policy process, the analyst must find 
some way of simplifying the situation in order to have any chance of 
understanding it. One simply cannot look for, and see, everything. 
In light of this, theoretical frameworks, and the presuppositions derived from them, 
are helpful in organising one’s thinking around the issues that are pertinent to a 
particular subject and those that could be ‘safely ignored’ (Sabatier 2007; p. 4). They 
provide a way of ‘telling the story’ without getting caught up in the details (Walt, 
Shiffman et al. 2008; p. 310). In addition, policy analysis presents with challenges of 
capturing and representing highly contested concepts such as ‘power’ (Walt, 
Shiffman et al. 2008). Hence, adopting a theoretical framework informs analysis of 
such complex subjects (Walt, Shiffman et al. 2008), thereby allowing the researcher 
to explain empirical findings within the realm of ‘wider bodies of knowledge’ 
(Giacomini 2010; p. 125). Giacomini (2010; p. 146) emphasises that ‘without an 
orientation to theory and its myriad forms in health and social science fields, 
researchers risk incoherence’. However, the practice of health policy analysis in low 
and middle-income countries has largely been ‘intuitive, ad hoc, and the assumptions 
on which it is based are seldom identified’ (Gilson and Raphaely 2008, Walt, 
Shiffman et al. 2008; p. 310).  
Turning to the explication of the theoretical framework adopted in this study, the 
search for a suitable theory was guided by consideration of the object of the study, 
specifically, interactions between actors in and around a partnership mechanism 
(CCM), in a developing country setting (Ethiopia). This follows the critical realist 
approach that predicates the selection of theory on the way ‘we carve up and define’ 
the objects of study (Sayer 2000; p. 27). Similarly, in a case study design, the choice 
of particular theories depends on the particular features of the case that is being 
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studied (Walt, Shiffman et al. 2008). In view of the object of this study, the search 
for guiding theories was directed at theories and conceptual frameworks seeking to 
explain the conduct of actors within a particular field of interaction (such as the 
CCM), and the relationship between this and the setting of operation (such as a 
national setting). 
 
This essentially relates to a concern with how a particular phenomenon of interest 
(the ‘micro’) relates to the wider context (the ‘macro’), which in turn constitutes a 
major preoccupation of different disciplines and fields of study, such as, political 
science, sociology, economics and organisational studies (Walt and Gilson 1994). As 
discussed earlier, this is also at the centre of a critical realist perspective, which holds 
that ‘concepts of structure and agency are implicit in every explanation we offer [to 
social phenomenon]’ (Hay 2002; P. 113). Theories that engage with this relationship 
between agency and structure essentially raise the quintessential question: ‘how and 
why are local social orders produced [contextual/structural/macro] and what role do 
actors play in this [the ‘micro’]?’ (Awases, Gbary et al. 2004).  
 
The different theories reviewed in this regard include: actor oriented sociology 
(Long 2001), new institutionalism (from the different conceptualisations in different 
disciplines) (Jepperson 1991, Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Scharpf 1997, González 
and Healey 2005), policy networks theory (Marsh and Smith 2000, Evans 2001), 
theory of collaborative advantages (Huxham and Vangen 1996), interface analysis (a 
derivative of actor oriented sociology)(Long 1989, Bartsch, Hein et al. 2007) and 
Theory of practice (Wagenaar and Cook 2003). These conceptualisations are in turn 
seen to mainly draw upon Giddens’ (Giddens 1991) Structuration Theory and 
Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu 1990) Logic of Practice.  
Now, the section turns to discussing critically important propositions offered by 
these theories, regarding the nature of the relationship between actors’ agency and 
structure, which have in turn been imported into the adopted theoretical framework 
in this study (figure 2). In this regard, the important propositions include: the 
importance attached to the dialectical relationship between agency and structure, the 
multi-layered nature of structure that also includes actors’ ‘interlocking projects’, 
and that ideas, meanings and discourses play a crucial role in mediating the 
	  
 
56	  
dialectical relationship between agency and structure. These propositions and 
explications of the relationship between agency and structure will be discussed one 
by one to finally culminate in presentation of the adopted theoretical framework in 
this study. 
The first of the common threads across these theories is their rejection of the 
dichotomy between actors’ agency and structure, which is espoused by rational actor 
and structuralist theories. In other words, in seeking to explain how social actors ‘act’ 
and ‘interact’ with each other, these conceptualisations in essence eschew both the 
idea of the ‘free-willed social actor’ with no social constraints (rational actor 
theory/intentionalism) and understandings that exalt the determinacy of structural 
factors (institutionalism/Structuralism) (Scharpf 1997, Marsh and Smith 2000, Long 
2001, Hay 2002, Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004, Bartsch, Hein et al. 2007, March 
2010). Hay (2002; p. 116) describes this growing orientation as follows: 
If, for structuralists, structure determines agency, and, for intentionalists, 
agency causes structure, then for this new group of authors, structure and 
agency both influence each other. Indeed, they are inherently and inexorably 
related and intertwined.  
Similarly, from the new institutionalism perspective, Scharpf (Scharpf 1997; p. 36) 
states that this conceptualisation integrates ‘action-theoretic and rational-choice’ 
paradigms (economistic outlooks), on the one hand, and ‘institutionalist or 
structuralist’ paradigms (sociologist perspectives), on the other. Conventionally, 
these perspectives would be considered to be mutually exclusive, whereas their 
integration enables:  
a better ‘goodness of fit’ between theoretical perspectives and the observed 
reality  of political interaction that is driven by the interactive strategies of 
purposive actors operating within institutional settings that, at the same time, 
enable and constrain these strategies.’ (Scharpf 1997; p. 36) 
In the same token, Potvin and Clavier’s description of actor network theory states 
that a sound theoretical framework should ‘enable an in-depth analysis of the 
interactions between actors, their actions and the situations in which they take place’ 
(Potvin and Clavier 2013; p. 88). Further to emphasising the interplay between 
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agency and structure, these theoretical perspectives qualify and describe the nature of 
this interplay. In this regard, this relationship between actors’ agency and structure is 
conceptualised as constituting what is known as a ‘dialectical’ relationship. In their 
explication of how this interplay is conceived within the theory of policy networks, 
Marsh and Smith (2000) describe a condition whereby actors’ assessment and 
awareness of their environment (‘strategic knowledge’) mediates the ‘constant 
iterations’ between their actions and the structured context:  
… action is taken by an actor within a structured context. The actor brings 
strategic knowledge to the structured context and both that strategic 
knowledge and the structured context help shape the agent’s action. However, 
the process is one of almost constant iterations, as the action affects both the 
actor’s strategic knowledge and the structured context, which then, in turn, 
shape, but of course do not determine, the agent’s future action (Marsh and 
Smith 2000; P. 5) 
This notion is similarly reflected in the new institutionalism thinking whereby the 
analysis and synthesis of the enabling and constraining features of the structured 
context are said to occur within the thought processes of actors. As Fligstein (2004; 
P. 231) states: 
… actors have cognitive structures that utilise cultural frames, akin to what 
Bourdieu (1977) calls “habitus” to analyse the meanings of the actions of 
others. These frames help actors decide, “what is going on” and what 
courses of action are available to them as interactions proceed 
In other words, structure influences ‘the lenses through which actors view the 
world …’ (Scharpf 1997; p. 13). This in turn signifies that the relationship between 
structure and agency is not seen as external, but rather internal (Hay 2002).  
This is in turn related to the second crucial common thread in these theorisations of 
the interplay between agency and structure, which relates to the important role 
accorded of ideas, meanings and discourses within this dialectical relationship. This 
naturally follows the framing of the relationship between agency and structure as 
internal and self-reflexive, thereby involving the cognitive processes of social actors. 
Accordingly, Hay (2002) attributes the importance accorded to ideas in these 
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conceptualisations, to actors’ needs of interpret and making sense of their 
environments: 
… Actors lack complete information, they have to interpret the world in 
which they find themselves in order to orient themselves strategically 
towards it. Ideas provide the point of mediation between actors and their 
environment. (Hay 2002; P; 209) 
In explicating the theory of practice, Wagenaar and Cook (2003; p. 156 - 157) 
further point out that the process of making sense of the structured context, on the 
part of actors, involves a process of ‘telling stories’ about the context and 
‘negotiating the appropriateness and meaning of the stories with listeners and/or 
other story tellers’. This relates to the power of discourses which Hajer (Hajer and 
Wagenaar 2003)further explores. Drawing on his study of environmental policy 
process in the Netherlands (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; p. 107), he  highlights that the 
way ‘discourses are taken up in the process of mutual positioning’ is critical to 
understanding the ‘repositioning’ that occurs as part of the processes of interactions. 
Norman Long (2001; p. 18) further clarifies that the discourses deployed by actors in 
these ‘social repositioning’ processes that occur during interactions are variable and 
that ‘they form a part of the differentiated stocks of knowledge and resources 
available to actors of different types [from the wider context]’ rather than being 
‘’inherent features of the actors themselves’.  
The final thread in the explication of the relationship between agency and structure 
in these theories relates to the qualification of the attributes of structure. Norman 
Long’s (2001; p. 61 - 62) actor oriented sociology injects into the notion of structure, 
an understanding that the self-reflexive strategies of actors within interactional 
settings also take into account actors’ ‘interlocking projects’. This in turn means that 
actors also ‘attempt to anticipate the reactions and possible moves of the [other] 
actors and organisations’(Long 2001; p. 61 - 62):  
… In more substantial terms, structure can be characterised as an extremely 
fluid set of emergent properties that, on the one hand, are a product of the 
interlocking and/or the distantiation of various actors’ projects, while on the 
other, they constitute an important set of reference points and 
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constraining/enabling possibilities that feed into the further elaboration, 
negotiation and confrontation of actors’ projects.  
More relevant and crucial to this study is Marsh and Smith’s (2000) layered concept 
of structure in their explication of the theory of policy networks. They (Marsh and 
Smith 2000; p. 6/7) outline that the ‘structured context’ for actors’ interaction is 
constituted by two layers constituting the ‘network’s structure’ and the ‘broader 
political and socio-cultural context’:  
agents are located within a structured context, which is provided by both the 
network and the broader political and socio-cultural context within which the 
network operates and those contexts clearly affect the actor’s resources 
This qualification of the structured-context into two levels fits the set up of the CCM, 
whereby the network level corresponds to the CCM while the ‘broader political and 
socio-cultural context’ corresponds to the wider context in the Ethiopian setting. A 
similar notion is reflected in the new institutionalism literature, where Gonzalez and 
Healey (2005) differentiate between levels of ‘specific episodes’ of actors’ 
interactions and governance cultures. The former represents the immediate field of 
play for actors or the ‘specific institutional ‘sites’ or arenas where ideas are 
expressed, strategies played out, ‘decisions’ made and power games fought out’, 
while the latter represents ‘the deeper frames of reference - embedded cultural 
values and formal and informal structures for policing discourses and practices’ 
(González and Healey 2005; p; 2059 - 2061). The concept of arenas (corresponding 
to the immediate action frame or field of interactions – such as the CCM) is also 
vividly captured in Norman Long’s explication of actor-oriented sociology: 
‘Arenas’ are social locations or situations in which contests over issues, 
resources, values, and representations take place … that is, they are social 
and spatial locations where actors confront each other, mobilise social 
relations and deploy discursive and other cultural means for the attainment 
of specific ends, including that of perhaps simply remaining in the game…  
Hence, the adopted theoretical lens in this study (figure 2) eschews the traditional 
dichotomy between actors and structure, instead focusing on the interplay between 
actors’ agency and structure. The theoretical lens further upholds a multi-layered 
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view of the structured context, which includes the two layers of the regulatory 
frameworks of the CCM and the deeper frames of reference that emanate from the 
Ethiopian setting. The conception of this relationship between the visible world of 
actors and the deep lying structural factors as ‘dialectical’ directs the study to decode, 
interpret and understand the mutually influencing relationship between actors’ day-
to-day interactions and the structured context. Further more, the theoretical lens 
directs the inquiry to identify critical discourses that have a role in shaping the 
conduct of actors, and the way they interact in and around the CCM.  
Finally, the framework also incorporates notion of ‘methodological glocalism’ 
discussed in chapter 2, which embodies a notion that ‘context’ for national level 
actors in developing countries includes global level governance processes (Holton 
2008; p. 46, Kennett 2010; p. 21). This conception entails that the search for 
contextual explanatory factors for observed trends in interactions also considers 
global level processes, whether they emanate from the Fund’s global structures or 
other global governance processes. The dotted boundaries between the national and 
global spheres in figure 2 represent this conception. 
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Figure 2: Theoretical Lens: A Dialectical relationship between actors, CCM 
regulatory frameworks and the ‘deeper frames of reference’ 
 
3.4  Research design and methods 
	  
This section presents the case study design and the methods of data collection 
and analysis, along with methodological reflections and ethical considerations of 
the study. 
3.4.1 The case study design 
	  
The widely upheld definition of a case study design holds that a case study is ‘‘an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within 
its ‘real-life’ context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 2009; p. 18). The case study approach is 
essentially characterised by: a focus on a particular case of interest (although several 
cases may also be selected depending on the type of study involved), an intensive 
investigation of the selected case, a comprehensive analysis that takes account of 
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context, and the consideration of multiple perspectives (mainly through multiple 
methods but also through consideration of multiple perspectives while deploying a 
singular method) (Stake 1995, Robson 2002, Lewis 2003, Yin 2009). These 
characteristics reflect the methodological positions of contemporary orientations of 
health policy and systems research, where analysis are sought to be ‘holistic and 
contextualised’ (Gilson, Hanson et al. 2011; p. 3). 
The case that was selected in this study, ‘the Global Fund’s Country Coordinating 
Mechanism (CCM) in Ethiopia’ was selected as a ‘critical case’, whereby the case is 
seen to be a typical representation of the phenomenon under study, that is, cross-
sectoral interactions in and around a globally designed partnership mechanism in a 
developing country setting’ (Robson 2002, Yin 2009). The assumptions and 
propositions of the study, which need to be explicit in case studies, are encapsulated 
in the research questions and the theoretical framework adopted in the study.  
3.4.2 Planning and preparing for the fieldwork  
	  
The fieldwork was conducted over six months, between January and June 2013. The 
fieldwork was conducted after the necessary ethical clearance was obtained from 
ScHARR and the National Ministry of Science and Technology in Ethiopia. Prior to 
the field trip, I had travelled to Ethiopia for 3 months between March and May, 2012 
to apply for ethical approval at the National Science and Technology Ministry and to 
establish preliminary contacts for the fieldwork. During this trip, the formal request 
for ethical approval was lodged at the Ministry, preliminary contacts were made with 
key agencies such as the CCM secretariat and other researchers and consultants in 
the country, and key policy and strategy documents were gathered. The Head of the 
CCM Secretariat served as the gatekeeper for this project throughout the fieldwork 
period. I was in continuous contact with the Head of the Secretariat for the purposes 
of obtaining permission to observe the CCM meetings, to gain access to CCM 
minutes, and generally, to solicit other pertinent information regarding the CCM and 
its members. 
Prior to embarking on data collection, I conducted a couple of pre-test interviews 
with colleagues working in the HIV/AIDS field. While the pre-tests did not 
necessarily generate findings that significantly altered the content of the interview 
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guides, they served as good preparatory exercises in terms of revising the wording 
and sequencing of questions on the interview guide. I couldn’t undertake these pre-
tests with actual CCM members as I was careful not to include potentially useful 
interviews in this pre-test data, given that the CCM members are few and as there 
were no guarantees at the time that all or many of them would respond positively to 
the requests for interview. 
3.4.3 The key informant interviews  
	  
Within this multi-method case study design, key informant interviews constitute the 
primary method of data collection. In this regard, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with a total of 43 participants drawn from different organisations that are 
either members of the CCM or stakeholders of the CCM’s work in Ethiopia. 
Participants for the key informant interviews were identified through a theoretical, 
purposive sampling strategy. Here, theoretical sampling refers to the selection of 
participants in view of the research questions and the theoretical framework of the 
study (Silverman 2006). Hence, as the aim of this study is to generate understanding 
of how actors interact around a cross-sectoral partnership mechanism (the CCM), it 
was important to seek to include organisations that come from the different sectors 
that participate in the CCM. The main sectors that were considered include: the 
public sector, the private sector, CSOs, and donors.  
At the practical level of identifying the particular organisations or people to be 
included in the study, I used a combination of tracing participants from documents 
such as the CCM members’ list and CCM minutes, and through employing the 
snowballing method. The latter involves the solicitation of names of potential 
participants during interviews and during informal discussions with policy makers in 
the field. Snowballing was used to identify people who had involved in the CCM in 
the past, as well as individuals who are said to represent particular points of view 
that could be useful in view of the study’s aim. As Robson (2002) explains, the 
snowballing method is best used in conditions where participants are hard to reach, 
which applies to this study, where the participation of policy elites was being sought. 
Table 1 presents description of participants (sectoral affiliations), the language used 
in the case of each interview and the duration of the interviews. The duration of 
	  
 
64	  
interviews ranged between 18 minutes (private sector I) and 88 minutes (multilateral 
donor III), whereas the average length of interviews was 43 minutes. 
Table 1: List of participants, their sectoral affiliations and duration of 
interviews. 	  
S/N Interview codes  Duration of 
Interviews 
Language Remarks 
1 Public Sector Interview I  30.59 Amharic  
2 Public sector Interview II  21.09 >>  
3 Public Sector Interview III 33.06 >>  
4 Public Sector Interview IV  30.41 >>  
5 Public Sector Interview V  28.35 >>  
6 Public Sector Interview VI  24.43 >>  
7 Public Sector Interview VII  31.34 >>  
8 Public Sector Interview VIII  60 >> Not recorded 
9 Public Sector Interview IX  49.21 >>  
10 Public Sector Interview X  49.31 >>  
11 Public Sector Interview XI  39.23 >>  
12 Public Sector Interview XII 43.20 >>  
13 Bilateral Donor I 29.18 English  
14 Bilateral Donor II 51.07 Amharic  
15 Bilateral Donor III 58.41 English  
16 Bilateral Donor IV 49.20 English  
17 Bilateral Donor V 45.02 English  
18 Bilateral Donor VI 47 English Not recorded 
19 Bilateral Donor VII 65.20 Amharic  
20 Bilateral Donor VIII 36.22 Amharic  
21 Bilateral Donor IX 27.10 Amharic  
22 Multilateral Donor I 26.42 English  
23 Multilateral Donor II  40.25 Amharic  
24 Multilateral Donor III 88 Amharic  
25 Multilateral Donor IV 32.27 English Geneva based 
staff  
26 CSO I 50.56 Amharic  
27 CSO II 45.17 >>  
28 CSO III 60 >>  
29 CSO IV 84 >>  
30 CSO V 62 >>  
31 CSO VI 52.35 >>  
32 CSO VII 28.50 >>  
33 CSO VIII 29.87 >>  
34 CSO IX 27.11 >>  
35 CSO X 44.44 >>  
36 CSO XI 60 >>  
37 CSO XII 60 >>  
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38 CSO XIII 59.43 >>  
39 CSO XIV 28.24 >>  
40 CSO XV 34.09 >>  
41 Private Sector I 18.52 >>  
42 Private Sector II 31.67 >>  
43 Private sector III 49.04 >>  
 Total 1860.55   
 
The interviews were ‘semi-structured’ whereby an interview guide (appendix 1) was 
used to facilitate the interviews. The interview guide includes key questions designed 
to allow for progressively exploring the different issues that were deemed critical to 
the aim of the study the theoretical orientation. As can be seen in appendix 1, the 
questions are assorted mainly to include ‘how’ questions in the beginning, followed 
by more targeted, probing questions. This reflects the interests that emanate from the 
theoretical orientation and the research questions that seek to garner participants 
perceptions and interpretations of their lived-experiences (‘how questions’), 
followed by exploration of the underlying factors that give rise to these (‘why 
questions’). On top of this, additional questions and probes were included in due 
course of the interviews, in consideration of the issues of interest generated in 
preceding interviews and in view of the unique positions and perspectives of each 
participant.  
Semi-structured interviews are known to afford interviewers with this kind of 
flexibility (Robson 2002). Such flexibility is important in the case of a critical realist 
perspective where there is need for ‘an active, investigative and analytically-
informed interviewer’ in order to direct the participants’ thinking towards the causal 
mechanisms that underlie their lived experiences (Smith and Elger 2012; p. 26). In 
other words, the researcher needs to orient the focus of the participants to the 
‘specific context’, by ‘carefully contextualising the domain in which subjects reflect 
on their own thinking’ (Smith and Elger 2012; p.26).  
In accordance with this reflexive and flexible approach to interviewing, individuals 
who had not been enlisted for interview originally were sought out for subsequent 
interviews because they were highlighted in preceding interviews as representing 
critically important voices. This can be seen as a form of snowballing, but it is 
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important to highlight that the individuals were not just sought after for being 
potentially good informants but because they were said to be proponents of particular 
points of view that were seen to be analytically pertinent. For example, a donor 
agency representative who was described as being critical of the deliberative 
procedures in the CCM was sought out for interview. In another demonstration of 
this active, reflexive steering of the study, organisations and associations that are not 
members of the CCM or directly related to it currently, were sought out for interview 
as findings pointed to grievances with the way their route for membership was 
curtailed in the past. With emerging findings suggesting that the implications of 
these historical incidences linger to present day, representatives from these 
organisations were enrolled for interview and the issues explored further. 
3.4.4 The non-participant observation and document review 
	  
The non-participant observation and documents’ review were employed in this study 
with a view of expanding on and scrutinising the findings that emerge from the main 
line of inquiry in the study, namely, the key informant interviews. As Ritchie (2013) 
notes, the manner in which multiple qualitative methods are used is dependent on the 
‘objectives of the study’, ‘the nature of the data required to meet them’ and the 
‘epistemological orientation of the researcher’ (Ritchie 2003; p. 38). Accordingly, 
the deployment of these methods is in line with the critical realist drive towards 
obtaining multiple perspectives in order to scrutinise participants’ accounts of their 
lived-experiences in interactions (triangulation) and to enrich the analysis of the 
underlying structural, causal mechanisms (Smith and Elger 2012). As Smith and 
Elger (2012; p. 15, 18) state, a critical realist use of multiple methods entails that:  
informants’ accounts need to be subjected to critical scrutiny not only in 
their own terms but also in relation to other sources, including observation, 
documents and other interviews…[also] they [interviews] are not by 
themselves an adequate basis for analysing the multiplicity of causal factors 
in play in social relations. 
The approach to observation mainly involved plans of non-participant observations 
of CCM meetings and a general plan of documenting relevant observations during 
the fieldwork. In the case of observation of CCM meetings, I had originally planned 
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to observe at least 3 meetings over the duration of the fieldwork (6 months), as the 
meeting schedule of the CCM indicated that meetings would be held every two 
months. However, I was only able to observe one meeting as the other meetings were 
postponed. I was included in the CCM emailing list by the Head of the CCM 
Secretariat, so that I could follow-up on the meeting dates and other communications 
sent out to members.  
Accordingly, I was able to observe the meeting that was conducted around the end of 
the fieldwork, on the 13th of June 2013. At the meeting, I was introduced as a 
researcher who would not partake in deliberations but who was present for the sole 
purposes of observing the meeting for research purposes. As the meeting occurred 
around the final days of my fieldwork, I had in fact become familiar to most of the 
CCM members who I had contacted to either get interviews or to inquire about 
documents and related matters. The meeting was chaired by the Deputy Minister of 
Health and ran for 3 hours. There were 22 attendees all in all: 11 voting members 
and another 11 non-voting participants made up of technical experts coming from the 
member organisations and representatives from other organisations who had 
expressed interests to observe the meeting. The non-voting members could 
contribute to the deliberations in the CCM but cannot cast their votes.  
Whilst observing the meeting in this manner, I assumed a ‘non-participant observer’ 
role, which meant that I did not participate in the discussions. This is synonymous 
with what Robson calls ‘observer-as-participant’ type of observation where the status 
of the researcher is disclosed to the group, but the researcher does not partake in the 
activity except for observing (Robson 2002; p. 319). The observation data was 
recorded through note-taking.  
As described above, the observation data was used to corroborate or challenge the 
findings emanating from the interviews. Specifically, the observation of the meeting 
provided an insight into the manners in which the representatives of the different 
sectors participate in the meetings as well as helping to observe the procedures that 
were in place to facilitate the deliberation process. In other words, it generally helped 
to visualise the sense of interactions described in the interviews. The data that was 
generated in this manner was mainly used in the write-up to corroborate and 
illuminate on discussions of the findings drawn from interviews (chapters 5, 6, and 
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7). Where this is done, it is explicitly indicated that the observation data is being 
used. 
The other aspect of observation deployed in this study relates to adopting an 
ethnographic approach as described by Robson (2002). This involves a general 
approach of getting  ‘fully immersed’ in the research field (Robson 2002). 
Observation of decision-making processes are generally considered to be 
‘particularly difficult’ as ‘decisions emerge rather than taking place at a single point 
in time’, and as they ‘are often unobservable to the researcher’ (Walt, Shiffman et al. 
2008; p. 310). However, by spending an extended amount of period in the field (6 
months for data collection, and a further 3 months for ethical approval and making 
preliminary contacts), the purpose was to achieve good familiarisation with the field 
and attain a holistic appreciation of actors and their interactions in the setting.  
The actions taken to enhance the familiarisation process included: enrolling on the 
CCM’s emailing list, thereby gaining access to CCM communications of meeting 
agenda, minutes of meetings and related communications, and attending an 
international health conference hosted in Addis Ababa, whereby I was able to attend 
sessions focusing on aid coordination in Ethiopia and establish contacts with relevant 
policy makers. Generally, through the extended interactions in the field with ex-
colleagues, other researchers and consultants, I was able to acquaint myself with 
perceptions of the position and significance of the CCM in the setting. In addition, 
this facilitated my access to potential interviewees (snowballing) as well as generally 
orientating me in terms of the critical ‘events’ and ‘issues’ in the health policy-
making field in the setting.  
Through out this process, I kept a field diary.  May (2001; p. 160) explains that field 
note entries should not concern documentation of ‘anything and everything’ but that 
they should be guided by judicious selection of what is relevant to the study and the 
theoretical orientation. The entries into the field diary included notes about issues 
picked up from informal communications with contacts in the field that could be 
followed up in interviews, names of important persons and documents cited in 
interviews and in informal communications, and analytical notes about preliminary 
themes and causal relationships. Regarding the preliminary analytical notes, a field 
report shared with my supervisors back in July 2013 is included as appendix 2. 
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Looking back at the report helps compare the intuitions and first impressions that 
came out of the fieldwork and the themes that were finally developed in due analysis 
and write-up.  
As indicated earlier, document analysis, along with observation, were used to expand 
on and scrutinise the findings generated through interviews. This reflects their use in 
case study designs as well, where documents are mainly deployed to ‘corroborate 
and augment evidence from other sources’(Yin 2009; p. 37). In the case of this study, 
the main use of documents has been towards enriching the exploration and 
investigation of causal mechanisms that underlie trends in actors’ interactions. 
Whilst participants often offered quite useful explanations of why they interact in the 
manner that they do in the CCM, the document analysis provided additional, very 
useful avenues to bolster the interpretation of associations between manners of 
interactions and the underlying structural factors. Essentially, this constituted an 
iterative process between analysing the interview data and reviewing pertinent 
documents in order to confirm, clarify and expand on claims made by participants 
with the overall aim of building a holistic, embedded picture of observed trends in 
interactions.  
The analysis undertaken in this manner included different types of documents related 
to actors, the CCM and the wider context. These include: constitutional and 
operational directives of the CCM, minutes of CCM meetings, Global Fund 
directives and reports, development policies and sectoral strategies in Ethiopia, 
policy briefs, evaluations reports, consultant reports, and academic papers focusing 
on the Ethiopian context. A list of the main documents that were reviewed is 
provided in appendix 3. 
3.5 Data analysis 
	  
In qualitative study, analysis is not just limited to a particular stage in the research 
process but rather accompanies all stages including the initial choice of theoretical 
framework, reflection on the emerging data during data collection, the analysis stage 
and well into the research write-up (Spencer, Ritchie et al. 2003). This has been the 
case in this study too whereby preliminary thematic categories were being drawn and 
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causal associations tested during the fieldwork. Appendix 2 provides a testimony of 
this process.  
To focus on the analysis of the data gathered through the fieldwork, the first action 
after the fieldwork was to record the data in manageable formats. Accordingly, the 
data generated from the interviews that were voice recorded (41 out of the 43 
interviews) were transcribed in the same language used in the interviews (36 in 
Amharic and 7 in English). The English interviews were transcribed by myself while 
the Amharic ones were contracted out to a freelance transcriber, as I am not able to 
use the computer software used to type in Amharic. The Amharic transcriptions were 
checked for consistency by myself and were later similarly translated into English. 
These processes did not just constitute a data management stage but a continuation 
of the data familiarisation process (Ritchie and Spencer 1994).  
Within a critical realist paradigm, analysis focuses on the identification of themes in 
relation to the phenomenon of interest (interaction between actors, in this case) on 
the one hand, and pursuing interpretations and explanations of structural, causal 
mechanisms based on participants’ accounts and other sources (observation and 
document analysis)(Sobh and Perry 2006, Smith and Elger 2012). Hence the broad 
categories of data related to the phenomenon of actors’ interaction, and the 
explanatory factors at the levels of the CCM regulatory frameworks and the deeper 
frames of reference in the setting are drawn apriori from the theoretical framework 
adopted in the study.  
Beyond this stage, identification and development of themes resonates with what 
Robson (2002; p. 458) calls ‘template approaches’ and the ‘iterative analytic 
hierarchy’ described by Spencer (2003; p. 212). Accordingly, preliminary themes 
were formulated from initial read of the data, and were used to code the entire corpus 
of data. This in turn involved an iterative process whereby the thematic categories 
themselves were reflexively reviewed in view of the diversity of data that was 
encountered. Finally the themes were categorised into higher-level concepts through 
mapping and interpretation of associations, patterns and relationships between 
themes. The coding and analysis was done through a combination of coding on the 
print out of transcripts and flipcharts, and using Nvivo 8 data analysis software.  
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3.6 Ethical considerations 
	  
Ethical concerns in research practice relate to standards that need to be met across 
the life cycle of the research process, including the kind of questions that are 
formulated, the design of the research, and the way it is presented and reported 
(Robson 2002).  These issues were ensured in this research through actively seeking 
to meet these standards at all stages of the research process and through fulfilling the 
ethical approval requirements at the School of Health and Related Research 
(ScHARR), University of Sheffield, and the National Science and Technology 
Ministry in Ethiopia. The ethics approval letters obtained from ScHARR and the 
National Science and Technology Ministry in Ethiopia are attached as appendices 4 
and 5 respectively.  
During data collection, participants were given ample time to consider whether they 
would be willing to participate in the interview. For most participants, a request for 
participation was sent to them via email. A follow-up email was then sent to them in 
a fortnight, in case they did not reply. For some participants, the letters of request 
were dropped at their place of work, with follow-up visits similarly done in a 
fortnight. In the case of most participants, they asked to be reminded over the phone 
and interviews were finally arranged through repeated interactions with cancellations 
and postponements occurring in some occasions. The Research Information Sheet 
prepared for the study (appendix 6) and the consent forms (appendix 7) were 
dispatched along with the emails. 
On the day of the interview, participants were briefed using the information sheet 
and informed consent was received before interviews commenced. Participants were 
assured that they could opt out of the study at any point in the study. Participants had 
the option to opt in or not for the voice recording by indicating in the consent form 
(appendix 7).  
Throughout the stages of data collection and analysis, all self-identifying information 
was removed and participants were only identified at the level of their 
sectoral/organisational affiliation. In the final report, only the sectoral affiliation of 
participants is indicated. All materials related to the raw data, both soft and hard 
copies, were stored in tightly protected systems. Data was stored in my personal 
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computer and the University provided desktop computer, which are both password 
protected. During analysis and write-up, efforts were made to remove instances of 
data that could be traced back to the participants, for example, where they make 
reference to themselves or their organisations. 
3.7 Methodological reflections: claims of validity, reliability and 
generalisability in this study 
	  
While concepts of validity, reliability and generalizability constitute critically 
important criteria for judging the quality of research and gauging the claims of 
contribution to knowledge made by studies, they mean different things to different 
ontologies and epistemologies, such as, positivism, interpretivism and critical 
realism (Healy and Perry 2000, Robson 2002, Riege 2003, Snape and Spencer 2003, 
Sobh and Perry 2006, Yin 2009, Denzin and Lincoln 2011). This section presents a 
reflection on the design and execution of this study in reference to qualifications of 
the applicability of these methodological concepts in qualitative research (Lewis and 
Ritchie 2003) and specifications of the same within the critical realist paradigm 
(Healy and Perry 2000, Sobh and Perry 2006) and case study research (Riege 2003, 
Yin 2009).  
For qualitative studies, the question of validity essentially relates to whether the 
study accurately represents ‘the phenomenon under study as perceived by the study 
population’ (Lewis and Ritchie 2003). In other words, it poses the question as to 
whether the study has been undertaken in ways that ‘ensure credibility’ (Riege 2003). 
Ways to enhance credibility include triangulation of sources of data and evidence, 
inclusion of critical voices and constituencies in the study, and ensuring that the 
interpretation and explanations are not far removed from the representation offered 
by participants (Lewis and Ritchie 2003, Riege 2003, Yin 2009).  
The use of multiple data collection methods in this study bourne out of the analytical 
stance that seeks to validate findings and provide a more complete and 
contextualised picture is seen as contributing to the validity of the study. As 
indicated earlier, the deployment of the multiple methods and multiple perspectives 
from different sectors is constitutive of the critical realist epistemology that seeks to 
find a ‘family of answers’ for ‘reality’s several contingent contexts’ (Sobh and Perry 
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2006; p. 1203). In addition, the theoretical sampling approach has enabled the 
inclusion of critical, cross-sectoral voices related to the CCM in the setting. The 
continuous supervision and dialogue regarding the formulation of themes and the 
comprehensiveness of the analysis is also seen as contributing towards the validity of 
the study. Finally, use of quotes from participants’ accounts as well as adopting clear 
‘logic models’ for presenting findings are approaches used within this study, which 
are also known to enhance the validity of the study (Lewis and Ritchie 2003, Yin 
2009; p. 37). 
Reliability or the qualitative equivalent terms of ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘dependability’ 
(Healy and Perry 2000, Riege 2003), refer to the ‘stability and consistency in the 
process of inquiry’ (Riege 2003) or concerns related to whether the findings would 
be replicated if another researcher followed the same procedures to undertake the 
study on the same case (Yin 2009). Ways of enhancing reliability of a study include 
developing clear research questions, developing a well laid-out investigation plan, 
and clearly communicating the research process to the reader to assure them of the 
reliability of the study (Healy and Perry 2000, Lewis and Ritchie 2003, Riege 2003). 
In this regard, apart from providing the stated research questions, the study has 
documented and presented the data collection and analysis processes both through 
explanation of the processes and provision of key documents as appendix 
(appendices 1 – 3).  
The notion of generalisability differs from its conventional usage in quantitative 
studies. In qualitative study it is variably referred to as ‘inferential generalisability’, 
‘naturalistic generalisability’ and ‘transferability’ and is more concerned with an 
intuitive judgment about generalisability of findings to other settings (Healy and 
Perry 2000, Lewis and Ritchie 2003, Riege 2003). From a critical realist point of 
view, this is represented by replication through a replication logic whereby similar or 
different results are expected due to considerations of ‘predictable reasons’ (Sobh 
and Perry 2006; p. 1203). Generalisability in this sense is ensured by providing thick 
descriptions of the phenomenon and context so that readers are able to judge the 
transferability of results to the setting they have in mind (Lewis and Ritchie 2003, 
Riege 2003). In this respect, the orientation of the study towards providing a 
contextual account of explanations of observed phenomenon enhances the 
transferability of findings as it essentially offers explanatory logics that can be tested 
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in other studies. In addition, the use of the guiding theoretical framework to guide 
the study and the reflection on theory that is made in view of the findings are seen as 
bolstering the transferability of the findings (Murphy and Dingwall 2003, Riege 
2003).  
3.8 Researcher’s positionality and some practical reflections  
	  
The paradigmatic traditions that underlie qualitative research do not seek to delimit 
the role of the researcher to a neutral, unobtrusive position, as would be the case in 
the positivist paradigm, but recognise the co-construction of findings in interactions 
between participants and researchers and aim to reflexively situate findings as part of 
this accepted process (Robson 2002, Denzin and Lincoln 2011, Ritchie, Lewis et al. 
2013). As discussed above, the critical realist epistemology entails an active role for 
the researcher both in terms of the co-construction of meanings during interviews, 
and in interpretation of participants’ views and data generated from documents and 
observation to generate propositions of explanatory, causal factors (Sayer 2000, 
Smith and Elger 2012). In this regard, a reflexive approach that acknowledges the 
researcher’s own positions, preconceptions, value systems and relation to the setting 
is critical at all stages of the research process (Robson 2002, Snape and Spencer 
2003). This section describes the issues pertaining to my positionality as a researcher 
in this study. Explication of issues related to positionality is particularly pertinent to 
policy analysis works as access to meaningful data is not straight forward and 
involves negotiating interactions with policy elites and ‘issues of high politics’ (Walt, 
Shiffman et al. 2008; p. 314). 
My biography as a researcher does not allow for a simple ‘insider’ - ‘outsider’ 
categorisation. As an Ethiopian national who had worked as a public health expert 
both at national and regional levels in Ethiopia, I came to this research with 
considerable insight into the dynamics of the health policy field and with some 
useful contacts to enable me to access key policy makers. I had worked with 
different international NGOs as HIV/AIDS and Health programmes coordinator and 
advisor both at national and regional levels between 2001 and 2006. Over the latter 
end of this period, I was also working as chairperson of a taskforce within the 
national HIV/AIDS Forum of NGOs working in Ethiopia, which had in turn given 
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me good opportunities to participate in national policy and strategy formulation 
platforms and establish critical contacts in the health policy field.  
On the other hand, I left the country in 2006 to work in another country (Uganda) 
and progressively, to pursue my studies in Europe. Hence, my knowledge of the field, 
and the contacts I have in the policy field, would not necessarily be described as 
current. A lot has changed between my experiences of participating in national 
deliberation platforms focusing on the Global Fund grants (2004 – 2006) and my 
fieldwork visit (2013). For instance, in the beginning, individual associations of 
people living with HIV/AIDS were key, vocal actors in the CCM and generally, in 
deliberations regarding HIV/AIDS and the Global Fund. During the fieldwork, I 
could see that a newly constituted national network of PLWHA associations had 
taken up this role while the individual associations have receded to the background. 
Generally, the personnel representing the different governmental, non-governmental 
and donor agencies in national health policy frameworks had mostly changed 
between the periods of my professional involvement back in 2004 – 2006, and the 
fieldwork conducted in 2013.  
Hence, I was not known to most of the current, active players in and around the 
CCM, but nevertheless had useful resources in terms of my historical knowledge of 
the field of action and useful professional contacts to be able to negotiate access to 
policy-makers. During the interviews, I found myself, often involuntarily, recounting 
my professional experiences in the policy field and my insights into particular issues. 
I believe that this was bourne out of an intuition that it would help me negotiate a 
good position within the interview process to be able to solicit meaningful responses 
from participants; than would be the case if I simply presented as a ‘postgraduate 
student’. It also felt that registering my awareness of key issues and developments in 
the field helped with invigorating the conversation.  
Having said this, my experiences also resonate with the understanding that 
positionality, both in terms of the ‘insider’ – ‘outsider’ categorisations and in relation 
to the power dynamics between the researcher and participants, is not fixed and that 
it depends on a spectrum of factors, beyond the ones raised here. In describing the 
complexity of positionality, Merriam et al (2001; p. 411) quote Narayan’s (1993; p. 
671 - 672) description: ‘The loci along which we are aligned or set apart from those 
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whom we study are multiple and in flux’. For exampled, while I found myself 
relying on my experiences in the field to enhance my position as a worthwhile 
interviewer, I could not but appreciate the influence that my enrolment in an 
academic institution abroad was having to the dynamics between me and the 
participants. It felt as if being from outside the field of interaction and coming with 
some academic pedigree from a reputable, international institution had the effect of 
bolstering my credibility for dealing with the sensitive issues raised in interviews 
with due academic and professional diligence.  
Obviously, my personal attributes and professional and academic background meant 
quite different things in my interactions with different types of participants. In this 
regard, my experiences of interviews ranged from encounters with a multilateral 
agency representative who hurried through the issues whilst continually looking at 
his watch, to another participant form the same sector who gave me the longest 
interview, supplied me useful policy documents, and inquired at the end if the 
interview had been satisfactory. Outside of my positionality, a number of issues are 
bound to affect a participant’s interest in such researches including, the sensitivity of 
the subject matter, their roles in the mechanism and their interests in using this as an 
opportunity to disseminate their views. 
Crucially, my main concern related to whether participants were engaging fully and 
with minimum reservations in the interview process. In this regard too, experiences 
were widely variable and seemed to depend on factors beyond my own attributes. 
Generally, public sector officials appeared guarded in their responses, whilst CSO 
and donor agency participants were more forthcoming and outspoken. Private sector 
participants appeared to be generally inhibited by their limited involvement and 
stake in the mechanism. My experiences with some interviews coming from public 
sector participants mainly, and some donor agency participants, resonate with Smith 
and Elger’s (2012; p. 16) assessment that some policy elites ‘may be very 
experienced in addressing public media and providing polished but strongly edited 
accounts of their views and activities’.  
On the other end of the spectrum, some of the most forthcoming participants from 
CSOs appeared to be heavily invested in not simply supplying information, but to 
use the interviews as platforms for airing their reservations and grievances and 
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advancing their micro-political agenda. In extreme cases, some CSO participants 
raised issues directed at other policy makers, which were considered to be of 
personal nature. The latter were not included in the analysis as they did not strictly 
fall within the purposes of the study and as they could not be substantiated. 
Regarding the theoretical framework and the agency/structure literature, it has to be 
said that the theoretical writings from the different disciplines were not readily 
accessible to me as the relevant discussions on  agency and structure are found 
waded with explanations of other complex political science, international relations, 
organisational theory literature. In other words, the discussions in these literature are 
made in reference to wider discipline specific concepts, which made it quite difficult, 
time taking and at times, frustrating for me to get my head around. Here, Colin 
Hay’s book entitled, ‘Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction’, specifically, the 
chapter that synthesises the different positions on the agency/structure debate, 
chapter 3, was highly useful for me to be able to trace the different strands of the 
debate. It got to the book mid way through my reading on the subject, but still, 
hugely helped me organise my thinking and make sense of the multi-disciplinary 
material. 
Finally, as an Ethiopian public health professional turned researcher, the critical 
importance of the Global Fund grants and the CCM to the national health 
programme of the country was not lost to me. As described in chapter 4, the Global 
Fund grants represent the largest single source of support from the national health 
sector development programme. This is exemplified by the Fund’s support to the 
national antiretroviral therapy programme to provide lifelong therapy to more than 
300,000 people living with HIV/AIDS. I was reminded of the critical importance of 
the Fund, in the grand scheme of things, at different stages of the research journey. 
For instance, while processing a support letter from the Federal Ministry of Health 
for obtaining ethical approval from the National Science and Technology Ministry, 
the person in-charge with issuing the letter convened a committee to decide on 
granting me the letter, as the request this involved ‘a key donor’. During and after 
interviews, most participants indicated and gestured that the research did involve 
really sensitive issues.. During analysis and write-up of the data, I have accordingly 
sought to ensure that the data was interpreted and presented in a manner that 
reflected the weight of issues involved, whilst being true to the emerging data. 
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Chapter Four 
The Case: The Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) of the 
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB) and Malaria 
(GFATM) in Ethiopia 
4.1 Introduction 
	  
This chapter presents a description of the case under study, namely, the country 
coordinating mechanism (CCM) of the Global Fund in Ethiopia. It sets out to 
provide a historical and contextual demarcation of the key features of the case. To 
this end, the chapter starts by introducing the Global Fund to fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis (TB) and Malaria (hereafter referred to as the ‘Global Fund’ or the 
‘Fund’ in this study) by discussing its genesis and evolution as a ‘global public-
private partnership mechanism’ and its basic structures and functions. Following on 
from this, the chapter describes the roles and position of ‘CCMs’ within this global 
structure; how they are envisaged to work as partnership platforms within host 
countries, and the guiding values and principles they are expected to adhere to. The 
chapter then delves into the particular structure and partnership modalities of the 
CCM in Ethiopia (the ‘Ethiopian CCM’ or ‘CCM/E’) and outlines where the CCM 
sits within the broad health aid coordination structure in the country. Finally, the 
chapter describes key aspects of the Ethiopian setting, particularly, the key social and 
economic indicators, the systems of government and administration, and the 
different attributes of the health system.  
In so doing, the chapter seeks to set the scene for the ensuing discussion of findings 
in the empirical chapters (5 – 7) and the discussion and conclusion chapter (8).  
4.2 The Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (The Global Fund) 
	  
The Global Fund was established in 2002 with the aim of fighting ‘three of the 
deadliest infectious diseases the world has ever known’, which had been cause to 6 
million deaths worldwide in the year 2000 alone (GFHATM 2014). Some important 
events are highlighted in the literature as precursors to the establishment of the 
Global Fund. These include: the report of the World Health Organisation’s 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, which emphasised the detrimental 
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effects of the three diseases on economic development and poverty reduction efforts, 
thereby calling for increased investment for fighting these diseases globally (WHO 
2001, Radelet 2004, Cgdev 2013); the G-8 summit in Okinawa in July 2000, where 
the heads of state of the G-8 countries agreed to ‘implement an ambitious plan on 
infectious diseases, notably HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis’(G8 2000, Radelet 
2004); the Abuja declaration, whereby African leaders called for increased support 
for fighting the three diseases in Africa (African Union 2001); the call by the then 
UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan, to set up a new fund for fighting the three 
diseases with an outlay of 7 – 10 Billion dollars a year (Radelet 2004, Ingram 2009), 
and the subsequent agreement reached at the UN General Assembly’s Special 
Session on AIDS to form a ‘new fund’ (UN 2001).  
Although these milestones are important for the evolution of the Fund, the institution 
is not a mere evolutionary outcome of these events. Its emergence as a global public-
private partnership, in the manner that it did, is said to be rooted within wider 
changes in the realms of international politics and global governance (Maciocco and 
Stefanini 2007). While these changes in the global health governance system have 
been discussed at length in chapter 2, they will be discussed here from the 
perspective of the evolution of the Global Fund. 
A critical turning point in the historical evolution of the Global Fund relates to the 
controversies that surrounded the glaring inequalities witnessed in access to AIDS 
treatment between patients in developing countries and those in advanced settings, in 
the 1990s. This was very crucial for catapulting HIV/AIDS to the top of the global 
political agenda (Ingram 2009). In this respect, activisms by global networks of 
CSOs, faith based organisations, academia, and some developing country 
governments were aimed at intellectual property right regimes, the ‘Big Pharma’ and 
particular governments (the US government mainly) that were seen to be reinforcing 
a system of gross inequalities (Behrman 2004, Ingram 2009). At the same time, 
some middle income countries, namely, South Africa, Thailand, India and Brazil, 
had run into legal battles against the Intellectual Property Right Regimes as they 
sought to either produce and export generic drugs or import them for availing to their 
populations through their health systems (Olesen 2006, Ingram 2009) .  
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These contestations set the scene for the search of a global solution. However, the 
way the solution was ultimately designed did not merely reflect the wishes and 
agenda of the activists. Rather, the solutions reflect a negotiated settlement between 
the egalitarian, equity orientated, ‘health for all’ agenda championed by global 
activists on the one hand, and the prevailing neoliberal world order and the ways of 
rationalisation and operationalisation that it represents, on the other (Ingram 2009). 
Ingram (2009) argues that global public private initiatives such as the Global Fund 
essentially constitute neoliberal solutions devised to tackle problems precipitated by 
a neoliberal world order in the first place: 
‘Yet, while neoliberalism has provoked a variety of social crises, it is a mark 
of its ability to colonise social relations that solutions to them have also 
increasingly been articulated in broadly neoliberal terms, via ideas of 
network governance, partnership and entrepreneurialism and underpinned 
by diverse technologies of surveillance, transparency and 
competition.’(Ingram 2009; p. 84)   
Specifically, the global HIV/AIDS response is seen as falling short of the ‘health for 
all’ aspirations of global activists, instead being limited to targeted interventions and 
specific outcomes related to particular aspects of HIV/AIDS treatment and control. 
Here, it is not just what the new global health initiatives such as the Global Health 
and PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) achieved or failed to 
achieve in terms of the global fight against HIV/AIDS, but what they represent in 
terms of broader public health debates such as the holistic versus targeted/vertical 
approaches debate. In this respect, it is claimed that the Global Fund ‘typifies’ the 
‘substantial shift from a publicly funded, comprehensive system approach to 
ensuring the right of health for all (enshrined in the Alma Ata Declaration) to a 
privately-influenced, segmented, “just-for-some” provision of health care goods and 
services’ (Maciocco and Stefanini 2007; p. 47) 
Critics also cite yet another anomaly regarding the way the Fund was set up. In this 
respect, the way the Global Fund was established outside of the UN structure was 
seen as a departure from traditional ways of doing business in international health. 
Specifically, the fact that such a major global health initiative was setup outside the 
WHO was seen as signifying a major step in terms of charting a new direction in 
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global health governance. Especially, coming on the backdrop of the structural 
adjustment years of the 1990s where the WHO was increasingly ceding influence in 
international health affairs to the global financial institutions, such as the World 
Bank (Parker 2002), the advent of the Global Fund further heralded the decline of 
traditional actors in global health governance affairs. Accordingly, as Maciocco and 
Stefanini argue, the rise of the Fund did not just represent a casual phenomenon:  
The GF [Global Fund] is not a casual initiative, nor is it the fruit of an 
improvised political event (G8 Genoa). It is the direct consequence of a chain 
of circumstances and political choices that reflect the history of international 
health institutions and organizations (Maciocco and Stefanini 2007; p. 486) 
In a nutshell, the Global Fund is seen as a manifestation of deeper changes in the 
global governance field. Specifically, it is seen as representing changes in the 
configurations of the positions of, and power relationships between, actors in the 
global health governance field. Further more, its narrow focus on the three diseases 
is seen as part of a wider trend of moving away from commitments towards a holistic 
approach in public health, which were strongly reflected in international public 
health accords of the past, such as the Alma Ata declaration of 1978. Its design is 
also seen as incorporating neoliberal values and approaches, as seen in the public-
private model of governance it adopted and its performance based funding system. 
The next section describes the structures and key functions of the Global Fund. 
4.3 The Global Fund: structures and key functions 
	  
The Global Fund was set up in 2002 as a public-private foundation to ‘raise, manage 
and disburse’ additional funding to countries to support their fight against HIV/AIDS, 
TB and Malaria (GFATM 2015).  The Fund currently supports programmes in more 
than 140 countries, with cumulative expenditures of close to 30 billion dollars to 
date (GFATM 2015). Upon its formal establishment on January 29, 2002, the aim of 
the Global Fund was scribed as: 
“to attract, manage and allocate added resources through a new private 
public partnership providing a significant and sustainable contribution to 
the reduction of the infection, illness and mortality caused by HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, mitigating their impact on needy countries and 
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aiding poverty reduction as part of the ‘Millennium Development 
Objectives.”(Maciocco and Stefanini 2007) 
This section introduces the global structure of the Global Fund that was set up with 
the aim of meeting the above stated objectives of the Fund. The global structure of 
the Fund is composed of the Board, the Secretariat, the Technical Review Panel 
(TRP), the Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCM), the Local Fund Agents, the 
Principal Recipients, and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). In this section, 
these different structures making up the Fund are described briefly with a view of 
setting the scene for a more detailed discussion of the CCM in section 4.4. 
The overall governance of the Global Fund rests on the Board, whose members 
comprise representatives from donor countries, private foundations, CSOs, and 
people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) associations. The Board has 20 voting 
members and 8 non-voting members with advisory roles. The Board oversees the 
strategic directions of the Fund, its external relations, and performance and risk 
management aspects (GFATM 2015). Management of the day-to-day affairs of the 
Global Fund is undertaken by the Global Fund Secretariat, which includes a quite 
significant number of staff members (600) at its headquarters in Geneva (GFATM 
2015). The Secretariat undertakes the tasks of overseeing country grant portfolios, 
disbursement of funds, monitoring and evaluation of country programmes and 
external relations with donors (GFATM 2015). The Technical Review Panel (TRP) 
comprise a group of independent experts that review and assess country proposals 
against technical and scientific criteria. The Office of the Inspector General, which is 
set-up to function independently of the Secretariat, has the responsibility for carrying 
out periodic financial audits and investigating cases of fraud and mismanagement. 
Unlike more conventional approaches to aid, the Global Fund Secretariat has no 
presence in recipient countries, except for the periodic monitoring and evaluation 
visits by the respective grant portfolio managers and related officials. The 
groundwork in terms of collecting data from the Principal Recipients, doing capacity 
assessments and verifying the reports is done through the Local Fund Agents 
assigned in each country. These agents serve as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the Global 
Fund in the country of operation (GFATM 2015). In the case of Ethiopia, it is the 
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) that has been tasked with this 
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responsibility. Principal Recipients (PRs) are organisations that are designated by 
CCMs as recipients and managers of Global Fund grants. They could be government 
agencies, CSOs or faith-based organisations, which receive and manage Global Fund 
grants after approval of the country proposals by the Global Fund Secretariat. These 
agencies undertake the projects as specified in the country proposals and further 
disburse funding to other implementing organisations within their constituencies. In 
the case of the Ethiopian CCM, the designated PRs are the Ministry of Health (for 
malaria, TB and AIDS treatment, and diagnostics and health care related grants), the 
Federal HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office (for prevention interventions 
including prevention of mother to child transmission) and Ethiopia Interfaith Forum 
for Development and Action (EIFDA) and the Network of networks of HIV 
Positives in Ethiopia (NEP +). The latter, non-governmental organisations (EIFDA 
and NEP +) were included as a PR in 2007 through the application submitted for the 
Global Fund’s round 7 grants (GFATM 2015). The next section discusses the 
constitution and functions of the country coordinating mechanisms (CCMs) in detail. 
4.4 Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) 
	  
The Global Fund’s country coordinating mechanisms are established within recipient 
countries as multi-sectoral and multi-organisational partnership mechanisms in order 
to facilitate identification of in-country needs, development of joint/country 
proposals to access Global Fund grants, and to jointly monitor and follow-up 
implementation of projects and utilisation of funds (table 2) (GFHATM 2014).  The 
CCMs designate a chair and co-chair from amongst the participating organisations to 
act as chairpersons of the CCM meetings and coordinate other tasks of the CCM. 
During proposal preparation, they also nominate the PRs that would directly receive 
the grants from the Global Fund for execution of the projects specified within the 
country proposals, and to disburse grants to other implementing organisations 
(GFHATM 2014).  
In terms of their constitution, CCMs are expected to be composed of actors drawn 
from the main stakeholders involved in fighting the three diseases (HIV/AIDS, TB 
and Malaria) at the national level, namely: ‘public and private sectors, including 
governments, multilateral or bilateral agencies, non-governmental organisations, 
	  
 
84	  
academic institutions, private businesses and people living with the diseases’ (table 
2)(GFHATM 2014). CCMs are considered ‘central to the Global Fund's 
commitments to local ownership and participatory decision-making’ (GFHATM 
2014). In fact, CCMs, along with the multi-sectoral representation at the Global 
Fund’s Board in Geneva, represent the way in which the Global Fund’s 
commitments to partnership are operationalized within the Fund’s structure. The 
Global Fund has identified ‘partnership’ as one of its key principles of action, along 
with ‘country ownership’ and ‘performance based funding’, whereby it states that 
‘all those involved in the fight [against the three diseases] should be involved in the 
decision-making process’ (GFATM 2015) (table 3). In terms of how the CCMs are 
actually organised within countries, the directives of the Global Fund have left the 
options open for countries to either form new multi-sectoral mechanisms in 
accordance with the above described criteria or adopt existing multi-sectoral 
coordination mechanisms that meet the criteria (Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005, Alemu 
2009). In the case of Ethiopia, and most recipient countries, CCMs were organised 
anew, outside of any pre-existing structures (Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005). 
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Table 2: Global Fund’s description of the CCM, Source: the Global Fund (GFHATM 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: The Global Fund’s Guiding Principles, Source: The Global Fund (GFATM 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Principles 
Everything the Global Fund does – from governance to grant-making – is based upon three key principles. 
1: Country Ownership – The countries where we support programs to fight AIDS, TB and malaria know how to 
solve their own problems. The principle of country ownership means that countries determine their own solutions to 
fighting these three diseases, and take full responsibility for ensuring the implementation of these solutions. In this 
way, each country can tailor their response to their own political, cultural and epidemiological context. 
2: Performance-based funding – That means that on going financing is dependent upon performance. While initial 
funding is awarded based on the strength of a proposal, continued funding is dependent upon the demonstration of 
proven results. In essence, countries must be able to show where the money has been spent and what results have 
been achieved with that money in order to continue to receive on going funding. 
3: Partnership – The only way to defeat AIDS, TB and malaria is by working together. Under the Global Fund 
business model, the work is carried out by all stakeholders working together, including government, civil society, 
communities living with the disease, technical partners, the private sector, faith-based organizations, academics, and 
other multilateral and bilateral agencies All those involved in the fight should be involved in the decision-making 
process. 
Together, country ownership, performance-based funding and partnership form the foundation of the Global Fund 
model.  
Country Coordinating Mechanisms 
Country Coordinating Mechanisms are central to the Global Fund's commitment to local ownership and participatory 
decision-making. These country-level multi-stakeholder partnerships develop and submit grant proposals to the 
Global Fund based on priority needs at the national level. After grant approval, they oversee progress during 
implementation. Country Coordinating Mechanisms include representatives from both the public and private sectors, 
including governments, multilateral or bilateral agencies, non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, 
private businesses and people living with the diseases. 
For each grant, the Country Coordinating Mechanism nominates one or more public or 
private organizations to serve as Principal Recipients.  
CCM Core Functions: 
• Coordinate the development and submission of national proposals.  
• Nominate the Principal Recipient.  
• Oversee implementation of the approved grant and submit requests for continued funding.  
• Approve any reprogramming and submit requests for continued funding.  
Ensure linkages and consistency between Global Fund grants and other national health and development programs. 
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4.5 The Ethiopian CCM 
	  
The CCM in Ethiopia was first established in 2002 (CCM/E 2004). The Ethiopian 
CCM’s operational guideline (CCM/E 2004) states that the CCM in Ethiopia 
‘derives its legal status from the government, represented by the Federal Ministry of 
Health (MoH), Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) and 
HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office (HAPCO)’.  The membership of the 
CCM/E, which has been set at a ceiling of 15 members at any one time, is made up 
of voting and non-voting members and it has been specified that the chairperson 
would be drawn from the public sector (CCM/E 2004). Since the establishment of 
the CCM/E, the chairperson position has been occupied by the Minister of Health. 
As seen in table 4, the guideline further specifies the particular organisations and 
departments that would represent the different sectors. In the table, the left hand 
column specifies the organisations that have been designated as potential members, 
while the right hand column presents the list of actual member organisations as 
identified during the fieldwork.  
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Table 4: Specification of CCM members and actual members identified during 
the fieldwork 
 
Concerning the format of the meetings, it has been specified that the CCM meetings 
would happen at least every months and that they would involve CCM voting 
members as well as non-voting members, who are in turn made up of the technical 
advisors of the CCM members and any member of the public who has expressed 
interests to observe the meetings. The non-voting members are allowed to join in and 
contribute towards the discussions during the meetings, but cannot participate in the 
Voting Members of the CCM shall be: 
 
i. Government as represented by the 
Minister of Health (Chairman of 
CCM/E), Head of PPD [Programme 
and Planning Department], Head of 
Disease Prevention and Control, 
Director of Ethiopian Health and 
Nutrition Research Institute 
(EHNRI), and Director General of 
HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control 
Office (HAPCO); 
ii. Two representatives of the Health, 
Population and Nutrition (HPN) 
Donor’s Group; 
iii. Two representatives of United 
Nations Theme Group, with WHO as 
the CCM/E Secretary; 
iv. A representative of NGOs and/or 
civil society, CRDA as vice chair of 
CCM/E; 
v. Network of networks of HIV 
Positives in Ethiopia; 
vi. Professional Association; 
 
vii. Private Sector; and 
 
viii. Religious/faith based organisation 
 
Source: Structure and Functions of CCM/E 
(CCM/E 2004) 
Actual members as identified during the 
field work: 
i. The Minster of Health or the Vice 
Minister, the Director    General of 
HAPCO and the corresponding heads of 
the MoH Departments (Head of PPD, 
Head of Disease Prevention and Control, 
Director of EHNRI, and Director of 
HAPCO) 
 
 
 
ii. The US and French Embassies (The 
latter handed over membership to DFID 
during the field work) 
iii. WHO (The World Health Organisation) 
and UNAIDS (United Nations Joint 
Programme on HIV/AIDS) 
iv. The Christian Relief and Development 
Association (CRDA) 
v. NEP + (Network of People Living with 
HIV/AIDS) 
vi. Ethiopian Public Health Association 
 
vii. Ethiopian Employers’ Association 
 
viii. EIFDA (Ethiopian Interfaith 
Development Association) 
 
ix. Confederation of Ethiopian Trade 
Unions (also representing the private 
sector) 
(Source: Field observation document 
review) 
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decision-making processes. In reality, the meetings happen less often, and tend to be 
influenced by how busy particular periods of time are. In this regard, participants 
pointed out that the proposal submission period was the busiest period, hence 
meetings would occurred even more frequently than every two months during these 
periods. During the time of my fieldwork (January, 2013 to July, 2013), only one 
meeting was held as the other meetings were postponed.  
The CCM meetings are open to everyone and observers only need to notify the 
secretariat ahead of time to be granted access (CCM/E 2004). During the CCM/E 
meeting of June 13, 2013, which was the meeting that I was able to observe, there 
were a total of 10 voting members along with the head of the CCM/E secretariat who 
was present in a non-voting capacity. Three voting members, specifically, 
representatives of WHO, EHNRI and the Employers Federation, had sent their 
apologies ahead of time and did not participate. In addition to the voting members 
that were present, some experts drawn from the participating organisations were 
present at the meeting in a non-voting capacity. These were drawn from the 
following institutions: Federal Ministry of Health (3), EIFDA (2), NEP + (1), and 
HAPCO (2). The final list of participants included participants who were present 
with an observer status. These included people who had notified the secretariat of 
their intention to participate, and who have accordingly come along to the meeting in 
order to observe and participate in the meetings. The list of persons who participated 
in this category include: 3 representatives from a local NGO, 1 representative from 
the local fund agent (UNOPS), 1 representative from PEPFAR, 2 representatives 
from the Global Fund Secretariat and 1 representative from the Clinton Health 
Access Initiative (CHAI). My own participation as a non-participant observer was 
made possible in the same way, whereby I had requested permission from the 
CCM/E Secretariat in order to undertake the non-participant observation. 
The other two entities organised within the CCM in Ethiopia are the ‘CCM 
Secretariat’ and the in-country ‘Technical Review Panel (TRP)’. The head of the 
office of the Secretariat, who is known as ‘the Secretary’ in the setting, has 
responsibilities of facilitating the smooth running of the work of the CCM through 
catering for the day-to-day administrative and logistical needs of the CCM/E. The 
Secretary organises the CCM meetings, takes the minutes of all the meetings and 
participates as a non-voting member of the CCM. On the other hand, the set-up of 
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the TRP mirrors the design of the Global Fund’s TRP and is made up of 8 – 11 
independent experts drawn from different fields such as ‘public health, clinical 
medicine, socio-behavioural sciences, and individuals with experience in developing, 
implementing and assessing relevant programmes in resource limited 
settings’(CCM/E 2004). This task force is mainly organised to undertake review of 
projects submitted for funding by different organisations to solicit support from the 
grants received by the CCM from the Global Fund. It is specified within the 
guidance documents that the members of the TRP would function at a personal or 
professional capacity and not in relation to their positions within their organisations 
of origin, and that they would not participate in proposals where an institution(s) 
they are related to had submitted a proposal.  
In terms of the achievements of the CCM, the grant portfolio of the Ethiopian CCM 
reveals that over 1.7 billion dollars have been disbursed to Ethiopia to date, which 
represents the largest grant portfolio of any country (GFHATM 2014). As can be 
seen in table 5, around 2/3rd of all funding has been allocated to the HIV/AIDS sector 
(GFHATM 2014). It is also worth noting that the lion’s share (96 %) of the 
US$ 1,743,811,423 received to date from the Global Fund has been channelled 
through the designated PRs coming from the public sector (MoH and HAPCO) 
(GFHATM 2014). Table 6 shows some of the results attributed to the Global Fund 
grants (GFHATM 2014). 
Table 5: Global Fund Grant Portfolio, Ethiopia (GFHATM 2014) 
 
 
 
SIGNED FOR 
ETHIOPIA 
US$ 1,743,811,423 
 
 
 
HIV/AIDS 
US$ 1,083,482,984  
 
 
Tuberculosis 
US$ 150,193,141  
 
 
Malaria 
US$ 489,623,075 
 
 
Health Systems 
Strengthening 
 
US$ 20,512,223 
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Table 6: Key Results attributed to the Global Fund grants in Ethiopia 
(GFHATM 2014)  
 
4.6 The CCM and aid coordination in Ethiopia 
	  
‘Although we appreciate the support accorded to us by development partners, 
the innumerable plans, budget channels and reporting requirements are 
causing serious burden to the already weak health system and capacity we 
have’ 
- Dr. Tedros Adhanom Gebreyesus (Minister of Health, 
Ethiopia) Source: HSDP Aid Harmonisation Manual 
(FMOH 2007) 
In view of the difficulties associated with coordinating multiple sources of external 
support, as indicated in the Minister’s description above, the government of Ethiopia 
urges all actors to strive towards the vision of a ‘One-Plan, One-Budget and One-
Report approach at all levels of the health system’ so that the transaction costs 
associated with the multiple sources of support are minimised (FMOH 2007, FMoH 
2010). In other words, the ideal situation is a pooled fund system that can be used to 
support the national health sector development plan (HSDP), rather than the current 
situation where the public sector deals with multiple sources of external support. In 
this regard, the government had signed a joint code of conduct back in 2005 with the 
development partners (donors) for coordination of support around one plan (the 
HSDP) (FMoH 2005). The government further signed a country level partnership 
compact with 13 development partners (FMoH 2008), which culminated in the 
signing of a joint financing arrangement (JFA) to support the so called MDG 
 
People currently  
on ART 
330,000 
 
New smear-positive  
TB cases detected and treated 
418,000 
 
Nets distributed  
(ITNs & LLINs) 
42,000,000 
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Performance Fund1 (FMoH 2009, MoH 2011). The Ministry of Health (MoH) has 
issued a code of conduct for harmonisation of ‘the existing fragmented programme 
and/or donor specific coordination mechanisms’ (FMOH 2007).  
Accordingly, the following coordination mechanisms have been instituted: central 
joint steering committee (CJSC), the FMoH (Federal Ministry of Health) – 
Development partners joint consultative meeting, the joint core coordinating 
committee (JCCC), FMoH – RHBs joint steering committee and the annual review 
meetings (ARM). The importance of these mechanisms is highlighted within HSDP 
IV, whereby it states that: 
The Inter-sectoral collaborations will be practiced at different levels of the 
health system through the formal government institutions (such as regional 
and woreda councils) and health sector governance structures (such as CJSC, 
RJSC and WJSC) (FMoH 2010; p. 74) 
The CJSC is the highest ‘governance body’ nationally and a platform for key 
decision makers from the different sectors to come together to discuss overall policy 
issues, institutional arrangements and mobilise resources for the HSDP (FMOH 
2007). It especially focuses on ‘core tracker’ programmes, namely, ‘the national 
health extension programme, HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control, Human Resources 
Development, Reproductive and Family Health/population and Health Systems 
strengthening’(FMOH 2007). The CJSC is chaired by the Minister of Health and 
seeks to bring together high level representatives from the Ministry of Health and 
other federal government bodies, development partners (Bilateral and multilateral 
donors), NGOs, the private sector and health professionals’ associations (FMOH 
2007). In practice, while the representation of the government and development 
partners is very prominent, representation of CSOs and other actors is quite limited, 
whereby CSOs are represented only through the Consortium of Christian Relief and 
Development Agency (CCRDA) in this mechanism (Alemu 2009).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  ‘is a pooled funding mechanism managed by the FMOH using Government's procedures, which provides 
specific federal  
grants for public goods and capacity building activities within the framework of health system strengthening. It is 
one of the GoE’s (Government of Ethiopia’s) preferred modalities for scaling up Development Partners‟ 
assistance in support of HSDP’ FMoH (2009). Joint Financing Arrangement Between The Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia And Development Partners on the Support To The MDG Fund. Addis Ababa, Federal 
Ministry of Health.	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The CJSC is designed to meet every quarter, although in reality, it ‘meets far less 
often’ whereas the other committees (JCCC) do meet regularly (Alemu 2009, FMoH 
2010). In fact, it has proven difficult to convene the high level representatives of the 
development partners, such as the Ambassadors and Heads of Diplomatic Missions, 
as specified in the CJSC. On the other hand, the JCCC, which concerns the technical 
officers drawn from these organisations, meets far more regularly (Alemu 2009). 
During the fieldwork of this study, it was observed that participants recognised the 
JCCC, wheras most have not even heard of the CJSC. 
The Ministry of Health also has an in-house consultative forum that aims to bring 
together the two critical levels of government, that is, the federal and regional levels 
through the FMoH-RHBs Joint Steering Committee. These are held every 2 months 
and focus on implementation related issues and on facilitating communication and 
coordination between the two levels of government. The ARMs (Annual Review 
Meetings) on the other hand bring together a broad set of actors from all levels of 
governance, from the federal down to the woreda levels, annually. Over 200 
participants take part in these meetings, whereby annual action plans of the HSDP 
are formulated and periodic evaluation results discussed. The CCM was seen by 
some participants as duplicating the efforts the JCCC, as it involves the same 
partners exclusively for coordinating the Global Funded activities (Alemu 2009). It 
was learnt during the fieldwork that some actors have been asking for merging the 
CCM with the JCCC, while others have resisted this suggestion based on an 
assessment that doing so would curtail the broad based participation of non State 
actors achieved in the CCM. 
4.7 The Study Setting: Ethiopia 
	  
This section presents an overview of the social, political and economic situation in 
the country. Specifically, it outlines on the socio-economic situation, the national 
government and administrative systems and key health indicators, with emphasis on 
HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria. 
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Figure 3: Map of Ethiopia source: WHO (WHO 2015) 
4.7.1 Socio-economic situation 
	  
Ethiopia is one of the oldest nations on earth. It is the only African country that has 
remained independent throughout the era of colonialism. As can be seen in the map 
above, it is situated in the volatile region commonly known as the horn of Africa. It 
has the second largest population in Africa, estimated at more than 84 million (CSA 
2011). As common with most developing countries, the population pyramid is 
characterised by a broad base, whereby 64 % of the population are under the age of 
24 years and just around 4.6 % are above 65 years of age (CSA 2010). Ethiopia is 
made up of diverse ethnic groups and nationalities who speak over 80 languages 
(ICF 2011). It is one of the least urbanised countries in the world; most of the 
population live in the rural area (83.6 %) and agriculture remains the back bone of 
the economy contributing towards 43.2 % of GDP and 80 % of exports (FMoH 
2010). Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 173 out of 187 
countries on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2013). 
The country has been making significant strides in the last two decades towards 
poverty alleviation and social and economic development. The human development 
report of 2010, which also marks the 20th anniversary of the launch of the report, 
ranked the country at 11th position amongst the list of ‘HDI movers’ in the world or 
countries that brought about substantial progress in human development (UNDP 
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2010). The country has been making sustained economic growth of more than 10 % 
of GDP since 2003 (MOFED and UNDP 2010). The Ethiopian Government has 
developed a reputation for ‘pro-poor’ focus, whereby over 60 % of government 
expenditures are said to be dedicated to poverty related sectors such as agriculture, 
health, education and infrastructure (MOFED and UNDP 2010). The past two 
decades have seen: the quadrupling of primary school enrolments, halving of child 
mortality rates, doubling of the number of people with access to clean water, and a 
reduction in the poverty head count from 42 % in 2000 to 29.6 % in 2010/11 (The 
World Bank 2011, MOH and UNDP 2014). Except for MDGs 1 and 8, which are 
said to be ‘possible to achieve if some changes are made’, the UN has assigned 
Ethiopia’s progress towards MDGs, a favourable designation of ‘very likely to be 
achieved, on track’ (MDG Monitor 2011).  
The country is highly donor dependent, it ranks 9th on the OECD’s list of top official 
development assistance (ODA) recipient countries (OECD-DAC 2015). However, 
given its large population, the aid figure works out at 36 USD per capita, which lies 
on the lower side of the average figure for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (50 USD 
per capita)(DAG 2014). In addition, it faces numerous challenges that threaten the 
poverty alleviation and development efforts. Oxfam estimates that the country loses 
around 1.1 billion USD every year due to recurrent droughts, which almost 
completely erodes the support gained from foreign aid (Oxfam 2009). 
4.7.2 The national government and administrative systems  
	  
The history of government in Ethiopia is characterised by a long monarchical 
tradition extending back centuries, which came to an end after a military coup of the 
last monarch, Emperor Haile Selassie I, in 1974. The military Marxist government 
then governed for a period of 17 years; a period characterised by a long civil war and 
a programme of ‘extensive socialist state engineering’(Vaughan 2011; p. 621). The 
current government came into power in 1991, when the then rebel groups, the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), toppled the heavily 
armed military government after a bitterly fought armed struggle. Since then, the 
government’s defining project has been the dismantling of a ‘pan-Ethiopian identity’ 
and establishment of an ethnic based federalist system, which is intent on devolution 
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of power and authority to the semi-autonomous, ethnic based administrative regions 
(Loukeris 2005, Abbink 2011; p. 596).  
 
Accordingly, the country is administratively divided into 9 semi autonomous, ethnic 
based regions, namely: Afar, Amhara, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambela, Harar, Oromia, 
Somali, Southern Nations Nationalities and People’s Region, and Tigray) and two 
chartered cities (the capital, Addis Ababa, and Dire Dawa) (Loukeris 2005). The 
Regional States are further divided into Wordedas (districts), which are the basic 
decentralised administrative unit. The Woredas are in turn made up of 16, 253 
Kebeles, which are the smallest administrative unit (FMoH 2010). The coordination 
and administration of social services such as health and education are organised 
across these levels of administration. 
 
The federal system of government includes 3 branches of government: the executive, 
the legislative (a bicameral parliament) and the judiciary branches. The executive 
branch includes the office of the prime minister, the council of ministers and the 
council of state. The bicameral parliament consists of a legislative body, that is, the 
council of people’s representative (547 members elected in single-seat constituencies) 
and the Council of Federation which is charged with interpreting the constitution 
(110 members coming from the ethnic nationalities and one additional member 
determined by population number) (Loukeris 2005).  
 
The country’s constitution adopted in 1994 assures a democratic system of 
governance with full compliments of multi-party democracy, personal liberties, and a 
shift from the military regime’s command economy system towards a liberalised one 
(Gudina 2011). However, the government are not seen to have shed off their Marxist 
tendencies, deeply inculcated during the days of the armed struggle. Instead, the 
government appear to have adapted to changing scenarios of a different geo-political 
context through a distinctive ideological orientation called ‘revolutionary 
democracy’, which in turn prioritises sustained economic development through the 
creation and enhanced involvement of a ‘developmental State’ (Loukeris 2005, Bach 
2011). This has translated into a less than whole sale buy into liberalism, instead 
giving rise to a system that mimics ‘electoral authoritarianism’(Gudina 2011) or the 
Leninist-Marxist model of ‘democratic centralism based on a vanguard party’ 
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(Loukeris 2005, Bach 2011; p. 643). Despite an uninterrupted rule over the last 24 
years, the reign of the government has been characterised by continuous 
contestations of its approaches by opposition groups, the media, CSOs and human 
rights advocates from within and outside the country (El-Saharty, Kebede et al. 2009, 
Hagmann and Abbink 2011). 
4.7.3 Population health status 
	  
The vital statistics for health and wellbeing reveal poor but improving conditions. 
The life expectancy at birth for both sexes stands at 64 years (WHO 2012). The 
maternal mortality ratio and the under 5 mortality rate are reported at 420 per 
100,000 live births and 68 per 1,000 live births, respectively (WHO 2012). Between 
1980 and 2012, life expectancy at birth increased by 15.8 years, the bulk of the 
increase (12.6 years) coming during the reigns of the current government (UNDP 
2013). The country is one of 6 countries in Africa that have achieved the MDG target 
of reducing the under five mortality rate by 2/3rd before the 2015 deadline (UNECA, 
AU et al. 2014). While meeting the MDG target for maternal health, reduction of the 
maternal mortality ratio by 3 quarters, does not appear likely, reports for 2010 
indicate a reduction from 810 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990/91 to 350 
(UNECA, AU et al. 2014). The achilles heel for progress in maternal health is the 
low level of skilled birth attendance in the country, whereby just 10 % of deliveries 
were said to be attended by skilled attendants, falling significantly short of the 60 % 
target set within the MDG frameworks (UNECA, AU et al. 2014). 
There is a huge gap in the coverage of health care services and skilled human 
resources. The physician to population ratio is one of the lowest in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, with a ratio of 1: 36,1158 reported in 2009 (FMoH 2010, WHO 2015). In 
view of this gap, the government is focusing on an accelerated training of mid-level 
health workers like nurses and midwives, and has embarked on a flagship 
programme of training and deploying frontline community based health workers, 
through what is known as the ‘health extension programme’(FMoH 2010). The 
programme has now enabled the deployment of 34,000 female health workers at the 
community level for health promotion and prevention works, in efffect doubling the 
county’s health workforce (FMoH 2010, WHO 2015).  
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The Ethiopian health system is a three-tiered system comprising the tertiary level 
(specialised hospitals), the secondary level (generalised hospitals) and the primary 
health care level (a system of health centres, health posts and primary 
hospitals)(FMoH 2010). Health extension workers are posted at the health posts, the 
lowest level of the health system, serving 3,000 to 5,000 people with health 
promotion and basic curative services (WHO 2015). There is a huge divide between 
rural and urban areas in terms of access to services (WHO 2015). All in all, the 
public sector runs 122 hospital, 2,660 health centres and 15,095 health posts (MoH 
2011). In contrast, the private sector manages 63 hospitals (56 run by private for 
profit sector and 7 by non profit NGOs) and 4,088 clinics (MoH 2011). It is 
estimated that the private sector carried out around 40 % of all curative and 
rehabilitative services (Weller 2014). 
The top ten list of causes of morbidity mainly features infectious diseases including 
HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria: ‘malaria, prenatal and maternal death, acute respiratory 
infection, nutrition deficiency, diarrhoea and HIV/AIDS’ (WHO 2015). Although the 
HIV prevalence rate of 1.2 % is amongst the lowest in the region, it translates to a 
very high absolute number of people living with HIV/AIDS (790,000) due to the 
large population number (UNAIDS 2014). Currently, there are more than 300,000 
people receiving ART monthly, which represents quite a rapid scale-up from a mere 
900 people enrolled on the programme back in 2005 (Assefa, Jerene et al. 2009). The 
ART service is almost entirely supported by the Global Fund (GFATM 2014). 
Through a combination of nation-wide malaria prevention campaigns including long 
lasting insecticide treated bed nets (LLITNs) and anti-malaria sprays, and early 
detection and treatments of cases, the country has managed to reduce prevalence of 
malaria from 25 % to 15 % and cut down deaths due to malaria by more than 50 % 
(MOH and UNDP 2014). Ethiopia has the 7th highest TB burden in the world with a 
prevalence and mortality rates of 224 and 18 per 100,000 (MoH 2011, MOH and 
UNDP 2014). The country has achieved the MDG treatment access targets of over 
90 % (MOH and UNDP 2014). 
The fifth national health accounts report indicates that the country has managed to 
spend a total of USD 1.6 billion on health in 2010/11, which works out at a per 
capita spending of USD 20.77 (MoH 2011). This falls significantly short of the per 
capita spending of USD 34 recommended by the WHO Commission on Macro 
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Economics and Health (WHO 2015). The health sector is highly donor financed 
whereby, in the fiscal year 2010/11, donors contributed nearly half of all health 
expenditures, and 83 %, 79 %, and 51 % of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis 
related expenditures, respectively (MoH 2011).  
The large amount of external support also means that the sector involves a large 
amount of actors, in turn making it ‘a complex arena for aid processes’ (Pereira 2009; 
p. 15). Currently, a large number of actors are active in the health sector, including 
20 bilateral donors, 20 multilateral donors and 50 international donors (Alemu 2009, 
Pereira 2009). Since 2005, contributions from traditional donors have been surpassed 
by new, so called ‘vertical donors’, specifically the Global Fund and PEPFAR. The 
latter now represent the largest sources of donor support not just for the health sector, 
but compared to all donors in the country (Pereira 2009). 
4.8 Chapter Summary   
	  
This chapter has described key features of the case under study. In this regard, it has 
attempted to provide a historical and contextual description of the Global Fund and 
the CCM in Ethiopia. In addition, key features of the Ethiopian setting are described. 
Taken together, the descriptions of the case and the setting of study, provide a 
background for the ensuing discussion of results in the empirical chapters (5 – 7) and 
in the discussion and conclusion chapter (8). 
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Chapter Five 
Interplay between actors’ interactions, the CCM regulatory 
frameworks, and the deeper frames of reference in the Ethiopian 
setting 
5.1 Introduction 
  
This chapter presents an interpretation of the observed ways of interactions between 
actors against the structured-context, which in turn constitutes the CCM regulatory 
frameworks and the deeper frames of reference in the Ethiopian setting. The chapter 
is geared towards satisfying the sub-questions of this study related to understanding 
how actors interact in and around the CCM and why they interact in the manners 
observed in the study. The ‘why’ question specifically seeks to understand the role 
of the 2 layered context in influencing interactions between actors. As described 
above, the two-layered context in turn comprises the CCM regulatory frameworks 
and the deeper frames of reference in the Ethiopian setting. This approach of 
explaining the phenomenon of interest (interactions) with reference to context in turn 
reflects the critical realism paradigm and the theoretical lens adopted in this study 
(chapter 3).  
As discussed in chapter 3, the theoretical framework conceptualises observed trends 
in interactions between actors as a function of the interplay between actors’ agency 
and structure. This theoretical orientation essentially constitutes a refutation of the 
determinism of either actors’ ageneitic attributes or structural factors. Instead, 
observed trends in interactions between actors are conceptualised as a function of a 
dynamic (dialectical) interplay between actors agency and structure (Fligstein 1999, 
Gualini 2001, Long 2001, Hay 2002, Healey, De Magalhaes et al. 2003, Wagenaar 
and Cook 2003, Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004, Gonzalez Block 2006). The 
conceptualisation further emphasises the critical role of ideas, narratives and 
discourses in mediating this interplay between actors’ agency and structure (Marsh 
and Smith 2000, Long 2001, Hay 2002, Wagenaar and Cook 2003, González and 
Healey 2005).  
Accordingly, the chapter presents the ‘critical themes’ identified in the study based 
on participants’ characterisations of their lived experiences of interacting within the 
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CCM (interview data), followed by an interpretation of these theme in reference to 
the structured context (interviews and documents’ review). In so doing, the chapter 
seeks to tell a story of the interplay between the observed trends in interactions in the 
CCM and the structured context. In other words, it seeks to unravel the 
‘embeddedness’ of actors’ experiences within the structured context in which they 
occur. As mentioned at the outset, this is believed to enable the study to generate 
insights that would ultimately help satisfy the study’s aim of understanding ‘how 
cross-sectoral interactions occur in and around a partnership mechanism (CCM), in a 
developing country setting (Ethiopia)’.  
The critical themes related to actors’ characterisations of their lived experiences 
were generated from the interview data while the data on the pertinent factors 
emanating from the regulatory frameworks of the CCM and the deeper frames of 
reference in the setting come from interviews and document review. Documents in 
this regard comprise CCM guidance documents, policy and strategy papers, 
consultant and review panel reports, evaluation reports, national policy papers, 
political and economic commentaries, speeches, and academic papers that focus on 
the Ethiopian social, cultural, political and economic landscape (Appendix 3).  
As shown in table 7 hereunder, the chapter presents an explanation of the critical 
themes that were developed from actors’ characterisations of their lived experiences 
in interacting in and around the CCM with reference to the relevant factors 
emanating from the structured context (CCM regulatory factors and deeper frames of 
reference). The themes were identified through the thematic analysis approach laid 
out in chapter 3. These themes were then interpretively analysed in view of the data 
that describes the structured-context (both the CCM regulatory frameworks and the 
deeper frames of reference in the setting).  
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Table 7: Critical themes related to actors’ lived experiences in the CCM and 
the contextual factors that underlie these experiences  
  
Accordingly, the following sections (5.2 – 5.5) present a discussion of each critical 
theme along with an interpretation of the themes in reference to the pertinent factors 
emanating from the structured-context (CCM regulatory frameworks and the deeper 
frames of reference in the setting).  
A 
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Critical Themes (Actors’ characterisations of their lived experiences                                              
in interacting in the CCM) 
Critical theme I  
Asymmetric 
consensus  
Critical theme II   
Dominance of 
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5.2  Critical theme I: Asymmetric consensus 
	  
This critical theme relates to the routinisation of a consensus based decision making 
process in the CCM, although the ‘consensus’ may not necessarily reflect agreement 
from all actors on the decisions adopted. In other words, consensus based decision 
making is seen to have been routinised in the CCM, even on occasions when actors 
are not in agreement. The routinisation of the consensus based decision making 
process, to the exclusion of other forms of decision making such as voting, in turn 
entails asymmetric levels of compromise on the different actors involved. This 
section describes this observation, first describing the predominance of the 
consensus approach and then showing how this entails variable levels of 
compromises on the different actors participating in the CCM. 
The interviews conducted with all participants indicate that this consensus-based 
approach to decision making constitutes a routine trend or norm in the Ethiopian 
CCM. Indeed a consensual approach to decision-making has been prioritised within 
the constitution of the Ethiopian CCM and this provision in the CCM constitution is 
considered as one of the contextual factors that underlie this trend. However, the 
extent to which the consensus based decision-making approach has been routinised 
goes beyond the provisions entailed in the CCM constitution. Instead, the tendency 
to make decisions through consensus is seen as representing more of an established 
norm within the deliberation process. As the following quote from a CSO participant 
illustrates, the other approaches to decision making, such as voting, are hardly 
exercised, although they have been assured by the CCM constitution.  
Our representative in the CCM has a vote, however usually it is not through 
voting that decisions are made, it is through consensus. In cases where 
consensus could not be reached during a meeting, the agenda is retracted so 
that it could be reviewed further [so as to make it agreeable to all].  
- CSO participant III 
As mentioned earlier, this commitment to a consensus based decision-making 
process entails variable levels of compromise on the part of the different actors that 
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participate in the CCM. The compromises are to be made in favour of the ‘collective 
interest’, which essentially constitutes ensuring that the CCM country proposals win 
Global Fund grants. In addition, it involves ensuring a smooth process where the 
grants are utilised effectively and efficiently, so that access to subsequent rounds of 
grants are not compromised. The Global Fund grants have essentially been framed in 
the setting as constituting matters of national interest. As discussed in chapter 4, the 
Global Fund, along with PEPFAR, makes up the largest source of external finance to 
the health sector. It was evident from the interviews with participants from across the 
sectoral spectrum that this critical importance of the Global Fund grants to the 
national health system was not lost on them. Participants often used quite strong 
terms to describe matters related to the CCM, such as, ‘national interest’ and ‘the 
country’s image’, denoting the level of seriousness attached to the work of the CCM.  
Hence, actors participating in the CCM do so with acute awareness of the 
seriousness of the issues at stake for the nation as a whole. This in turn brings with it 
a sense of added responsibility on the part of actors to make critical compromises in 
order to make this partnership of ‘national importance’ work. In other words, the 
mechanism, as a whole, has been framed as being too important to fail, and everyone 
is hence expected to participate in a manner that reflects a sense of sensitivity and 
submission to this collective, national goal. Participants from across the different 
sectors imparted a sentiment that the processes related to the CCM do not merely 
constitute technical matters, but that they have ‘political’ connotations as well. 
Within this framework, the consensual decision making process is seen as a means 
of ensuring negotiated settlements over critical issues, in ways that safeguard and 
prioritise the collective interests that are at stake. The following quote from a public 
sector participant illustrates the role of the consensus approach within the context of 
the huge level of importance attached to the CCM’s work in the setting: 
 
In a context where you have very limited resources you depend more on 
consensus, it is not a context where you would simply hold out on a decision 
because you believe that your point of view may be right, this is not just a 
technical matter but a political one as well… so from start to submission of 
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the proposal, the process is based on consensus although you do leave room 
for evidence to govern the decision where evidence is available …  
- Public Sector participant XI  
Hence, in a setting with limited resources, the Global Fund grants effectively 
represent an issue of national interest, which in turn entails compromises on the part 
of every actor in order to make the partnership work and safeguard this national 
interest. This is a sentiment reflected by all participants that were interviewed. 
However, as indicated earlier, the compromise entailed by this consensual approach 
is seen to be different for different types of actors. Specifically, CSOs feel that they 
bear the burden of the compromises that have to be made in the process of reaching 
consensus. Study participants from CSOs expressed a sentiment that this consensual 
process essentially engages them in negotiations where the levers of influence are 
lopsided in favour of the public sector. For CSOs, the high level of importance 
attached to the CCM (an issue of ‘national interest’), makes it highly sensitive to 
abrogate this established procedure of consensual decision-making, even when they 
do not agree with the decisions adopted finally.  
CSO and donor participants relayed a sentiment that public sector representatives are 
quite assertive in the deliberations that take place within this framework of 
consensus-based decision-making. CSO participants and some donor participants 
also observed that donor agencies are reluctant to weigh in on these deliberations, 
essentially leaving the CSOs to fend for themselves in the negotiations with the 
public sector. The normative expectations amongst CSO participants, as reflected in 
the interviews, appear to be that donors are relatively well positioned and powerful 
to counter the influences of the public sector. The CSOs essentially believe that 
although donors support the pluralisation of decision-making processes and the 
enhanced involvement of the CSOs, they assume a cautious stance when it comes to 
acting in concert with this belief. This position and role of donors is further explored 
in section 5.3, where actors’ perceptions of each other are discussed. The following 
quotes from a CSO participant and a donor agency participant exemplify the points 
discussed above in relation to the lop-sidedness of the compromises made in the 
consensus-making process and how the cautious stance of donors contributes to this 
trend. 
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‘So, we all look out for the country’s image at the end of the day, that is the 
meeting point, we all want the funds to come to Ethiopia. And so we do 
hassle to get our points across as much as we can in the discussions, but we 
finally compromise, there hasn’t been any occasion where we held out on a 
decision, and they are flexible to some extent as well [the public sector 
representatives], although the arguments can be quite hard at times …  
                  - CSO Participant XI 
So when you talk about consensus building within the CCM, it does not 
reflect a real dialogue process but rather a modality I discussed earlier, so 
how it goes is that if the government brings a proposed decision to the 
meeting and it says that we need to do certain things in this and that way, the 
government says these things based on a number of considerations, donors 
usually choose to remain silent but the CSOs go out of the meeting unhappy. 
So the donors leave the meeting in silence, the CSOs leave visibly unhappy, 
and the government gets its way with its predetermined agenda. 
- Multilateral donor participant III  
A donor participant further highlighted that this consensus based approach has 
rendered the decisions adopted in the CCM largely predictable, in that no decisions 
adopted in the CCM would be expected to contravene public sector positions. The 
participant indicated that constituents of the donor group have now settled to 
receiving occasional updates from their representatives at the CCM, as the decisions 
adopted in the CCM have become all too familiar.  
… decisions are mainly made through consensus, you don’t find many 
dissentions to positions, so the bilateral representatives were feeling kind of 
comfortable with just being informed about the major decisions, just from 
time to time  
- Bilateral donor participant II  
The next section discusses the factors that emanate from the structured-context 
(regulatory frameworks of the CCM and the deeper frames of reference) that are 
seen to be related to this critical theme. As mentioned in the introduction section of 
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this chapter, the factors related to the structured-context were identified through 
interviews and the document review.  
CCM related factors that underlie critical theme I: formal rules and operational 
guidelines of the CCM, the composition of the CCM, and Global Fund principles 
The first factor that is considered to be associated with the critical theme, 
‘asymmetric consensus’, relates to the specification, within the operational 
guidelines of the Ethiopian CCM, that the consensus based approach constitutes the 
preferred approach of decision-making. In this regard, article XIIth of the Ethiopian 
CCM operational guideline, entitled, the ‘Structure and Functions of the Country 
Coordinating Mechanism of Ethiopia (CCM/E)’ (CCM/E 2004) reads: 
Decisions of the CCM/E shall be by consensus. In case of not reaching 
consensus, decision shall be based on simple majority and dissenters will be 
welcome to state their position in writing. 
This explicit emphasis on consensus making within the Ethiopian CCM’s 
operational guidelines constitutes a peculiar adaptation of the general guidance 
provided by the Global Fund globally. The word ‘consensus’ does not feature in the 
guidance document published by the Global Fund for CCMs worldwide (GFATM 
2002). While the Global Fund’s global guidance for CCMs includes statements that 
promote other principles such as country ownership, partnership and broad based 
participation, there is no statement indicating that decisions should be made through 
‘consensus’. The global guidance does impose requirements on CCMs to engage a 
broad range of stakeholders, but falls short of specifying the actual method of 
decision-making that is to be adopted.  
The statement in the Ethiopian constitution signifies that the default approach to 
decision-making process constitutes one of seeking to salvage the support of 
everyone involved through the consensus making process. Only on occasions where 
this fails would voting be considered. Even then, the language used in the article 
(‘dissenters’) is not seen to be too encouraging. Hence, the impulse for the 
established norm of making decisions through consensus is clearly rooted in the 
CCM’s operational guidelines. However, as discussed in the earlier section, the 
routinised norm of a consensual decision-making process cannot be explained 
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merely in reference to these directives, as it was seen to be routinised as the only 
approach towards decision making, to the exclusion of other decision making 
approaches assured in the guideline such as voting. 
Hence, other factors need to be explored. In this regard, another factor that appears 
to reinforce the observed routinisation of the consensus based decision-making 
process, to the exclusion of the voting route, is seen to relate to the composition of 
the CCM. As reviewed in chapter 4, public sector representatives (5 out of the 14 
voting members) make up the most potent voting bloc of any actor in the CCM. The 
other sectors have smaller numbers of representatives: 2 representatives each 
represent bilateral and multilateral donors, 3 seats go to CSOs (NGOs, faith based 
organisations, and networks of people living with HIV/AIDS), 1 seat goes to 
professional associations and 2 for the private sector. Over and beyond the head 
count, the ‘public sector’ represents a unified entity that functions under the same 
political and technical leadership. This gives it an advantage as a voting bloc. In 
contrast, the other members of the CCM, such as CSOs, donors, and the private 
sector, are bound to be afflicted by disparate ideological positions, beliefs and 
strategies that are bound to exist amongst the autonomous constituents that make up 
the sectors. For instance, ‘CSOs’, as a sector, constitute a faith-based organisations’ 
representative (EIFDA), the NGO umbrella organisation (CCRDA) and the Network 
of Networks of People Living With HIV/AIDS (NEP +), which are naturally likely 
to exhibit differences of positions on different issues. Donor participants have also 
reflected the difficulties faced with seeking to formulate common positions out of 
the different donor organisations that make up the sector.  
This signifies that calling for the vote does not really constitute a viable option for 
non-state actors in terms of getting their positions adopted as CCM decisions. The 
strength of the public sector as a voting bloc rules out the option of the vote as a 
viable alternative to the consensus based decision-making process. The following 
dialogue with a CSO participant exemplifies this point. The participant is explaining 
an instance where they went along with the ‘consensus decision’ although the 
decision was unfavourable to their organisation: 
Participant: …There were rounds of application where we wanted to apply 
on our own while the public sector wanted to make a joint application, the 
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decision of the CCM was that we should apply jointly, we did and the 
proposal failed 
Interviewer: I have heard that you [as an organisation] had other ideas, 
that you may have won had you applied on your own? 
Participant: We would have won, because the public sector had many issues 
at that time  
Interviewer: Could you not have put this argument forward then? 
Participant: Every decision is made through consensus. And you realise that 
you just have one vote, but the public sector has multiple votes, the Ministry 
of Health, HAPCO, and there are other civil society organisations that are 
known to support the public sector, so you realise you don’t have much 
power in that respect [if it went to votes], so rather than losing out on the 
whole thing, you decide to take up the option of applying with the public 
sector and see whether the proposal becomes successful or not, that’s your 
option, it is a case of doing cost benefit analysis, otherwise it was clear that 
applying with the public sector would not be a successful venture as the 
government had not settled some issues form previous rounds of funding 
[such completing performance and financial reports for the previous round 
of funding].  
       - CSO Participant XI 
Hence, the composition of the CCM essentially serves as an enforcer of the 
consensus based decision-making process. Besides the composition of the CCM and 
the provisions in the operational guidelines, some of the core principles and 
guidelines of the Global Fund are seen to reinforce this trend of asymmetric 
consensus. In this regard, two core provisions found in the Global Fund’s global 
guidance for CCMs (GFATM 2011) stand out as particularly pertinent: the 
requirement for CCMs to ensure ‘the participation of a broad range of stakeholders 
from government and non-government constituencies in the development of concept 
notes’ and the Global Fund’s policy of ‘zero tolerance to fraud’. In the case of the 
former, the requirements ate embodied in the following statements: 
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i. Coordinate the development of all concept notes through transparent and 
documented processes that engage a broad range of stakeholders - 
including CCM members and non-members – in the solicitation and the 
review of activities to be included in the application. 
 
ii. Clearly document efforts to engage key affected populations in the 
development of concept notes, including most-at-risk populations. 
Hence, it is important for the CCM to ensure that all partners engage in the 
deliberation process in the CCM and to also project an image of a cohesive working 
process between the different sectors that participate in the mechanism. In view of 
these statements, it is important that the different actors participate in the process and 
are seen to embrace the final outcome of the deliberation process. In other words, the 
voting option is not a good option for the public sector as well, as these requirements 
from the Global Fund essentially seek a process where everyone is on board with 
adopted decisions. Hence, the semblance of a deliberative, cohesive process is as 
important as getting one’s preferred decisions adopted, within the context of the 
Global Fund rules. 
The second Global Fund provision that is seen to reinforce the CCM’s consensus 
based approach is the Fund’s policy of ‘zero tolerance to fraud’. Across the board, 
participants were found to be acutely aware of the sensitivity attached to incidences 
of fraud or misuse of resources within the Global Fund systems. Participants often 
referred to the severe penalties meted out to other country CCMs for failing to 
adhere to the strict policies of the Global Fund in this area. The Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) describes the Fund’s strong position as follows: 
The Office of the Inspector General believes that every dollar counts and has 
zero tolerance for fraud, corruption and waste. Through its whistle-blowing 
channels, the Office of the Inspector General encourages all to come forward 
to point out any irregularities that prevent Global Fund resources from 
reaching those who need them (OIG 2014). 
Interviews with public sector and donor agency participants indicated that these strict 
policies of the Global Fund further reinforce the sustenance of a well controlled 
mechanism, which is in turn believed to be facilitated by a deliberative, consensus 
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based decision making process. While they rue the shortage of pluralism in the 
decision-making process, donor participants commend the tight control that is in 
place in the CCM. Some donor participants even appeared to welcome the tight 
control and enhanced role played by the public sector within this consensual process; 
based on their concerns related to fraud and mismanagement. These participants 
juxtapose this trend of tight control in Ethiopia against the case of countries where 
non-state actors play an enhanced role in CCMs and where this has led to misuse of 
Global Fund resources. The following quote extracted from an interview with a 
donor participant illustrates this observation: 
Well as I said, in Mali for example, civil society probably was too much 
involved. And for that, you know if you follow the history of the Global Fund, 
you know in Mali they had a lot of problems after the auditor general’s 
inspections, they found a lot of problems and it was probably, it was a 
consequence also, because they chose as PR (Principal Recipient] some civil 
[society] association and NGO but they were not very able to manage 
correctly the finance, it was a big finance in Mali, for that, in Ethiopia for me 
it’s good. It’s well controlled, but efficacious. It’s not a bad thing. … 
somebody said in Ethiopia it’s not really democracy, maybe, but the aim is 
important also, and the result, and this is one country, I say we because I was 
involved also, we had an inspection by the auditor general, and if you have 
seen the report, the critics were very, very small…  
- Bilateral donor participant IV 
Hence, the critical theme, ‘asymmetric consensus’ is seen to be a reflection of the 
emphasis on a consensus based approach within the operational guidelines of the 
CCM, the composition of the CCM and the Global Fund principles that favour the 
presence of a cohesive and tightly controlled mechanism. The next section presents 
an analysis of factors that emanate from the deeper frames of reference in the setting 
to influence the observed tendency towards routinisation of a consensus based 
decision-making process.  
 
	  
 
111	  
Deeper frames of reference related to critical theme I: ‘Poverty alleviation’ as a 
political pledge  
At the level of the deeper frames of reference in the setting, one factor that was seen 
to be associated with this critical theme is the way poverty alleviation and 
development objectives are upheld by the State. The developmental state instituted in 
Ethiopia, essentially stakes its ambitions of perpetual rule (last 24 years in power in 
the country) on the basis of its claims that it is uniquely suited to the task of 
alleviating poverty and ensuring uninterrupted growth. Indeed, as Feyissa (2011; p. 
807) observes, ‘the language of development has become a new source of political 
legitimacy’ in the country. The State’s performances vis-à-vis development 
objectives even constitute issues of ‘passionate contestation’ between the ruling 
party and the opposition (Feyissa 2011). An excerpt from the late Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi’s response to a question posed from the audience following his 
presentation at Columbia University, New York, in 2010, is found to be quite 
revealing regarding the centrality of development for the ruling party’s ambitions of 
continued rule (Zenawi 2010): 
Questioner: Mr Prime Minister, thank you for your speech, … could you tell 
us how your party and its allies were able to get 99.6 % of the vote in the last 
major election? Thank you. 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi: My party did not get 99.6 % of the votes, it 
got 99.6 % of the seats, there is a difference in parliamentary systems … it’s 
first past the vote system …but we did get an overwhelming majority of the 
vote, and I suspect after 7 years of double digit growth, 7 years of roughly 
11.6 % growth, after 7 years of very equitable growth, Ethiopia’s Gini 
coefficient is 0.29, it is the lowest in the continent and one of the lowest in 
world, which means our growth has been very broadly equitable, given these 
two facts alone, I would be very surprised if we didn’t get overwhelming 
support from the population 
Hence, the sensitivities surrounding the huge importance attached to the Global Fund 
grants (‘national importance’) need to be understood within the context of the 
developmental state and the meanings that such projects carry within this context. It 
goes without saying that donor support, such as the Global Fund grants, play a huge 
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role in the project of ‘development’. As covered in chapter 4, the national health and 
HIV/AIDS budgets are highly subsidised by donors; around half of the former and 
over 80 % of the latter come from donors (MoH 2011). Hence, the business of the 
CCM, namely, ensuring the effective mobilisation of this critical source of support to 
the country’s health sector, constitutes a highly important issue that calls for tight 
control and management.  
The following quote from a civil society participant demonstrates the extra caution 
and sensitivity with which the affairs of the Global Fund are handled for constituting 
a vital source of support for the country’s development plans.  
Participant: What you need to underline is that the door is only narrowly 
open for those who seek to join the CCM, but once you have been accepted 
as a member, there is room to participate as you like  
Interviewer: Why do you think that is? 
Participant: There may be worries that an organisation may not have the 
capacity, and upon studying the background of the organisations there may 
be fears that the particular organisation may bring some problems to the 
process, so there’s high level of caution as a country … and as the Global 
Fund, if the funds are misused it will be the CCM that will be incriminated 
and penalised as a whole not just the particular organisation involved… 
- CSO participant XI 
This section has presented the critical theme labelled ‘asymmetric consensus’. The 
theme represents the routinisation of the consensus based decision-making approach 
as a norm in the CCM, even on occasions where actors may be in disagreement. This 
phenomenon is interpreted as being linked to CCM related factors such as the 
emphasis placed on consensus in the CCM operational guidelines, the composition 
of the CCM that effectively rules out voting as a viable option for non-state actors, 
and Global Fund principles of broad based participation and zero tolerance to fraud. 
The phenomenon is also reinforced by the critical importance attached to 
development programmes such as the CCM within the context of the developmental 
state. 
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5.3 Critical theme II: Dominance of clinical care 
	  
Another critical theme that is seen to be prominent within actors’ characterisations of 
their interactions in the CCM relates to contrasting perceptions and standpoints of 
actors regarding the relative role and merits of clinical care interventions versus 
community based health promotion works.  In this regard, the tussle between actors’ 
positions on this long standing debate in the field of public health is not simply 
waged on its own, but comes bundled with value judgements related to the respective 
area of work and the actors that are linked to these interventions. The observation 
entails that the health facility based, clinical care activities, mainly undertaken by the 
public sector, are accorded more importance than the community based, awareness 
raising and care and support works undertaken the CSOs.  
As discussed in chapter 4, the country portfolio of the Ethiopian Global Fund 
finances reveals that the lion’s share (96 %) of the US$ 1,743,811,423 received to 
date from the Global Fund has been channelled through the designated PRs from the 
public sector (MoH and HAPCO). While these offices, especially HAPCO, also 
contract out resources to CSOs, the majority of the Global Fund grants are utilised 
for health facility-based clinical services run by the public sector. Indeed, some of 
the CSO and donor participants regarded the involvement of CSOs as merely 
tokenistic, as exemplified in the following quote from CSO and donor participants:  
The Ethiopian government is very clever, there isn’t any conflict over the 
resources, you know, the main spending of the health sector, the health 
extension workers, the clinics, TB control and so on, they almost all utilise 
the Global Fund money, so they have access to enough resources in that 
respect, the aspect that goes to the civil society is just a minor portion,  
- CSO Participant VIII 
 
 … It’s all government money … 
- Bilateral Donor Participant V 
 
Beyond this difference in funding, participants from CSOs reflected a sentiment that 
public sector representatives exhibit an attitude that the work that the public sector 
does in expanding health care services was superior to the community based health 
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promotion and care and support work undertaken by the CSOs. Statements from 
public sector participants also betrayed unfavourable value judgements on the work 
undertaken by CSOs. In this regard, some public sector participants characterised the 
work undertaken by CSOs as being less demanding (unsophisticated), less budget 
intensive and just auxiliary to the health care services provided by the public sector. 
The following quotes exemplify this point: 
 
When the discussion is general and on cross cutting issues, the discussion is 
good, but when the discussion becomes detailed, about detailed activities, for 
example what they do ‘sefer wist’ [meaning ‘in communities’, but using a 
condescending term], it becomes remote, in terms of our interest, it is the 
same when we discuss hard science, such as drug resistance, it becomes 
remote to them, but other than that in matters related to the overall 
functioning, we do have very good discussions.  
– Public sector participant XII  
Some of these interventions such as IRS (Insecticide Residual Spray) are 
technically complex which many of the civil society lack capacity for, there is 
a lot of sensitivity regarding usage of the chemicals and you need the public 
system to effectively implement these at a large scale … so the civil society 
work in information, education and communication in order to complement 
these efforts, such as through school clubs. 
      - Public sector participant II 
CSO participants reflected that they work with acute awareness of the lopsided 
importance attached to the interventions undertaken by the respective sectors. 
Participants imparted a sentiment of operating under the shadow of this lop-
sidedness in funding and the sense of prioritisation that accompanies it.  
This means that there is this thinking that what the government does is valued 
more and that it should have more weight and there’s pressure that comes 
from that thinking. It needs to be looked at in view of the space given to 
NGOs and civil societies, everything is related to that … 
- CSO participant XI 
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One intervention that seems to signify the core of the importance attached to facility 
based, clinical services is the anti-retroviral treatment (ART) support channelled 
through the public sector. As discussed in chapter 4 the Global Fund provides 
funding for almost the whole of the national ART scale-up programme in Ethiopia 
(except for the paediatric ART supply provided by PEPFAR). It was seen in this 
study that this support, currently covering more than 300,000 PLWHA, is regarded 
by all participants as constituting the core aspect of the contribution of the Global 
Fund to the country. Participants from across the sectoral spectrum prioritised the 
ART programme over other aspects for representing the main intervention that is 
saving lives at a large scale, for being budget intensive due to need of expansion of 
auxiliary diagnostic and follow-up services, and for being a life-long uninterruptible 
intervention.  
At the end of the day what we all believe is that the government is the main 
player in fighting HIV/AIDS in the country and that clinical care 
interventions [mainly delivered by government health facilities] require high 
budgetary input, you could interrupt any other intervention, but they [clinical 
care interventions] can’t be interrupted, if you interrupt, say ART provision, 
new infections would develop and the whole programme would collapse. So 
if you had to choose you would say let’s continue the ART programme, it’s 
better if our programme discontinued [CSOs’ work that mainly focuses on 
population based prevention and care interventions]…  
- CSO participant XI 
Hence, this theme highlights the high level of importance attached to clinical care 
services in CCM deliberations, and by association, the prominent position of the 
public sector; as it is the sector entrusted with undertaking the clinical care aspects of 
interventions funded by the Global Fund. 
Deeper frames of reference related to critical theme II: History of AIDS in 
Ethiopia  
The above critical theme appears to be influenced by the history of AIDS in Ethiopia, 
which can be considered a ‘deeper frame of reference’ for those involved in the 
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CCM. The epidemic in Ethiopia has gone through different phases over the years. 
Within the evolution of the epidemic in the setting, the advent of ART is seen as a 
critically important milestone. The discussion below seeks to demonstrate how the 
advent of ART in the setting by way of a rapid national scale-up programme, 
underlies observed trends in deliberations in the CCM. 
Since the first diagnosis of AIDS in the country in the mid 1980s, the epidemic has 
gone through different trajectories, a steep increase in transmission, from 1 % in 
1989 to 5.2 % in 1996, followed by a flattening of the prevalence rate for some years 
after that, to then progressively decrease to current levels of 1.2 % (FDRE 2012, 
UNAIDS 2014). Still, this prevalence rate translates to a very large number of people 
living with HIV/AIDS, owing to the large population (nearly 800,000 adults living 
with HIV) (UNAIDS 2014).  
Until the large-scale provision of ART in 2006, it was the social response to the 
epidemic that was hugely prominent within the national response to the disease. The 
early days of rapid transmission of what was essentially an incurable disease simply 
meant that a social response of health promotion and care and support was the only 
viable response. This in turn precipitated an enhanced involvement of civil society 
organisations, such as NGOs and faith based organisations, which in turn mobilised 
actively to tackle the societal effects that appeared to overwhelm the capacities of the 
public sector (Rahmato, Bantirgu et al. 2008). This trend has been widely observed 
whereby the HIV/AIDS epidemic is credited with enabling an unprecedented influx 
of CSOs into the health field globally (Bastos 1999; p. 7, Seckinelgin 2002). Some 
study participants relayed a sentiment that the HIV/AIDS epidemic had brought 
unfamiliar actors into the health field. The following quote taken from an interview 
with a donor participant illustrates this, whereby the participant, somewhat less 
fondly, recalls the enhanced involvement of CSOs brought about by the epidemic: 
So some NGOs were doing quite well out of that HIV/AIDS gravy train2 and 
others maybe less so and some were just probably too small or too, you know, 
lacking capacity to really, to really get in on the action… I think civil society 
should have quite an important role in accountability and so on, but very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Oxford	  Dictionaries	  Online	  defines	  this	  informally	  used	  phrase	  as:	  ‘Used	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  situation	  in	  
which	  someone	  can	  make	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  for	  very	  little	  effort’.	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often the opportunity isn’t realised just because nobody knows how to get a 
grip on them. 
      - Bilateral donor participant III 
HIV/AIDS services have expanded hugely since those days; crucially, the national 
ART programme has expanded from levels of reaching just 900 people in 2005 to 
covering more than 300,000 people currently (Assefa, Jerene et al. 2009, GFHATM 
2014). This rapid scale-up of ART is almost entirely funded by the Global Fund, 
with PEPFAR supplementing the service with support for paediatric ART. The 
interpretation here is that this large-scale availability of treatment appears to sway 
support away from a social response, where a multitude of actors enter the field of 
play, to a biomedical one organised by the public sector. Indeed, the appreciation 
towards the national ART programme was ubiquitous in the setting. Even when CSO 
participants argued for more emphasis to community based health promotion 
services, they were doing so while acknowledging the central role of the ART 
service. Participants’ support for the ART programme seems to emanate from their 
experiences before and after the ART service in the setting. The following quote 
exemplifies this: 
But the main benefits of the Global Fund and something that really leaves 
you deeply satisfied is that people have been treated through these funds! So 
if you take me, I used to work with the Family Guidance Association before 
ART was introduced, so what we used to do before is go home to home and 
delivery home based care, palliative work, cleaning people’s ulcers and so 
on … But when the drugs arrived, someone who had lost massive amounts of 
weight that they were only weighing about 20 kilos and bedridden would 
gain weight, rebound to normal, something like 60 kilos, and get back to 
working again … 
  - Bilateral donor participant VII 
As indicated earlier, this high level of support from the ART programme also 
appears to implicate the debate related to clinical care versus multisectoral approach 
to the disease. A participant from bilateral donors went as far as attesting that the 
national scale-up of ART had effectively transformed the AIDS epidemic from a 
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‘multisectoral’ problem to a medical one. The participant specifically challenged the 
qualification of HIV/AIDS as a uniquely multisectoral issue that requires 
multisectoral response. They argued that this was no longer tenable as the disease 
has now effectively become a treatable condition. This dialogue with the participant 
actually ensued when I asked them what they thought of the concern expressed by 
some actors that merging the CCM with the other health sector coordination 
mechanisms (the JCCC), would threaten the broad-based, multi-sectoral engagement 
achieved through the CCM: 
 
Interviewer: But there are others who say, doing that would dissipate the 
focus on the 3 diseases that the Global Fund has accorded 
Participant: Possibly, I certainly I think the HIV, some of the HIV Funds, 
especially UNAIDS say, ‘but you know HIV is a multi-sectoral approach 
therefore it’s gotta be outside of health’. I don’t actually buy that anymore, I 
think, you know when I was, I set up the CCM in [they specified the country 
and the year they set up the CCM] and at that point, there was very much, 
you know, HIV was a multisectoral issue, because there was no medical 
approach, you know there was no cure to it, but now over the last decade, we 
have seen such a shift in HIV, it is a medical issue now, yes there are issues 
about caring for orphans and vulnerable children, but I would say there are 
more orphans due to maternal mortality than HIV in Ethiopia, so I think the 
argument is a bit weak now, to be honest, and health is a multi-sectoral issue, 
not just HIV, so actually I think, I think that it is not a valid argument 
anymore, in the Ethiopian context  
      - Bilateral donor participant I 
Hence, the greater level of importance that seems to be attached to clinical care 
interventions in CCM deliberations appears to be rooted in wider shifts in trends 
related to how the epidemic is perceived pre and post the national ART scale-up. The 
rapid scale-up of ART in the country appears to be momentous in affecting how the 
disease is conceived and the relative position of actors that follow from this. 
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5.4 Critical theme III: Actors’ perceptions of each other  
 
The third critical theme relates to participants’ perceptions of each other’s (actors’) 
roles and positions. In this regard, the public sector was perceived as getting its way 
during interactions in the CCM, CSOs were described as too timid and lacking an 
assertive voice in their interactions with the public sector, donors were depicted as 
being too cautious in their involvements, and the private sector were seen to be 
‘missing in action’.  This section accordingly participants’ perceptions of actors’ 
positions and roles.  
5.4.1  A public sector that gets its way 
 
The interviews conducted with participants coming from CSOs and donors all 
revealed a perception of a public sector that gets its way in the deliberations taking 
place within the CCM. These participants described the public sector as representing 
a highly organised entity that has clear visions of what it seeks out of the partnership. 
The public sector was also described as having strong positions regarding what its 
own roles and those of other actors should be.  
The ruling party is coherent from top to bottom, most organised group I have 
ever come across, and the health sector, most coherent of any country I have 
worked in... 
      - Bilateral donor participant VI 
It’s a very dynamic policy environment, you have got great, strong 
government leadership, they know what they want, they know how to get it, 
policies are based on evidence, they are pro poor, you know and, it’s 
delivering results, I think that’s what’s so exciting, We really are seeing 
significant results on the ground that are independently verified, I mean it’s 
not, you know, so it’s, it’s fantastic actually, it’s great working here. 
      - Bilateral donor participant I  
In terms of its influence on others, the public sector was described as dominant. 
Participants from donors and CSOs imparted a sentiment that deliberations are 
seldom conducted ‘from scratch’, and that the agenda are often tightly controlled 
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(‘scripted’) by the public sector. In this respect, the choices regarding ‘what to do’ 
and ‘who would do what’ were said to be tightly regimented. For participants from 
donor agencies and CSOs who reflected on this issue, the phenomenon merely 
represents an extension of the general trend in the way the public sector acts in the 
setting. It was an issue they were all too familiar with from experiences of working 
in the setting, a trend they had learned to live with. This sentiment of a strong public 
sector that assumes foremost responsibility, and delimits the roles of actors was 
widespread amongst CSO and donor participants. The following quotes extracted 
from CSO and public sector participants illustrate this predominant sentiment:  
As you can see our government is a developmental state so it claims 
that foremost responsibility for the citizens of the country lie with the 
government, the constitution caters for everything, and so unless the 
government is overwhelmed and expresses need for input and 
involvement from other actors, all external support, money has to 
come through the government  
 
     - CSO participant V 
 
As government, we have leadership role, no question about that – 
(Public sector 4th interview (EHNRI) 
     - Public sector XII 
Some participants from donor agencies and CSOs described some of the ways in 
which this dominance of the public sector manifested in CCM deliberations. The 
quote presented hereunder provides an insight into how this dominance of the public 
sector plays out in the deliberations and negotiations that occur within the CCM.  
So if the government had requested 200 million and the Global Fund says 
that the ceiling of fund requests should be 200 million, and we [CSOs] had 
asked for 50 million, it would not mean that we would be denied any place, 
as our participation is required, but the government won’t drop its shares to 
incorporate our 50 million, what happens is that our share would reduce 
markedly, like down to 10 million, so the reduction would not be proportional, 
the pressure would mostly be on us  
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- CSO participant XI 
 
Hence, the public sector is characterised as a highly organised entity with clear plans 
and strong commitments to tackle the objectives set within the CCM. However, this 
also comes with a side effect in which the sector is seen to be too dominant in the 
deliberations within the CCM. The next section turns to discussing study participants’ 
perceptions of CSOs. 
 
5.4.2 A timid civil society 
	  
In contrast to these perceptions about the public sector, the perceptions of CSOs, as 
garnered from the views of participants from donor, public sector and CSO 
participants themselves, reflected an unflattering assessment of a sector too timid in 
their involvements in the mechanism. The assessments included observations that the 
CSOs are less assertive and incapable of making optimal use of available spaces of 
participation. The CSOs included in the CCM are generally seen by participants to 
be lacking the capacity to engage in deliberations across a wide range of topics in the 
field of public health. As discussed in section 5.2, the views of public sector 
participants regarding the relative importance of clinical versus community based 
health promotion works also carry an unfavourable appraisal of the capacity and 
mandate of CSOs. Some donor participants also shared these sentiments: 
The other thing is that they are recipients [the CSOs] but yet do not have that 
much experience, both are weak, although EIFDA is a bit better.  So when 
you look at their capacity, power and negotiation skill and the position they 
hold within the CCM, they really hold very weak positions. So they are not 
that skilled to negotiate and are not empowered at the same time. 
      - Bilateral donor participant II 
In addition, donor participants imparted a sentiment that the CSOs sitting at the 
CCM, claiming to represent their respective constituencies, may be prone to conflicts 
of interest as they are beneficiaries of Global Fund grants. Some donor participants 
went as far as questioning the extent to which the CSOs that sit on the CCM can be 
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considered to be free from the control and influence of the public sector. The 
following dialogue with a donor participant reveals this dilemma that donors harbour 
regarding the CSOs and their relationship with the State: 
Participant: But like I said it’s [the Global Fund] the largest donor and the 
Ministry is very dominant, so I think in general, if you would look at it, it’s or 
I mean personally I would just consider it, this is all government money, and 
even then, I think it’s only Ethiopian Interfaith Forum who is another 
recipient or is there somebody else? 
Interviewer: NEP+[Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS] 
Participant: NEP+ aha, also one of the natural, what is it, beneficiaries. 
How independent are these organisations from government? I don’t know, I 
don’t know. So I think the whole thing is dominated by, by government and 
sometimes, I think, well, is that really bad? 
- Bilateral donor participant V 
Hence, the perception of CSOs amongst donor, public sector and CSO participants is 
one that sees CSOs as lacking in capacity and power to engage assertively in CCM 
deliberations. In addition, their involvement in a mechanism from which they receive 
grants, cause donor participants to raise questions related to conflicts of interest and 
the CSOs’ independence from the influence and control of the public sector. 
5.4.3  A cautious donor community 
	  
Donors were generally characterised as having a cautious stance in their 
involvements in the CCM. These views predominantly came from CSO participants 
as well as self-reflections by some participants from donor agencies. The former 
appear to come with expectations of an assertive role on the part of donors to counter 
the influences of the public sector. These expectations may be bourne out of 
awareness of donors’ commitments to pluralist and inclusive systems of 
development management and governance. However, to the dismay of the CSO 
participants, the donors are seen to be too cautious to confront the public sector or to 
keep in check, what the CSO participants see as an unfettered domination by the 
pubic sector. As illustrated in the quotes from CSO and donor participants below, the 
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donors are instead seen to keenly observe the rules of engagement that have been 
laid out by the public sector in the Ethiopian setting. 
The development partners, especially the funding agencies, are not bold 
enough to talk to the government regarding the comparative advantages and 
roles of the civil society, and frankly, some of them [donor agencies] don’t 
really know where the comparative advantages and roles lie. Even if they 
know, some of them will not act unless the government gives that privilege … 
- CSO participant I 
CSOs are not comfortable with the cosy relationship that exists between 
donors and the government 
     - Bilateral donor participant VII 
The section has revealed the predominant perception in the setting that donors’ 
actions reflect a cautious stance, as opposed to the assertive role CSOs expect them 
to play.  
5.4.4: A private sector missing in action 
	  
The findings related to the private sector entail that the sector, in its conventional 
form (private health care providers), is entirely ‘missing in action’ in the CCM. As 
discussed in chapter 4, the ‘private sector’ is represented in the CCM by the 
Ethiopian Employers Federation and the National Trade Union. This was an 
interesting discovery to me as my assumption had been that the ‘private sector’ in the 
health sector would rather include private health care service providers such as 
private clinics, pharmacies, diagnostic centres and so on. The absence of 
representation of private health care service providers contrasts sharply with the 
significant proportion of health care facilities that are managed by the sector: around 
40 % of all curative and rehabilitative services in the country (Chapter 4). It appears 
that there was no organised body that had come forward to represent private health 
care facilities in the CCM and other members of the CCM instead did designation of 
representatives for the ‘private sector’. The following dialogue with a CSO 
participant illustrates this point. 
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Interviewer: What I find interesting is that the private sector is represented 
by the Employers’ Federation and the National Labour Union? I would have 
thought that private clinics, hospitals would be represented at this forum. 
Why do you think they are not there? 
Participant: I remember the thinking behind inviting the Employers 
Association and the Labour Unions was influenced by the desire to 
incorporate HIV/AIDS workplace interventions. But I don’t believe that’s 
worked either finally. The medical professionals had one association at the 
time, which was called ‘private medical partners association’ and there were 
ideas about bringing that association into the CCM. However, it was then 
thought that this in turn meant that only the health care sector got 
represented in the mechanism. And this would in turn mean that we would be 
neglecting the workplace concerns, which was not sensible, especially given 
the mega-projects employing large amount of staff in the country, such as the 
sugar factories and hydroelectric plants that employ 5,000 – 6,000 people 
each [so high potential for workplace interventions]….  
       - CSO participant XV 
As described in the participant’s quote above, the definition of ‘private sector’ 
adopted by the CCM is based on the ILO driven agenda of workplace HIV/AIDS 
policy and strategy. In any case, this decision, in the face of lack of any organised 
representation of private health care providers, has culminated in the exclusion of a 
key stakeholder group from this important partnership mechanism. For some 
participants (1 participant from donors and 2 from the public sector) this has more to 
do with the way private health care providers are generally perceived in the setting. 
They contend that the predominant conception of private health care providers in the 
setting constitutes one of a profit driven entity that has no role in poverty related 
issues. The following quote exemplifies this assertion. 
For me, I don’t really see the value of engaging the private sector in the 
CCM, because at the end of the day they are there to serve the needs of the 
richer sections of the society, those who can pay for services  
      - Public sector participant XI 
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Hence, the perceptions of actors in the setting entail a picture of a proactive public 
sector that gets its way in deliberations in the CCM, a timid civil society, a cautious 
donor community and a private sector missing in action. Now the section turns to 
explaining these observed trends with reference to the structured context (CCM 
regulatory frameworks and the deeper frames of reference) 
CCM related factors that influence critical theme III: ‘Country Ownership’ as a 
Global Fund principle 
This section explores the CCM related factors that are seen to reinforce the dominant 
role of the public sector, the timidity of the CSOs, the cautiousness of the donors and 
the absence of private sector health care providers in the interactions. In this regard, 
the Global Fund’s principle of country ownership and how it has been 
operationalised within the CCM is found to be a critical factor. The principle is seen 
to have been written vaguely, without specifications of what it should mean for the 
different actors involved in the mechanism. This situation appears to have left the 
interpretation of the principle to the in-country actors, which in turn plays into the 
power and influence of powerful actors in the setting (the public sector). As 
highlighted in chapter 4, the Global Fund’s explication of its core principle of 
‘country ownership’ is quite terse and does not explicate what the principle means 
for different in-country actors: 
The countries where we support programs to fight AIDS, TB and malaria 
know how to solve their own problems. The principle of country ownership 
means that countries determine their own solutions to fighting these three 
diseases, and take full responsibility for ensuring the implementation of these 
solutions. In this way, each country can tailor their response to their own 
political, cultural and epidemiological context. 
A review conducted by a high level independent review panel in 2011, which studied 
the grant portfolios of 40 countries as well as visiting 12, had observed that there 
was ‘no shared perception’ of this ‘hazily defined’ principle both within and outside 
the Global Fund (High Level Independent Review Panel 2011). This has in turn led 
to a ‘culture of passivity’ in grant management on the side of the Global Fund, 
whereby ‘it can be easy to game the system’ (High Level Independent Review Panel 
2011; P. 22). The report has called for a redefinition of the statement so as to also 
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encompass the provision that ‘all stakeholders participate meaningfully and on an 
equal basis in decision making’ (High Level Independent Review Panel 2011; P. 22). 
This further confirms the interpretation forwarded in this study that the way that this 
principle has been loosely defined and enforced is playing into the hands of powerful 
actors.  
It is worth noting here that the Global Fund’s emphasis on country ownership forms 
part of a wider trend in contemporary donor/recipient government relations. As 
underscored in global accords on aid effectiveness (OECD 2008), donors are 
expected to work through government systems to support the national poverty 
reduction plans. This constitutes efforts aimed at eclipsing the negative effects 
wrought by donor driven agenda in the structural adjustment era (Feyissa 2011). 
Hence, the lack of specification of what the principle entails within the CCM needs 
to be seen as further entrenching the upper hand accorded to national governments 
within wider donor/government relations. 
One of the ways in which this commitment to country ownership has been 
operationalised within the CCM relates to the specification within Global Fund 
global guidance notes and in the guidelines of the Ethiopian CCM that Country 
proposals should reflect the priorities of the national strategy plans of the host 
country. This specification is seen as reinforcing the control of the public sector as 
the national plans in Ethiopia are widely seen amongst non-State actors as 
documents produced through the dominant role of the public sector. Hence, some 
donor and CSO participants saw this specification as further extending the 
domination of the public sector in national policy processes to the CCM. To begin 
with, the statements ascribing this provision within the Global Fund guidance and 
the Ethiopian CCM are presented hereunder: 
Global Guidance (GFATM 2013; P. 6): 
Build on, compliment, and coordinate with existing regional and national 
programs in support of national policies, priorities and partnerships, 
including poverty reduction strategies and sector-wide approaches;  
Ethiopian CCM (CCM/E 2004; P. 4): 
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As a coordinating and governing body, facilitate the synergy between 
activities of the Fund, HSDP [Health Sector Development Plan], EMSAP 
[Ethiopian Multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS Programme], SDPRP [The Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Reduction Plan], MDGs [Millennium 
Development Goals], donors, civil society and others. 
The position accorded to these national strategy documents within CCM processes is 
quite strong. As highlighted by interviews with participants coming from the 
different sectors, the national strategic plans are literally taken as the source or 
‘mother’ documents for ideas to be included in the CCM country proposals. In this 
regard, donor and CSO participants reflected that this essentially affected the scope 
for innovativeness in the CCM country proposals, instead leading to a trend of 
replicating what they see as plans developed through public sector controlled 
processes. The following quote coming from a participant from the public sector 
illustrates the position accorded to these national strategies, while the quote by a 
CSO participant exemplifies the concerns of CSO and donor participants: 
The source document for the proposal development process is the strategic 
plan, the national strategic plan [HSDP – Health Sector Development Plan] 
is the governing document for whoever is working in the country, be it 
government, the CCM, the Principal Recipients, the regional bureaus, 
whoever it may be, the governing document is the strategic plan, so the 
proposal is prepared on the basis of the strategic plan.  
- Public Sector Participant XI 
I have to be honest, when the strategy was being developed, I was part of that 
process, however, I can’t say that the strategies have been developed in a 
way we wished they would, we have been part of it, if you ask me if we had 
participated, I would say yes, but if you ask me if it was done in a manner 
that the civil society or donors wanted, I would say no…  
- CSO participant XIII 
In a nutshell, the way the principle of country ownership has been institutionalised is 
seen as further reinforcing the dominant role accorded to the public sector. The next 
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section discusses the deeper frames of reference that are considered to the critical 
theme related to actors’ perceptions of each other. 
Deeper frames of reference related to critical theme III: The nature of the 
Ethiopian State; culture of sovereignty and tradition of government; and the 
Charities and Civil Societies Proclamation 
Three factors emanating from the deeper frames of reference in the setting are 
considered as reinforcing the above-described trend in the position and role of actors 
within the CCM. These factors are the nature of the State in Ethiopia, the culture of 
sovereignty and government, and the Charities and Civil Societies Proclamation. As 
described in chapter 4, the State in Ethiopia is constituted as a developmental State 
based on the revolutionary democracy ideology of the ruling party, which has been 
in power for the last 24 years. The developmental state thinking essentially 
constitutes an ‘antithesis to neoliberalism’, whereby it unabashedly attributes an 
enhanced role for the public sector in the provision of public goods (Bach 2011, 
Feyissa 2011). In this regard, as quote from a civil society participant demonstrates, 
actors participating in the CCM are well aware of this ideological stance, and 
consider it as part of the rules of engagement in the Ethiopian setting: 
The resource needs in this country are huge and when you look at the policy 
orientation of the country, it follows a developmental state approach, which 
means that the government plays the prominent role [‘ye awrawin mina’ in 
Amharic], the leading role [‘fit awrariwin’ in Amharic], takes the lion’s 
share of the work … 
- CSO participant II 
The Amharic phrase, ‘ye awrawin mina’, vaguely translates to ‘prominent role’ in 
English. However, the usage in Amharic comes with more cultural resonance as it is 
used as a metaphor referring to the role of a pack leader (in chickens, usually), which 
has a decisive say on all matters relating to the pack. Hence, the reference from the 
participant carries this deep cultural understanding of the proactive and multifaceted 
role the Ethiopian government plays in all aspects of life in the country.  
As discussed in chapter 4, the ideological orientation of the Ethiopian State, 
revolutionary democracy, is understood to be an adaptation of the Marxist 
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ideological lineage of the ruling party (Bach 2011). This has in turn translated into a 
‘very interventionist’ state that takes it upon itself to fashion economic and social 
policies and to deliver social services (Bach 2011). As Hagmann and Abbink (2011; 
p. 584) observe, although the Ethiopian State adopts a rhetoric akin to a participatory 
model of development, the ‘EPRDF’s [ruling party] approach to development is 
state-centred and state driven’.  
The ideology also carries with it a characterisation of the different actors in the 
setting. In this regard, it qualifies the State as ‘the only one [type of actor] able to 
maintain a real autonomy in a globalised world’ (Bach 2011; P. 651). It further 
prophesises that the proactive state is the only way that can lead to a ‘broad based’ 
and ‘sustainable’ development, as ‘markets are not well developed’ (Feyissa 2011; P. 
796). In contrast, the characterisations of those actors that are seen to subscribe to a 
neoliberalist perspective, such as CSOs, human rights activists and opposition parties, 
are quite damning (Bach 2011). The relationship between the State and civil society 
is especially riddled with ideological and political wariness (Bach 2011, Feyissa 
2011). A statement released by the Government Communication Affairs Office, in 
response to an assessment made by the Human Rights Watch (HRW) on the human 
rights condition in the country, betrays this deep suspicion that the State harbours 
towards non-state actors: 
…. It is common knowledge that many NGOs in Africa are bank-rolled by 
foreign sources mainly to serve as Trojan horses for rigid neoliberal interest 
groups that seek to detect African politics. It has all too often been the case 
that diehard neoliberals underwrite these organisations through which they 
try to leverage Africa’s leaders and run the gauntlet against any governments 
that dare resist their ideological preference…(FDRE 2010) 
Regarding its relationships with donors, the government enjoys a favourable 
relationship whilst protecting its policy space. In this regard, it has managed to 
secure huge amounts of external support while staving off the kind of conditionality 
and external influence often imposed on other Sub-Saharan African countries 
(Borchgrevink 2008, Feyissa 2011). As Feyissa (2011; P. 800) observes:  
Even the Structural Adjustment Programme, the quintessential of donor 
ideology, was qualified in Ethiopia to the extent that it did not go as far as 
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international financial institutions would have liked it to go, particularly the 
liberalisation of the financial market, privatisation of land and 
telecommunications which are still state owned. 
Hagmann and Abbink (2011) point towards the unique position of the country in 
reference to a number of geopolitical considerations as reasons underlying the 
latitude enjoyed by the public sector. They (Hagmann and Abbink 2011; p. 590) 
state that donors exhibit a general willingness to ‘accept a heavy dose of 
authoritarianism’ in return for stability in a conflict ridden region, and in respect of 
what is considered to be an effective system that delivers on globally set 
development targets. In addition, a post 9/11 world appears to have firmly 
established the country as a strategic ally to the west in the global war on terror, an 
‘anchor state’, which further accords the Ethiopian State leverage in its negotiations 
with donors (Feyissa 2011).  
Hence, the claims made by participants regarding the interactions between donor 
agencies and the public sector need to be understood in light of this wider 
positioning of actors and the strategic issues that are at stake in these relationships. 
Similarly, the timidity of CSOs needs to be understood in view of the proactive, 
interventionist government. For CSOs and the private sector, functioning in a setting 
where the public sector proactively engages in all aspects of social and economic 
development, is bound to have restrictive effects. 
The other contextual factor seen to be related to this critical theme concerns 
participants’ accounts of a strong culture of sovereignty and tradition of governance. 
Participants from donor agencies alluded that they operate with an awareness of the 
sensitivities surrounding sovereignty and independence in matters of government in 
Ethiopia. Feyissa (2011; P. 800) makes a similar observation regarding the general 
trend in donor/government relations in Ethiopia where he observes that external 
actors operate within the realm of a ‘core domestic agenda’ that is ‘strongly owned’ 
in all fields of development including ‘agriculture, economic management, the pace 
of liberalisation and its [the government’s] commitment to improving basic social 
services, especially in rural areas’. He (Feyissa 2011; P. 800) further relates this to 
the country’s historical legacy as the only African country that has never been 
colonised, which he explains as being ‘enshrined in the collective memory of the 
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nation and strongly informs the country’s international relations’. A donor 
participant discussed how this sense of tradition of sovereignty was widely 
manifested in policy level interactions: 
One other thing about working in Ethiopia is that people do have a sense that 
it’s their own country and that they can make their own decisions and that 
they know what they want and that they are able to ask for what they want, 
and not that they just don’t have to take whatever comes along or whatever 
donors decide to do, which is a kind of attitude that you sometimes don’t find 
in other countries which is kind of, kind of depressing…there was somebody 
in World Bank or the EC [European Commission] and I don’t remember who 
it was and what the context is but it was some, one of the higher officials in 
one of these partner organisations who said of Ethiopia, ‘well, ownership is 
not an issue!” And it was something that we all kind of repeated because it 
was so true!  
      - Bilateral donor participant III 
Another cultural trait that is seen to underlie the trend of a dominant role played by 
the public sector relates to the reverence towards authority in the Ethiopian culture. 
Some donor participants remarked that Ethiopian representatives of different 
agencies including CSOs and donor agencies approached the deliberations with 
public sector authorities with a great deal of deference. As can be seen in the 
following quote taken from an interview with a CSO participant, it is a widely 
upheld conception that speaking against authority entails consequences: 
In this country there is something, it is considered part of the culture, if you 
have some difference of opinion and if you express that in public, you have to 
leave that office or you have to keep quiet …  
       - CSO participant XIII 
As Lefort and Eacute (2007) observe, although the traditional, popular conception of 
mangist (government) as ultimately derived from God, has been obliterated with the 
overthrow of the last Emperor (1974), the notion of mangist as something residing 
above the people and something to be revered, still persists.  The authoritarian 
culture of governing in Ethiopia is said to transcend successive systems of 
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government in history; surviving through the monarchical, the military and the 
current, developmental state regime (Hagmann and Abbink 2011). This tradition of 
authoritative government was evident to donor participants as exemplified in the 
following quote: 
I am not quite sure if the Ministry has the experience to manage such a 
process, you know, you can understand what I mean, as a ministry you can 
want something, but maybe, maybe also a part of the culture is just not like 
that, that you ask other people to come and provide the ideas, maybe, I mean, 
Ethiopia has a history of strong governments. To say it like that, so maybe 
it’s not easy to make the change  
       - Donor participant V 
Finally, two contextual factors appear to specially affect CSOs. These are the 
‘Charities and Societies Proclamation’ that was promulgated in 2009 (FDRE 2009) 
and CSOs inherent representation and coordination crisis in the setting. Regarding 
the former, the law is seen to underlie the timidity of CSOs in interactions in the 
CCM as it is seen to be highly restrictive towards CSOs. A key provision of the law 
constitutes a stark demarcation between ‘local’ and ‘international’ charities, which 
entails a restriction on those classified as ‘international’ from involving in issues 
related to human rights and advocacy works. In tandem with this, the law stipulates 
that those designated as local charities cannot raise more than 10 % of their budgets 
from external sources (the 90/10 law) and that all charities have to restrict their 
administrative budget to 30 % of their total budgets (FDRE 2009).   
The Proclamation has also established the Charities and Societies Agency, with 
‘broad discretionary powers’ to oversee the conduct of civil society organisations in 
the country (HRW 2008). Since its adoption, there have been numerous criticisms of 
the proclamation for restricting the scope of work of the civil society sector and for 
affording the Charities and Societies Agency unrestricted powers to interfere in the 
affairs of civil societies (HRW 2008, Addis Standard 2012, Amnesty International 
2012). A recent study aiming to take stock of the effects of the proclamation (2014; 
p. 18) has indicated the ‘potentially high organisational mortality as a result of the 
proclamation, in that the number of federally registered local CSOs fell by 45%, 
from 3800 in 2009, to 2059 in 2011’. Participants from donor and CSO participants 
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indicated that the proclamation has generally made the environment less hospitable 
for CSOs. The following quote illustrates the this assessments: 
We have got the new civil society legislation as well that was passed recently 
in Ethiopia, which again makes it more difficult for some NGOs to operate or 
it makes them wary of speaking out against the government, you know, they 
feel more vulnerable…  
- Donor participant I 
Participants differed in their assessments of the extent to which it affects those CSOs 
participating in the CCM.  Some participants observed that their experiences entailed 
that organisations that were not involved in ‘sensitive’ areas of work and who 
engaged purely in service provision work were not threatened by this legislation. On 
the other hand, others felt that the law served the government as a deterrent force to 
keep the CSOs in line. Generally, the latitude for local actors to be critical towards 
key government policies seems to be constrained by a system that a participant from 
donor agencies describes as making ‘freedom of expression not always easy’. 
… expression of, freedom of expression is not always easy, particularly for 
Ethiopian staff, particularly for NGOs, also foreign NGOs …  
     - Bilateral donor participant V 
Coming to the representation crisis that CSOs in the setting are said to be suffering 
from, participants from donor agencies and CSOs themselves reflected that the CSOs 
sitting at the CCM table have a very fluid constituency and that there are 
contestations over their positions in the CCM. This was highlighted as a source of 
weakness for the CSOs. As discussed in chapter 4, the CSOs sitting at the CCM 
include NEP +, which sits on the CCM representing the associations of people living 
with HIV/AIDS in the country, EIFDA, which represents faith based organisations, 
and CCRDA, an umbrella organisation for local and international NGOs in the 
country. Participants raised questions as to whether these organisations genuinely 
represent the range of voices in the civil society sector in the country, and whether 
they have the organisation and capacity to represent their constituencies effectively: 
	  
 
134	  
I can’t say they represent the civil society groups [EIFDA and NEP + - the 
CSOs that sit within the CCM]  
      - Bilateral donor participant IV 
The networks most of the time don’t represent their constituencies effectively, 
what that means is that they don’t have adequate capacity and legitimacy to 
represent their constituencies’ work and voice.  
- CSO participant I 
In summary, this section has discussed the critical theme related to actors’ 
perceptions of each other and the factors that are seen to underlie observed trends in 
actors’ behaviour in the setting. In this regard, the perceptions of participants 
depicted the following picture about actors: a public sector that gets its way, a timid 
civil society, a cautious donor community and a private sector missing in action. The 
discussion of the factors that underlie these trends in the behaviour of actors 
highlighted the importance of the global Fund’s principle of country ownership and 
the resulting emphasis on national strategy plans as CCM related factors. At the level 
of the deeper frames of reference, the discussion outlined the relevance the ideology 
of the government in Ethiopia, the culture of sovereignty and tradition of 
government, the Charities and Civil Society Proclamation and CSOs inherent 
representation and coordination crisis.  
5.5 Critical theme IV: A dominant discourse (An effective system best 
left to its own devices)   
 
The last of the critical themes relates to the predominant perception of the Ethiopian 
CCM (and the health system at large) as an effective system. This perception is seen 
to be pervasive amongst participants of this study and amongst actors in the setting, 
generally. This assessment of an effective system is made both in reference to the 
success of the CCM in winning Global Fund grants and generally in reference to the 
public sector in Ethiopia, in terms of its achievements in meeting globally set 
development targets. The following quote illustrates this pervasive perception in the 
setting: 
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… there is a strong leadership provided by the government but also by the 
CCM in Ethiopia, which has made Ethiopia the largest portfolio of the 
Global Fund, with a cumulative investment of about 1.7 billion USD, so the 
success in being able to attract so many resources of the Global Fund in 
itself is a demonstration of the leadership provided by the CCM in the 
country. And of course the CCM in the country is chaired by the Minister [of 
Health] so it has a very positive thing …  
     - Multilateral donor participant IV 
This perception is seen to be highly consequential in terms of sustaining the 
statuesque in the CCM. Particularly, it is seen to be injecting a sense of reluctance on 
the part of donors in terms of whether they would assert their influence in order to 
demand adjustments to engender more meaningful involvement of all actors in the 
deliberations. In other words, this assessment of ‘a system that gets things done’ has 
implications on how the shortcomings of the system related to lack of meaningful 
deliberation are gauged and acted upon by the Global Fund and the other donors 
involved in the partnership. The effectiveness argument essentially acts as a trump 
card against criticisms of other aspects of the partnership process. The following 
quotes illustrate this observation: 
… But it’s not worrying that much, because the performance targets are 
largely being met. So it [government dominance) may not be an issue at the 
moment. 
 – Bilateral donor participant II 
…you have got to understand the conflict between, yes you have got an 
effective government in social sectors, on the other hand, there are some 
issues about freedom of expression human rights, blah blah blah blah, uh 
and that’s of course, yeah that’s a challenge to uh to deal with that, on the 
other hand, what I would say here is I would say listen, access to health care, 
and access to education, access to water resources is human right, and I 
think, I really think the Ethiopian government should be given credit for that 
part of human rights, I think there are other parts of human rights where you 
should have dialogue with government and say well you are not so happy 
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with this kind of thing or could you maybe arrange things in a different, 
different manner, but sometimes I think we are a bit too, too critical … 
- Bilateral donor participant V 
Hence the observation here is that there is a pervasive understanding in the setting 
that the Ethiopian public sector and the Ethiopian CCM are highly effective 
mechanisms that are delivering results. This understanding is in turn seen to be 
highly consequential as it influences the way the record of the public sector in other 
areas of the partnership process are gauged and acted upon by other powerful actors 
in the setting, such as donors. The next section discusses the contextual factors that 
are seen to reinforce this observed trend. 
CCM related factors that reinforce critical theme IV: The Global Fund’s 
Performance Based Funding System 
The factor that is seen to reinforce the effect of the dominant discourse of ‘an 
effective government best left to its own devices’ relates to the emphasis on 
performance placed by the Global Fund’s performance based funding system. The 
statement from the Global Fund that describes the performance based funding 
approach reads: 
Performance-based funding: That means that on-going financing is 
dependent upon performance. While initial funding is awarded based on the 
strength of a proposal, continued funding is dependent upon the 
demonstration of proven results. In essence, countries must be able to show 
where the money has been spent and what results have been achieved with 
that money in order to continue to receive on-going funding. (GFATM 2015) 
This explicit emphasis on performance, whereby subsequent rounds of funding 
would be based on an assessment of implementation of activities in previous rounds 
of grants essentially exalts the importance of an ‘effective system’ above all other 
considerations. The consequence of this is that other concerns such as levels of 
participation are effectively treated as subsidiary to ‘effectiveness’ concerns. This in 
turn places the public sector in a favourable position as the perception of the public 
sector as an effective system that delivers results is widely recognised by local and 
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international actors, as describe above and in chapter 4.  
5.6  Chapter Summary  
	  
This chapter has presented the identified critical themes in terms actors’ 
characterisations of their lived experiences, and discussed an interpretation of these 
characterisations against pertinent factors emanating from the structured context (the 
CCM regulatory frameworks and the deeper frames of reference in the Ethiopian 
setting). In this regard, the analysis follows the critical realist paradigm and the 
theoretical lens adopted in this study regarding how the relationship between actors’ 
agency and structure occurs. Accordingly, the section has presented an attempt of 
understanding the trends in interactions between actors not just as a function of their 
ageneitic factors such as their intentions and strategies or as an outcome of the sole-
determinacy of structural factors. Rather it offers a ‘situated’ interpretation of actors’ 
intentions and strategies within a 2-layered context. The critical themes related to 
actors’ characterisations of their lived experiences and the underlying factors 
emanating from the structured-context are summarised in table 7. 
Accordingly, the key characterisations of the lived experiences were presented as 
constituting: asymmetric consensus, dominance of clinical care, actors’ perceptions 
of each other (a public sector that gets its way, a timid civil society, a cautious donor 
community and a private sector missing in action), and a dominant discourse of an 
effective system best left to its own devices. These characterisations were explained 
in reference to key contextual factors emanating from the CCM regulatory 
frameworks and the deeper frames of reference in the Ethiopian setting. The factors 
related to the CCM regulatory factors include: rules and operational guidelines of the 
CCM, the composition of the CCM, Global Fund principles of country ownership, 
performance based funding and partnership, and the Fund’s zero tolerance to fraud. 
The factors related to the deeper frames of reference and highlighted as critical to the 
observed trends of interaction include: the nature of the Ethiopian State, poverty 
alleviation as a political pledge, the culture of sovereignty and tradition of 
government, the history of AIDS in Ethiopia, and CSO’s inherent representation and 
coordination crisis. 
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The discussion in the chapter has accordingly sought to tell a story of actors’ lived 
experiences of interacting within the CCM in Ethiopia, as an ‘embedded tale’ (Nauta 
2006). This approach has also sought to illuminate how the factors emanating from 
the different layers of the context, the CCM regulatory frameworks and the deeper 
frames of reference, also interact with one another as they influence the manner of 
interactions between actors.  
The next chapter follows this by narrowing the gaze to analysis of process related 
factors.  
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Chapter Six 
Process Related Factors 
6.1  Introduction 
	  
The preceding chapter presented an interpretation of actors’ characterisations of their 
lived experiences in the CCM, with reference to the structured-context (CCM 
regulatory frameworks and the deeper frames of reference in the setting). In so doing, 
the chapter sought to contribute towards satisfying the research questions related to 
exploring how actors interact in and around the CCM, and assessing why they 
interact in observed ways. In this respect, the themes developed from actors’ 
characterisations of their lived experiences of interacting in the CCM sought to 
satisfy the ‘how’ question, while the explanations coming out of the analysis of the 
structured-context correspond to efforts aimed at satisfying the ‘why’ question. In 
other words, the former represents an attempt at describing features of the 
phenomenon (actors’ interactions), while the latter seeks to explain the phenomenon 
through analysis of the structured-context.  
This chapter follows the above with an effort to further contribute to answering the 
‘why’ question, from the perspective of process related factors. In other words, while 
chapter 5 attempts to find explanations as to why actors interact in observed ways 
from analysis of the structured-context, this chapter focuses on the process related 
factors that impede or facilitate actors’ interactions. It focuses on day-to-day 
practical issues that relate to the process of partnering across sectors. This can be 
seen as an effort aimed at documenting what Huxham and Vangen aptly termed as 
‘experienced the pain of collaboration’ and to expose the  ‘dilemmas which are 
subtle enough not to be obvious’ (Huxham and Vangen 2005; p. 34)In the process, 
the commitments toward developing a contextualised understanding of issues is 
maintained in this chapter too whereby the analysis of the process related factors is 
relayed as an ‘embedded tale’ (Nauta 2006) with recourse to the context of 
interaction.  
By exploring the ‘macro’ institutional factors in chapter 5 and focusing the gaze on 
the ‘micro’ process related factors in this chapter, the study seeks to offer a holistic 
account of the cross-sectoral partnership under study. As highlighted in chapter 2, 
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studies of partnerships are critiqued for being undertaken in a disparate manner 
through different disciplines whereby, for instance, while sociological approaches 
focus on institutional factors, the public management literature has largely been 
preoccupied with process related issues (Bryson, Crosby et al. 2006).  
6.2 Critical themes related to the cross-sectoral partnering process 
 
This section presents the themes that emerged from analysis of the data, in relation to 
the processes of partnering across sectors, within the CCM in Ethiopia. In this regard, 
the analysis in this chapter involved an exploration of participants’ perceptions, 
attitudes and experiences in relation to different processes related to the setting up 
and running of the CCM in the Ethiopian setting. In other words, by exploring 
participants accounts of their experiences related to the key stages of the partnering 
process such as recruitment of partners, deliberation within the CCM, the proposal 
development process and the PR nomination process, the chapter presents the key 
enablers and inhibitors of cross-sectoral interactions in and around the CCM in 
Ethiopia. The analysis in this chapter was based on the data generated through 
interviews and the non-participant observation. 
As represented in figure 4, the themes that were identified across the different stages 
of the partnering process include: The making of partners (recruitment process); 
capacity to partner (CCM deliberation process); manners of deliberation (CCM 
deliberation process); the role of consultants and technical working groups (proposal 
development process); the proposal development rush (proposal development 
process); role of an influential personality (across all processes); and challenges 
related to representing constituencies (CCM deliberation process and proposal 
development process).  
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Figure 4: Critical themes identified across the different stages of the partnering 
process 
 
6.2.1 The making of partners (Recruitment process) 
 
This theme refers to the understanding that is drawn from analysis of the data 
surrounding the recruitment process that the recruitment of partners into the CCM 
involves more than a mere process of enlisting actors as members of the mechanism. 
The recruitment process is seen as having variable effects on the different types of 
actors in the setting, whereby the criteria set by the CCM regarding potential partners 
was found to suit some partners (public sector) while causing others to undergo 
major reorganisation (CSOs). Some sectors are even excluded entirely from the 
mechanism for lack of organisation at the sectoral level as required by the CCM 
(private health care providers).  
Before exploring these observations in detail, the specification of partners contained 
within the Global Fund guidance documents will be described here. The statements 
that qualify who members of CCMs should constitute prioritise the following sectors: 
the public sector, civil society, the private sector, multilateral and bilateral 
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international donors, and key affected communities. The relevant statements in the 
guidance notes (GFATM 2013) specifically state:  
All CCMs may include members representing the following constituencies: 
government, civil society, the private sector, as well as other constituencies, 
such as multilateral and bilateral international partners working in-
country… 
CCMs should ensure the representation of key affected populations (refer to 
footnote 23) taking into account the socio-epidemiology of the three diseases 
and the national context. The Global Fund Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identities strategy provides additional guidance in this regard for 
populations most-at-risk for HIV.  
Hence, the membership criteria prioritise the representation of key sectors and 
constituencies at the CCM. This inclination towards ensuring inclusiveness in the 
way stakeholders are represented in the CCM directs country CCMs to seek to find 
ways in which constituencies groups would be represented through national level 
umbrella organisations or associations. Now this requirement is less problematic for 
sectors that have such a structure and organisation such as the public sector, which is 
anyway organised at all levels of government in different thematic areas: HIV/AIDS, 
health and so on. However, for sectors that have more fluid constituencies, such as 
CSOs, this requirement effectively causes them to reorganise into a more coherent 
form of representation that will see all the different constituencies subsumed within a 
national association or network. Even for donors, this has meant that the voices of 
the autonomous entities that make up the sector, such as different donor governments 
with different priorities and perspectives on issues related to the host country,  would 
be represented through 2 seats allotted for the sector.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  ‘Footnote 2’ as specified in the Global Fund Guidance Notes: Key affected populations in Key 
Affected Populations include: women and girls, Men who have Sex with Men (MSM) People who 
Inject Drugs (PWID), Transgender People, Sex Workers (SW), prisoners, refugees and migrants, 
people living with HIV, adolescents and young people, Orphans and Vulnerable Children, and 
populations of humanitarian concern. 
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In the case of CSOs in Ethiopia, the CCM actively enforced a requirement that CSOs 
representing the key, highlighted stakeholders such as NGOs, faith based 
organisations and associations of people living with HIV/AIDs, should organise into 
national level associations or networks that will represent constituencies of the 
respective sectors. For instance, NEP + (the Network of networks of HIV positives 
in Ethiopia) and EIFDA (the Ethiopian Interfaith Forum for Development and 
Action) were formed as a result of reorganisation of members in the respective 
sectors under new national level networks or umbrella organisations. In the case of 
both networks, although the requirements placed by the CCM were not the only 
cause for the formation of the national networks, they were a major catalyst for the 
formation of the networks. The following testimonies from donor and CSO 
participants exemplify this point:     
 ‘CCM was kind of forcing the civil society to be organised and represented’ 
    - Bilateral donor participant III 
… you know at the time individual faith based organisations were 
approaching the CCM unilaterally, especially the Orthodox Church was 
really getting ahead of themselves, especially as they are the biggest entity 
and as they have historically had access [to political power], and the same 
for the Catholics and others, so they [CCM] said that this will not stop, if we 
give it to the Catholics, the Orthodox would come and ask us … so they asked 
us to come as an interfaith body and this shows the wisdom of the 
chairperson [Dr Tedros, Ex Minister of Health], you could look at it from 
that point of view, but in any case this was interfaith body was in the process 
of being formed by then … 
Interviewer: So two things here, your consortium is like that of NEP +, and it 
looks like the government prefers that, so is it all done in response to the 
CCM? 
Participant: No no… the consortium came via its own way, EIFDA has been 
a long time coming, it started from New York, started from the 1999 Religion 
for Peace Conference in New York, where the World Council of Religious 
Leaders (WCRP) was founded …  (CSO participant XI) 
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Similarly, testimonies regarding NEP +’s formation indicated that there were long 
standing efforts to form a national level association that would subsume and 
represent the different PLWHA associations active in the country. In this case too, 
the impulse from the CCM further catalysed existing ideas and plans towards 
forming a national level network that would represent all constituencies of the sector. 
The CCM’s support for a national level network was critical for the formation of 
NEP + as the longstanding individual national PLWHA associations, namely, Tilla, 
Dawn of Hope, and Mekdim, had all staked a claim to the seat allotted for the sector 
within the CCM.  
As per the recollections of participants from the networks and other members who 
were involved in the recruitment process, the formation of these networks (both 
EIFDA and NEP +) was a highly contested affair. The prospect of representing the 
sectors in this critically important national mechanism had enticed the major players 
in these sectors (faith based organisations and people living with HIV/AIDS) to 
compete for the seat allotted for the sectors individually, rather than subscribing to 
the idea of formation of new networks. In addition, some of the constituencies, such 
as the different faith based development organisations, were not entities that could be 
easily incorporated under the same network. The following quotes illustrate this:   
… The dilemma was between choosing one of the longstanding associations 
and going for a network that represents the multiple associations, finally, it 
was decided that it would make sense to take the network option as it would 
eventually enable the Global Fund resources to reach out to and build the 
capacities of the member associations, because NEP + does include Mekdim 
and Dawn of Hope, Mekdim in fact fought hard saying that it is them that 
should get the seat at the CCM ….  
- CSO Participant XV  
When EIFDA was founded the process was very long, to get the Patriarch 
and the Muslims accept the arrangement of being within the constituencies of 
EIFDA took a long time, that’s why it took a long time … there was a lot of 
challenges getting the council to work together, say if a Protestant pastor 
asks the Orthodox patriarch to sit in a meeting chaired by the former, it 
creates tension, so we focused on the development wings, which are mainly 
	  
 
145	  
staffed by secular, technical people, we then eventually took the matter to the 
religious leaders. It helped that at the time that we took the matter to them, 
the CCM had put its weight behind EIFDA and they could clearly see the 
relative positions of their respective development wings within EIFDA, so 
they surrendered …  
       - CSO participant VIII 
The other important observation is that the negotiations related to the formation of 
the networks had involved moderation by the Ministry of Health, particularly, the 
then Minister of Health, Dr. Tedros Adhanom. This constitutes a critically important 
issue as the recruitment into the CCM and the requirements that were place as a 
consequence, have allowed the public sector to have a say in the organisation and 
representation of CSOs within the mechanism. The involvement of the Ministry of 
Health appears to be significant in the case of NEP +, whose formation was found to 
be more contested than that of EIFDA.  
In the case of NEP +, the long standing PLWHA associations were said to be 
engaged in intense competition amongst themselves to take up the seat at the CCM. 
Hence it took a lot of moderation from the public sector to convince enable the 
formation of the network. The formation of the network involved the recruitment of 
personnel from the individual PLWHAs into the network and that process was said 
to be a highly contested one. Most importantly, the individual associations saw the 
creation of a new network as a creation of new competitor for available resources 
and for the mandate of representing the voices of affected communities in the 
country. The contestations in this regard and the effects on the positions of actors are 
further explored in chapter 7. The following quote from a CSO participant illustrates 
this observation: 
 
…Indeed there was a lot of chaos when the network was first formed, there 
were conflicts of interests…they [the pioneer associations] used to solicit 
funds on their own, however, once NEP + was formed, donors started 
demanding that the requests should come through the network of networks 
[NEP +], because it is very convenient for them, as it becomes easier to 
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gather one report than chase ten or more reports, so the associations started 
thinking that after all we had created a competitor for our resources … 
    - CSO Participant V  
This requirement of a sectoral level representation is also seen to have resulted in the 
exclusion of private health care service providers from the process. In the absence of 
a national level association that could come forward to claim the seat allotted for 
private sectors, it is other CCM members who made the decision as to who would 
represent the sector. This has in turn resulted in the nomination of the National Trade 
Union and the National Employers Association representing the private sector in the 
CCM. As discussed in the previous chapter, the nomination of these organisations 
was influenced by their roles in workplace HIV/AIDS interventions. However, in 
view of the significant role played by private health care providers in the country 
(chapter 4), their absence from this important mechanism is considered in this study 
to represent an anomaly. Chapter 7 further explores their absence from the point of 
view existing power relationships and the lack of trust between the private sector and 
the public sector in the setting.  
This section has accordingly argued that the recruitment of partners or members into 
the CCM represents more than mere enlisting of organisations into the mechanism. 
Specifically, the requirements set by the CCM for partners was seen to have variable 
effects on different sectors, whereby for some sectors (CSOs) it has resulted in 
significant reorganisation with lasting effects on the relationships between 
constituencies of the sectors. The process has also allowed the public sector to have a 
say in the reorganisation of CSOs. The requirements of sectoral level representation 
have not suited donors either, whereby fashioning coherent positions out of the 
autonomous agencies that make up the sector has been problematic. Private health 
care providers are also excluded from the process for lack of a sectoral level 
representation in policy processes, despite their significant contribution to health 
care delivery in the country. Out of all actors in the setting, the requirements appear 
to have represented the least amount of adjustments for the public sector.  
Now the chapter turns to another theme that is identified from analysis of the 
deliberation within the CCM. 
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6.2.2 Capacity to partner 
	  
This theme refers to variable capacities amongst different actor effectively 
participate within the partnership mechanism. The data revealed that actors come to 
the CCM with highly variable levels of capacities. Naturally, this is to be expected, 
as the members of the CCM comprise different categories of actors who vary in their 
technical and financial capabilities, as well as their experiences in engaging in 
similar mechanisms and policy forums. Actors are specifically seen to exhibit 
differences in respect of the depth and breadth of areas of work they are comfortable 
to discuss and contribute towards, as well as their capacities to maximise 
opportunities presented by the partnership.  
In a nutshell, it could be said that the CCM brings together, highly contrasting 
capabilities in terms of financial, technical and experiential attributes of actors. 
These differences are seen to be quite stark when one contrasts the case of 
indigenous organisations (CSOs and private sector representatives) with that of the 
public sector and international agencies (the public sector, bilateral and multilateral 
donors). The following testimonies from CSO and private sector participants reflect 
this observation: 
…We don't feel that we have either contributed enough or gained as much, 
and we feel that's down to our own weaknesses 
- Private Sector Participant I 
What I think are challenges is that as we are at different levels, for example, 
WHO is a member, so the structure in WHO and that of EIFDA is different, 
so they often ask 'why don't you do this, it's simple, you can do this and that' 
But that has to be seen in light of EIFDA being a small, local organisation, of 
course the member organisations [of EIFDA] are big organisations, so there 
are issues related to understanding the variable capacities of members, so 
when you have quite different groups sitting on the same platform they won't 
have the same perspective ... 
   - CSO participant IX 
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Participants also indicated that these differences between representatives of local 
CSOs on the one hand, and those of governmental agencies and international 
organisations on the other, extended to usage of the language the English language, 
which is the working language within the CCM. Some participants from CSOs and 
the private sector highlighted their inability to converse well in the English language 
as one of the factors hindering their optimal participation. Participants in fact 
highlighted that it was not just the English language that was a hindrance, but the 
type of terminologies and jargons used by representatives of public sector and 
international agencies. Some participants (private sector) said that that they felt less 
comfortable and able to contribute to some aspects of the discussions and technical 
documents, as they were ‘too technical’ and ‘full of medical terms’. The following 
quote from a private sector participant exemplifies these difficulties faced by 
indigenous organisations in terms of the use of language: 
Participant: So as I have said earlier, the fact that the medium of 
communication is in English poses a difficulty, we work and write in Amharic, 
of course we try some English, but they mainly use these WHO,  
Interviewer: jargons?  
Participant: yes the jargons are very difficult, it is WHO, USAID, and many 
foreigners representing the NGOs, so the language has not been convenient 
for me, they give you huge documents to review … and most of it is 
abbreviations and jargons ...  
- Private Sector Participant I 
Further more, CSO participants pointed towards the difference in the social standing 
and professional stature of the representatives that the different organisations are 
able to field in the arena of interactions. In this regard, representatives of the public 
sector offices and international organisations come with the authority of their 
respective offices, which in turn carry significant clout in the setting. For instance, 
the Minister of Health or the head of one of the donor agencies commands 
significant influence on local CSOs, as their positions have implications for the type 
of policies the CSOs work under and the resources they are able to access. A 
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testimony from a CSO participant regarding their experiences in the CCM, illustrates 
this point: 
The people at the CCM are high level government officials and leaders of 
different international organisations, so when I went for the first time as a 
representative of a local CSO, I found it to be very difficult, it's scary, 
difficult, … speaking in front of the Minister, the head of an international 
organisation, the likes of WHO and UNAIDS, USAID, to speak in the 
presence of leaders of different donor organisations and discuss is very 
difficult, and the language is very difficult too, so these things are very 
difficult. So going there, there is fear and sometimes there is lack of know 
how, what they speak is high level diplomatic and scientific operational 
languages and so my knowledge, profession and education was not on par 
with them … 
- CSO Participant XI 
Hence, members of the CCM naturally reflected variable levels of capacities, which 
in turn influenced their levels of, and quality of participation in the deliberation 
process. In this regard, local organisations (CSOs and private sector participants) 
were seen to be at a disadvantage. They were not necessarily comfortable to engage 
in a broad set of areas due to the capacities of their organisations and the work they 
were involved in and faced difficulties relation to language. In addition, the 
representatives of the other sectors (public sector and donors) come with the 
authorities of their respective offices, which further affected the manner of the 
deliberations. 
The next section discusses the role of consultants within the deliberation process. 
6.2.3 The role of consultants  
 
The data related to the proposal development process pointed towards the 
importance of the role played by international consultants. Specifically, CSO, donor 
and public sector participants pointed towards the huge influence that consultants 
had in terms of shaping the technical aspects of the country proposals, whilst 
highlighting that the inputs from the consultants were at times contested in the 
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setting for not reflecting the objective reality in the setting. Although the consultants 
technical inputs were highly valued, on the occasions where the advice of 
consultants contravened the interests and perspectives of powerful voices within the 
CCM, the latter’s view was said to carry the day. These issues will be presented in 
detail in this section. 
Consultants can either be local or international, who are often hired by in-country 
donors to assist particular PRs (government departments or the CSOs) in the 
proposal writing process.  The consultants are said to be mainly recruited based on 
their technical qualifications and experiences of involvement in preparation of 
successful country proposals in the past. The consultants join proposal development 
team made up of technical experts drawn from the different member organisations of 
the CCM. Most of the technical experts making up this proposal development teams 
are also said to be drawn from donor agencies as they are seen to have qualified 
personnel that can come in and support the process. At the same time, the CCM also 
forms a proposal steering committee out of the CCM voting members, which 
provides general directions to the proposal development teams. A public sector 
participant describes the process as follows: 
… So the technical working group is established for HIV, TB and malaria 
because the input from different stakeholders would help, secondly having 
the involvement of people with different technical expertise helps with the 
quality of the proposal and thirdly because partners sometimes seek and 
recruit consultants in cases where there is the need for external support, for 
example, the main dominant body in malaria is roll back malaria, what 
makes it dominant is because it has a strong consortium in country, the likes 
of WHO also bring in people [consultants], one time the PLWHAs also 
brought in some people [consultants], -­‐ Public Sector participant II 
 
The role of the consultants was emphasised by participants on the basis that the task 
of developing the proposals was an intensive task, whereby it becomes too much of a 
demanding task for the full time staff of the CCM member organisations.  In this 
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respect, the consultants offer their dedicated attention to solely to the task of 
developing the proposal.  
The proposals are a huge huge huge amount of work, you know even just the 
format looks like a small telephone directory and then you have got all these 
things you have to answer like how were disabled people involved and how 
were young people involved because in my mind anyway I could imagine 
somebody was sitting there at the table in Geneva and demanding these 
things and it just got added and added and added to the proposal format. So 
there was always a lot of work umm usually it was led by consultants but 
there would be a team of people, including people from government and 
whatever to put together 
       - Bilateral donor participant III 
Accordingly, the full time dedication of the consultants to the task of developing the 
technical details of the proposals, combined with their technical insights and 
experiences of developing country proposals in the past, renders the consultants very 
influential in the technical discussions. The following testimony from a CSO 
participant provides an insight as to how the voice of the consultants influences 
technical decisions within the framework of the proposal development process: 
Participant: ...in all this the technical experts would advise, [they would say], 
‘if you insist, we can include this, but it would fail ultimately’, they say this 
with evidence.  
Interviewer: Who are they? 
Participant: Consultants, both international and national that participate in 
writing the proposal, those who have passed through 2 or 3 proposal 
development processes and who had been successful and hence come with 
experience ... 
          - CSO participant XI  
A highly interesting aspect of participants’ accounts of the role of consultants in the 
proposal development process relates to occasions whereby consultants’ advice 
turned out to be controversial. These occasions further reveal a power play between 
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the consultants, who draw their power from claims of their technical qualifications 
and past experiences with successful country proposals, powerful actors in the 
setting such as the public sector, who draw their influence from the constitution of 
power in the setting and within the CCM (chapter 7). On these occasions, it was said 
that the CCM voting members, particularly the public sector representatives, did not 
shy away from having their influences felt. The following quotes from donor and 
CSO participants illustrate these observations: 
The role of the decision makers [CCM members] is still huge, after the draft 
is presented, they decide, the only thing is that the technical people 
participate in the drafting, but all things would be highlighted and presented 
to the steering committee, technical people provide advice, however, 
regarding deciding on the thematic area, screening the concept notes and so 
on, even if the technical people provide advise, when there is tension 
regarding proposed decisions, it is the CCM members' say that holds sway 
         - CSO participant III  
I do specifically remember this one proposal whose consultant was saying 
let’s put in some money to pay extra, you know, to staff in the public sector 
and the Minister said no no we can’t do that, that’s our responsibility, we 
can’t do that because you know, it can’t go on forever, it’s our responsibility, 
we can’t do that and he insisted we are not putting that in, which again was 
very logical to me and to most of us but was a little bit shocking to this 
consultant, who said, oh but the global fund will allow, will pay this, but Dr 
Tedros [EX Minister of Health] said ‘no’ we don’t want that, that’s not 
appropriate, stop! 
      - Bilateral donors participant III 
Hence, consultants come with significant technical qualifications that accord them a 
critical say in the process of shaping the technical aspects of country proposals. 
However, their advices are occasionally contested from not reflecting the objective 
reality in the setting. On the occasions, that the advice of the consultants and the 
views of the powerful members of the CCM contradict, the power and influence of 
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the latter supersedes the influence of the former drawn from their technical and 
professional profile. 
6.2.4 Suboptimal participation, despite procedural safeguards 
 
This theme reflects the sentiments from donor and CSO participants that despite the 
presence of procedural safeguards to ensure equal participation, they do not feel that 
they are participating at equal footing with public sector participants. First, the 
section presents the testimonies from participants regarding the presence of good 
procedural safeguards for the deliberation within the CCM. Then, participants’ 
verdicts regarding whether they feel they are engages in meaningful deliberation 
within the CCM. 
Participants generally attested that there were adequate safeguards to enable 
members of the CCM to express their concerns on any agenda discussed at the CCM. 
Participants highlighted that they are given the opportunity to reflect on issues and 
forward their ideas. Participants often commented that the vice chairperson position 
was designated for CSOs, occupied by CCRDA currently, and that CCRDA chairs 
the meeting in the absence of the Minister or vice/Minister of Health.  They used this 
point to signify that there was a level of openness and understanding in how the 
meetings were conducted. All in all the views on the deliberative safeguards within 
the CCM were quite positive as illustrated from the following quotes from a CSO 
and private sector participant: 
In that respect [deliberations during meetings], there was no 
apprehensiveness, everyone aired what they felt was important, whether 
propositions were adopted is a different matter, but at least in terms of 
presenting and discussing issues … even the issue of whether the civil society 
should have a PR member was an issue that was highly debated in this 
regard … 
- CSO participant XV  
… so there may be differences in levels of involvement, but as much as 
possible, regarding the participation of stakeholders, there is this clear 
participatory approach, the agenda are distributed ahead of time, and the 
	  
 
154	  
minutes, so when you look at all these, it is highly participatory and 
organised, it has it's own secretariat, … in terms of information 
dissemination and all, it is very good and Dr Tedros was chosen as the board 
chairman [global Board], if I am not mistaken [as testimony of this 
exemplary process]... 
      - Private Sector Participant I 
I was able to confirm these claims from participants through the non-participant 
observation of the meeting, which I undertook on June 13, 2013. In the run up to the 
meeting, the agenda were circulated ahead of time by the CCM secretariat. At the 
start of the meeting, the chairperson, the vice Minister of Health, asked participants 
if they had anything to add to the agenda. During the meeting, the chairperson would 
point to everyone sitting around the table asking if they had any thoughts to add to 
the discussion. One critical observation in terms of the efforts aimed at ensuring 
equal participation related to how CSO participants were not as active as donor and 
public sector participants during the meeting. Out of all the participants, the donor 
participants seemed to be proactive in forwarding their views and asking questions of 
the reports that were presented by the different CSO and public sector PRs. In 
comparison, except for occasions of clarifying their own reports, CSO participants 
did not seem to be active in engaging with reports from other PRs. 
While positively appraising the system for deliberation, as described above, 
participants from bilateral donors and CSOs felt that the deliberations were still 
tightly controlled by the public sector. They alluded to a scenario whereby 
deliberations occurred within the confines of predetermined borderlines that indicate 
what is permissible and what is not. In this regard, some bilateral donor and CSO 
participants lamented that the processes of deliberating on issues do not start from 
scratch but that agenda items are more of crafted as decision propositions that favour 
certain points of view (mainly those of the public sector). Participants enumerated 
some of the issues that have support amongst some stakeholders but are nonetheless 
not raised in the CCM due as the actors anticipate that they would be opposed to by 
the public sector. They related these trends to the nature of the government in the 
setting. The following quotes illustrate these points: 
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…you know Ethiopia, you know the mentality and the organisation of the 
government, and the CCM is, the running of the CCM is very formal and we 
can say what we are thinking but practically the decisions are, when we have 
the meeting, the very important decisions they are still, how do you say in 
English, [already] decided.’  
      - Bilateral donor participant IV 
…. there are some other issues, like gender, like sexual minorities, MSM 
[men who have sex with men], which is important for the HIV control, which 
the Global Fund says they are paying a lot of attention to, it is uh I don’t 
think the Global Fund is really raising it and probably they would say, well 
this is, CCM has to raise this, this is not us, this is CCM which I think is a bit 
of an easy way out… 
- Bilateral donor participant V 
As indicated in the quote above, participants associate this to the contextual factors 
such as the ‘the mentality’ of the government. Hence, it is not just the deliberative 
safeguards that matter but the nature of relationships between actors in the setting, 
outside of the CCM. It is seen to emanate from actors’ relative positions in the CCM, 
and the setting, in general. This is explored at length in chapter 7, where the power 
relationships that give rise to these observations are discussed. For one donor 
participant, the problem lay with participants themselves as they self-censor 
themselves beyond a level implied by the contextual situation: 
… but I also think that the bilaterals, and maybe the UN system didn’t claim, 
still don’t claim always the space that is there. I think there is more space for 
dialogue than people claim and it’s too often, oh this is sensitive so we are 
not going to discuss it, uhh and in that sense I think, the donor community, 
the bilaterals and the UN, they apply a kind of self-censorship on a number 
of things, uhmm and I think that’s, that’s a pity … 
- Bilateral donor participant V 
In summary, while it was widely appreciated by participants that there set up of the 
CCM allowed for airing of their views and discussing issues, CSO and donor 
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participants still imparted a sentiment that they feel that the agenda for the meetings 
are tightly controlled. They felt that they were not at liberty to raise some sensitive 
issues that were not favoured by the public sector. Participants attributed this as 
emanating from the nature of the relationship between actors in the setting, outside 
of the CCM. 
6.2.5 The proposal development rush 
	  
This theme relates to how the country proposals are developed under tight timelines, 
in a reactive manner with less preparedness ahead of time, which in turn diminishes 
possibilities for reflective practices in the proposal development process. During this 
rush, CSO and donor participants said that there was less chances for a reflective 
practice whereby innovative approaches could be incorporated into the CCM 
proposals. Instead, this practice is said to have precipitated a trend of replicating 
interventions included in last rounds of funding without gauging the evidence as to 
their effectiveness. The following quotes from participants from CSOs provides an 
insight into the proposal development rush and the lack of reflective practice. 
… so if you say the Global Fund money has been released this year, the 
activities are the same year on year, it's copy paste basically, so they don't 
incorporate new, innovative ideas, the activities are prescribed by their 
action plans, if you have supported 5 people through IGAs last year you can 
keep on doing that for the coming years ... 
- CSO participant VII 
 
So to give you a specific example of this [that there is lack of new innovations] 
there are interventions called community conversation and community 
mobilisation, these have been included simply blindly and have not been 
evaluated….so it is not evaluated if these approaches are either economically 
or practically viable … but we continue to spend huge sums of money year 
after year for community conversation and community mobilisation….You 
don’t see any scientific considerations in the Global Fund CCM mechanism, 
is community conversation effective? How? Or anything of the sort, there has 
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been no evaluation of community conversation, I mean for the last 10 or 9 
years… 
- CSO participant XIII 
Some donor and CSO participants pointed out that the problems related to the 
proposal development rush were compounded by the lack of readily usable evidence 
in the setting. They further pointed out that this problem actually afflicts the national 
strategy plans’ formulation processes in the setting. Here are the two quotes from the 
participants who reflected these views: 
In terms of innovation, the problem is that we are not prepared ahead of the 
proposal development process, it is once the proposal development is 
underway that we scramble to collate ideas, we know the timelines well, of 
the next submission and so on, but we are not well prepared, and this is not 
just a problem with the CCM but across implementers in the country, there is 
not the tendency to document innovative interventions and document in a 
scalable format... … the same old interventions are then included at the last 
minute, it's always a rush, the final review is actually done during nights, 
nearer the deadlines … 
- CSO Participant XV  
It was complete, blanket coverage based on untested models (HIV/AIDS 
Strategic Plan].  Blanket coverage on counselling and testing, CC 
(community conversation) [a behavioural change communication method], 
and so on, school community conversation, all duplicative approaches … 
                  - Bilateral donor participant II  
Hence the proposal development rush represents the situation whereby the country 
proposals are prepared in a reactive manner, with less preparation ahead of time, in 
turn precipitating a ‘rush’ in the manner in which the proposals are developed and 
lack of innovativeness in the proposals. This is said to be compounded by lack of 
readily usable and scalable evidence in the setting and the problem is said to affect 
national strategy formulation processes as well. 
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6.2.6 The role of an influential personality   
  
A theme that is reflected in the data across all stages of the partnering process, from 
recruitment of partners to the proposal writing stages, relates to the role of an 
influential personality, the ex Minister of Health, Dr. Tedros Adhanom, who served 
as State Minister of Health and Minster of Health between 2003 and 2005, and 2005 
and 2012, respectively. The Minister’s name features in virtually all interviews. The 
Minister was said to have invigorated the work of the CCM by rendering it utmost 
focus and is said to have commanded a lot of respect from all types of actors. 
Participants described the Minister as someone that has significantly shaped in which 
the mechanism evolved including the recruitment of partners, the type of cooperative 
atmosphere that is engendered in the CCM and by representing the public sector 
agenda authoritatively. In addition, the Minister was described by participants from 
all corners of the sectoral spectrum as having a highly approachable and polite 
personality. 
The Minister’s significant influence appears to be bourne out of the multifaceted 
attributes of power and influence that he embodied. The Minister came to the post 
with a combination of: a global reputation for his research on the epidemiology of 
malaria, good experience and knowledge of the governance and structure of the 
health system through progressively serving in management positions at different 
levels of the national health system, and significant political sway as a member of 
the central coordinating committee of the ruling party. Besides serving as the CCM 
chairperson throughout his tenure as State Minister of Health and Minister of Helath, 
he was elected in 2009 as the chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Global 
Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, serving in that capacity for a period of 2 years. 
The following testimonies by a CSO participant and a bilateral donor participant 
exemplify these sentiments: 
Dr. Tedros was not an inflated personality who considered himself as 
government, he was very simple, very positive and very popular, with 
everyone, be it NGOs, government, donors, he was someone liked by 
everyone, and some of the days when the deputy stepped in to chair the 
meetings, the atmosphere was not the same...so when he comes you feel the 
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tension [deputy Minister] and everything changes completely, Dr Tedros was 
not like that, and so I think that personality is the reason [for consensus] … 
       - CSO participant XV  
I think probably also in the past, the former Minister, Tedros, I think was a 
good Minister, he was a very nice and kind person, if you know him, I don’t 
know, he is very interesting, for Ethiopia it’s a good thing also that he is a 
foreign Minister [current position]. But he has a good manner to manage 
also the CCM, because when he was the Minister, he was coming, relatively 
often, and the discussion was open also, we can say anything, we can discuss 
with him, we can say what we think, but he was able to make the consensus, 
to explain and after to manage his Ministry correctly … 
       - Bilateral Donor Participant IV 
The influence of the Minister was not confined to how he managed his Ministry. His 
influence extended to moderating the interactions between actors in other sectors. 
The prime example in this respect comes from how he had played a role in 
moderating conflicts between PLWHA associations during the formation and 
recruitment of NEP + into the CCM. Interestingly, both sides of the conflict cite the 
role of the Minister positively. Participants from NEP + refer to the positive role 
played by the Minister for intervening on behalf of the network when its existence 
was brought into question by a legal challenge from the member associations, regard 
the premise for its formation as a ‘network of networks’. On the other side, the 
national PLWHA associations also attribute their continued existence to the 
Minister’s thoughtful interventions, as they saw themselves being targeted by what 
they categorised as malevolent decisions from NEP +, which were designed to cut 
off their funding from the Global Fund. The following quotes from each side 
exemplify these sentiments: 
The trust is there with the government… there is support, there was a time 
where we got into some tension with our constituency around the time of 
submitting round 7 application, and it was the Minister of Health who 
convened all our constituencies and people from the CSO agency and 
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resolved the issue, we were stuck in the renewal of our license too because of 
that ... 
        - CSO participant III 
The Minster still supports us, even after he has gone to become the Foreign 
Affairs Minster … they had wanted to discontinue our funding but Minister 
Tedros intervened so that we have continued access …  
       - CSO participant VII 
However, some participants saw this prominent influence from the Minister (a CSO 
participant and a bilateral donor participant) as a factor that impeded the plurality of 
views reflected in CCM meetings. The participants basically alluded to the high level 
of deference accorded to the Minister for constraining the outspokenness of non-
State members of the CCM. The participants are effectively arguing that the 
significant clout that the Minister carries in the setting essentially inhibits others 
from challenging his or the public sector’s positions in the CCM. The two quotes are 
presented hereunder: 
I think also there is in Ethiopia a kind of fear for real dialogue, not only in 
CCM but I think also in general with the Ministry of Health in the donor 
group, it is improving but certainly NGOs and I think the private sector and 
research institutions, they don’t really enter into a dialogue with the Minister, 
maybe with some people in the ministry still, but certainly not with the 
Minister… 
       - Bilateral donor participant V 
I don’t think any of them are really willing to go against Dr. Tedros, that’s 
my opinion. Even if he does something that is wrong no one would say he is 
wrong, in the majority of cases, and he doesn’t change his ideas, I am not 
trying to say he is bad, there are a lot of things that Dr. Tedros has done, but 
he is responsible for all the good and bad that’s happened with the Global 
Fund, in the CCM many people don’t go against him, the whole structure is 
set up so that they don’t stray outside of this trend, if you ask me, I would say 
that this structure should not have been like this, because, the CCM may have 
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the donors group, ministries are there, civil societies, I don’t think all these 
would be going against him, no way 
       -  CSO participant XIII 
In summary, the ex Minister of Health is said to have left significant marks in how 
the CCM was set up and organised and in the way it conducted its day-to-day 
operations. The Minister embodied multifaceted attributes of coming with significant 
academic reputation, effective political power and professional insights into the 
workings of the health system. In addition, he came across to participants as a highly 
approachable and likeable personality. This has naturally boosted the position of the 
public sector in the CCM. At the same time, some participants rued the significant 
clout of the Minister for limiting the level of openness from the side of non-State 
actors. 
6.2.7 Challenges of representing one’s constituencies  
  
Another theme that cuts across all stages of the partnering process concerns the 
challenges related to representing constituencies effectively within the CCM. The 
challenges of representing constituencies related to how effectively the members of 
the CCM are representing the voices of their constituencies and if they can 
legitimately claim to be representing the voices of their constituencies. In this regard, 
the first level of doubts cast against the CCM seem to relate to whether the CCM as a 
whole ultimately represents all critical voices within the country. In other words, 
some participants raised questions as to whether the CCM reflects a representation of 
the most eligible constituencies in the setting. The following insight by a donor 
participant reflects these sentiments: 
… There are a few questions about the validity of the governance of the CCM 
and it’s representations of, you know, is it truly representing who it should be 
representing in country 
       - Bilateral donor participant I 
At the sectoral level, questions were specifically raised about the CSO and private 
sector representatives regarding the extent to which they can lay a claim of 
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representing the constituencies that they purport to represent. Here, participants 
mainly alluded to the fluidity of the constitution of these sectors and the difficulties 
related to optimally representing the critical, diverse voices in the sectors. Some 
questioned the legitimacy of the representation claims as the CSO members included 
in the CCM have not really been elected by their constituencies but rather reflect the 
choices made by the public sector as to who should represent the given sectors. The 
following quotes from a donor and CSO participants represnet these sentiments 
related to the appreciation of the difficulties associated with representing CSOs and 
questions posed over the legitimacy of claims of CCM members representing their 
constituencies, due to the notion that they are more seen as having been appointed by 
the public sector into the CCM roles than being elected by their constituencies: 
 
But I am still puzzled by that – how do you go about organising, coordinating 
civil society, NGOs, ... nobody knows how to get a grip on that 
- Bilateral donor participant III 
The networks most of the time don’t represent their constituencies effectively, 
what that means is that they don’t have adequate capacity and legitimacy to 
represent their constituencies’ work and voice, and what I mean when I say 
that they don’t have adequate legitimacy is that organisations which are not 
within their membership fold did not appoint them as representatives but 
when the government gives them that position to represent a certain 
constituency the message is that they would represent, so I don’t know what I 
would call this, it’s not a genuine representation. 
- CSO participant I 
Apart from this, donor and CSO participants raised more practical concerns in 
relation to the tasks of relaying CCM decisions to one’s constituencies and vice-
versa. In this respect, some donor and CSO participants highlighted time constraints, 
lack of capacity and experience, and technological challenges as barriers. The 
testimony hereunder illustrates this point: 
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After some time, it just became difficult to get ideas and feedback from the 
board of directors of my association, let alone the wider constituency, I 
would ask for input regarding opportunities at the CCM, there was no 
feedback and it increasingly became my own voice in the CCM, so I don't 
believe that the association has benefitted as much as it could from the CCM, 
nor has it contributed as to its potential  
- CSO participant XIV 
Hence, concerns were raised in relation to the CCM’s claims that all key 
stakeholders and voices are represented in the CCM. The concerns mainly relate to 
whether the CSO and private sector actors included in the CCM really represent the 
range of critical voices that exist in those sectors in the Ethiopian setting. Some 
participants questioned the legitimacy of those involved in CCM in this respect as 
they are considered as having been recruited by the public sector, rather than being 
elected by the respective constituencies. Finally, participants also raise some 
practical issues, such as time that hinder the task of representing the voices of 
constituencies in the CCM. These were said to be related to time constraints, lack of 
capacity and technological constraints such as email and other communication 
networks. 
6.3 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the themes that emerged in relation to 
different stages of the partnering process. In this regard, beginning with the way in 
which partners have been recruited into the CCM, it was seen that the recruitment 
process has significance that goes beyond mere enlisting of members. Specifically, 
the requirements set by the CCM for actors to organise representation at the sectoral 
level is seen to have variable effects on the different types of actors in the setting. 
The requirements set for sectoral level representation in the CCM are seen to suit the 
public sector while causing major reorganisations in other sector (CSOs), making it 
difficult to formulate coherent positions (donors), and resulting in the exclusion of 
sectors for lack of organisation at the sectoral level (private health care providers). 
These effects of the recruitment process are considered to further enhance the 
comparative advantages of the public sector within the CCM, discussed in chapter 5. 
	  
 
164	  
Through analysis of the processes of deliberation within the CCM, the following 
themes were developed: capacity to partner, suboptimal participation despite 
procedural safeguards and challenges of representing others. The first of these refers 
to the variable capacities that the different actors bring to the CCM and how this 
affects their experiences of interactions in the CCM and what they gain out of the 
interactions. The second presents a sentiment of disempowerment amongst CSO and 
donor participants to meaningfully affect CCM agenda, despite the procedural 
safeguards put in place within the CCM to ensure equal deliberation. Finally, 
participants’ views highlighted that representing others is not to be taken for granted 
(questions of legitimacy) and that it is plagued by practical challenges related to 
effectively communicating information between the CCM and constituencies. 
Participants with more fluid constitutions (CSOs and private sector) are seen to be 
particularly affected on both these accounts.  
Two themes emerged from analysis of date related to the proposal development 
process: the role of consultants and the proposal development rush. The role of 
consultants was seen to be significant given that they come in with considerable 
reputation in terms of their qualifications and prior involvements in successful 
country proposals. However, where their advice clashes with the perspectives of 
powerful elements with the CCM, the latter’s perspectives are enforced. The way 
proposals are developed are described as constituting a reactive process characterised 
by time constraints and lack of a reflective approach that incorporates innovative 
practices. This is seen to be compounded by the lack of readily usable evidence in 
the setting. 
Finally, a theme that cut across all stages of the partnership process relates to th efct 
if an influential personality in the form of the ex-Minister of Health Dr Tedros 
Adhanom. From the recruitment process to the proposal development and PR 
nomination processes, the Minister’s name featured in participants’ accounts of 
events. The Minister is seen to have been able to play such a key role owing to his 
multifaceted attributes as a leader: key political figure, a reputable scientist and a 
professional with experiences of managing the health system at different levels. 
While the Minister’s role was widely seen as positive, a few donor and CSO 
participants reflected that the significant clout that the Minister carries may have 
subdued the level of engagement from non-State actors. 
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In a nutshell, the chapter has explored factors related to the partnership process that 
influence actors’ interactions. In doing so, it has sought to provide a contextual 
account of these factors. For instance, in analysing the role of the Minster, it has 
attempted to interpret the Minster’s influential role with recourse to the different 
attributes of the Minister in political and professional relationships in the setting. The 
‘making of partners’ was similarly interpreted with reference to the different 
constitution and organisations of actors in the setting. The suboptimal participation 
of actors is also linked to the relative positions of actors in the setting and the power 
relationships, which will be explored further in the next chapter. 
The next chapter accordingly supplements the analysis in chapter 5 and 6 regarding 
the pertinent contextual and process related factors, by focusing on and exposing the 
power relationships that are at play in actors’ interactions in and around the CCM. 
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Chapter 7 
Manifestations of Power in actors’ interactions in and around the 
CCM 
7.1  Introduction 
	  
This chapter focuses on exploring the manifestations of power in actors’ interactions 
in and around the CCM. The motivations behind the explicit focus on power are 
related to: the pervasiveness of findings in the data that highlight the critical 
importance of underlying power relationships between actors, and recognition of the 
dearth of the understanding of the role of power in cross-sectoral interactions 
(chapter 2). To recap Buse and Harmer (Buse and Harmer 2004; P. 50), ‘…questions 
of power go to the heart of much that is contentious about PPP [Public Private 
Partnerships]…’. However, power remains a highly neglected, under-researched 
concept within the body of literature studying partnerships in particular, and 
governance mechanisms, in general (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004; p. 340, Barnett 
and Duvall 2005, Huxham and Vangen 2005, Bartsch, Hein et al. 2007; p. 30). In 
addition, the study of power is hindered by the lack of clarity and the plurality of 
conceptions of power, whereby power is ‘essentially a contested concept’ (Hay 2002, 
Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004, Walt, Shiffman et al. 2008, Clegg and Haugaard 
2009), and ‘there are as many definitions and approaches as there are power analysts’ 
(Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004; P. 346). 
Within this background, seeking to explore power calls for clearly delineating the 
conceptualisation adopted in the study. As discussed in chapter 3, theoretical 
frameworks enable the capturing of complex subjects, such as power, in theoretically 
accurate ways and with reference to wider bodies of knowledge (Walt, Shiffman et al. 
2008, Giacomini 2010). Out of the different conceptualisations of power, the study 
draws upon contemporary conceptualisations that reflect the study’s emphasis on the 
interplay between actors’ agency and structure. These conceptualisations include:  
Barnet and Duvall’s taxonomy of levels of manifestations of power, that is, 
‘interactions of specific actors vis-à-vis social relations of constitution’(Barnett and 
Duvall 2005), Hay’s ‘reformulation of power’ as both ‘context- and conduct 
shaping’(Hay 2002), and Arts and Van Tatenhove’s three levels of power, namely, 
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relational (‘agent power’), dispositional (agents’ position ‘in organisations vis-à-vis 
each other’) and structural (‘the capacity of macrosocietal structures to shape the 
nature and conduct of agents, being both individuals and collectivities’) (Arts and 
Van Tatenhove 2004; P. 13 - 14).  
While all these conceptualisations emphasise the interplay between the power 
resources at the levels of agency and structure, thereby reflecting the theoretical 
orientation of this study, Arts and Tatenhove’s (2004) qualification of a multi-
layered constitution of power resources is seen to overlap with the theoretical 
orientation of this study. Arts and Tatenhove (2004) adopt Goehler’s 
conceptualisation of the constitution of power (Goehler 2000, Göhler 2009) into a 
multi-layered concept in view of the structure of policy networks. Consequently the 
concept is framed as constituting a dynamic interplay between three levels that 
commensurate with the categorisations applied in this study: ‘relational power’ 
(actors’ interactions), ‘dispositional power’ (emanating from the regulatory 
frameworks of the CCM), and ‘structural power’ (corresponding to power that 
emanates from the deeper frames of reference in the setting)(Arts and Tatenhove 
2004). Furthermore, their theory conceptualises the relationship between these levels 
as being one of interdependence (‘duality’), rather than conceptualising them as 
independent entities (‘dualism’) (Henri Goverde and Tatenhove 2000, Arts and Van 
Tatenhove 2004), which again reflects the theoretical framework adopted in this 
study’ (chapter 3). Accordingly, this broad categorisation of power into the 3 
interrelated levels of relational, dispositional, and structural power is adopted as a 
conceptual framework within this chapter to guide the identification, description and 
analysis of the power relationships that are at play within the CCM (Table 8).  
In addition, the adopted framework acknowledges the two faces of power, namely, 
transitive and intransitive power. Transitive power or power of domination concerns 
power directed ‘to the outside’ or towards another actor or other actors with the 
effect of ‘[translating] the will of an actor into another actor’s will … thereby 
[exercising] influence’(Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004, Göhler 2009; P. 35). This type 
of power is exercised in a ‘zero-sum game’ between actors (Arts and Van Tatenhove 
2004; P. 350). On the other hand, ‘intransitive power’ refers to power as ‘self-
reference’, constituted by actors themselves or society; a positive form of power that 
enables actors to collaborate towards ‘common action’ (Arts and Van Tatenhove 
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2004, Göhler 2009; P. 37). As stated in chapter 2, the definition of intransitive power 
adopted in this study makes reference to actors acting ‘on the basis of, and within the 
range of, common value conceptions and principles of order’ (Goehler 2000; p. 48). 
Hence, the framework represented in table 8 hereunder, encapsulates the two faces of 
power (transitive and intransitive) and the levels where these manifest or where the 
power resources are drawn from (relational, dispositional and structural).  
Table 8: Theoretical Framework for exploring power in the CCM, adopted 
from   conceptualisations of the constitution of power (Goehler 2000, 
Göhler 2009) and adaptation of the same to exploring power in policy 
networks (Henri Goverde and Tatenhove 2000, Arts and Van 
Tatenhove 2004) 
Power Resources Forms of Power 
Relational Transitive (Potential and 
Active) 
Intransitive (Potential and 
Active) Dispositional 
Structural 
  
Furthermore, the framework reflects the notion that these two forms of power could 
either manifest merely as potential or as an active mobilisation of power resources in 
interactions between actors (Henri Goverde and Tatenhove 2000, Arts and Van 
Tatenhove 2004, Göhler 2009). For instance, in the case of transitive power it can 
simply exist as a latent attribute of an actor that deters others from pursuing certain 
courses of action, thereby giving way for the influence of one actor over another’s 
choices without the need for active mobilisation of power resources. In contrast, this 
type of power can manifest in the active efforts of actors where they mobilise their 
power resources to dominate the choices and actions of other actors in particular 
instances. Similarly, intransitive power could also manifest in active or potential 
forms. In case of the former, actors’ power resources are actively mobilised in 
facilitation of ‘common action’ whereas the latent expressions of actors’ power 
resources could also facilitate positive, collaborative engagements. Taken together, 
these two forms of power (transitive and intransitive, in their potential and active 
forms of expression) provide an ‘integrative concept of power’(Göhler 2009; P. 37).  
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At the outset, it is worth highlighting that the power plays reflected in the data (both 
transitive and intransitive) are seen to occur mainly in interactions between the 
Principal Recipients (PRs). As discussed in chapter 4, these are the public sector 
agencies (Ministry of Health and the Federal HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control 
Office) and the two CSOs that have been designated as PRs, namely, NEP + and 
EIFDA.  This could well be due to the fact that these two sets of actors represent the 
direct recipients of funds from the Global Fund, and hence engaged in negotiations 
and competitions over the existing resources (chapter 5).  
Section 7.2 presents an analysis of transitive power at work (both in its potential and 
active forms), while section 7.3 scrutinises cases of ‘common action’ thereby 
illuminating both the potential and active manifestations of intransitive power. 
Section 7.4 then presents a theme that emerged during data analysis, which 
highlights the dynamic nature of power relationships. The section explores how 
involvement in the CCM influences the position of CCM members relative to other 
actors in the setting.  
7.2 Manifestations of transitive forms of power 
This section discusses how the most potent actor in the Ethiopian CCM, namely, the 
public sector, as indicated in the previous chapters, deploys both active and potential 
forms of transitive power to ‘get its way’ in the interactions within the CCM. The 
section further explores the ways in which actors that are seen to occupy subordinate 
positions resist this power of domination coming from the public sector, by 
deploying their own active and potential power resources. This section accordingly 
explores manifestation of the transitive power games through examining how 
different actors deploy the two forms of transitive power, potential and active, in 
these power games. 
7.2.1  Potential forms of transitive power 
	  
Concerning the use of potential power, the public sector is seen to enjoy privileged 
positions at both the levels of the deeper frames of reference in the setting (structural 
power) and the regulatory frameworks of the CCM (dispositional power). The 
advantages that the sector enjoys in the relative positions of actors, in view of both 
the deeper frames of reference and the regulatory frameworks of the CCM, is seen to 
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preclude non-State actors from pursuing certain courses of actions. While some of 
the manifestations of the deployment of this potential form of transitive power by the 
public sector are alluded to in chapters 5 and 6, they will be recapped here briefly. 
The section then discusses some of the potential forms of power at the disposal of 
non-State actors, which they use to resist the public sector’s power of domination. 
One of the manifestations of the potential forms of transitive power deployed by the 
public sector relates to kind of automatic filtering of CCM agenda, whereby non-
State actors are left with sentiments that the discussions in the CCM are somewhat 
scripted in favour of public-sector positions (chapter 6). In this regard, chapter 6 has 
discussed participants’ sentiments that the issues that make it to the CCM agenda do 
not reflect the broad spectrum of issues championed by all sectors. This occurs when 
the procedural safeguards for equal participation are seen as having been assured in 
the CCM.  
Hence, the issue is understood to constitute self-censorship on the part of actors 
depending on whether the issues in question are considered no go areas or taboo by 
the public sector. In other words, the public sector has significant clout in the setting 
(potential power) that non-State actors are careful to bring up issues that the public 
sector is known to be diametrically opposed to. At best, the issues would not survive 
the decision making process in the CCM, at worst, they could end up affecting actors’ 
relationships with the public sector. As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, it is critical for 
actors to maintain good relationships with the public sector. As the following quote 
from a donor participant illustrates, actors generally seek to be ‘on the right side’ of 
the government in the Ethiopian setting: 
… there are certain areas, which are not challenged or discussed because 
everyone wants to be on the right side [of the government]. For example the 
HIV/AIDS response has been a bit weak on the targeting of key populations 
like commercial sex workers and other areas which have not been adequately 
explored, but if you have a very strong civil society constituent, that would be 
something which will be able to come to the forefront to say what is our 
burden, how do I engage and have a response for these communities and 
populations, so that continues to be a challenge  
     - Multilateral donor participant IV 
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Hence, despite all the safeguards for equal participation in the regulatory frameworks 
of the CCM, non-State actors were seen to exhibit a sense of helplessness in relation 
to affecting some decisions in the CCM. It appears that actors come to the CCM with 
awareness of the strong foothold of the public sector in the relative position of actors 
in terms of both the CCM regulatory frameworks (dispositional power) and the 
deeper frames of reference in the setting (structural power).  As discussed in chapter 
5, this was a prominent sentiment amongst actors, to the extent that some actors 
regard the Global Fund grants as essentially constituting public sector resources: ‘it’s 
all government money’ [Bilateral donor participant V].  
As discussed in chapter 5, this potential power projected by the government is 
attributed by participants to emanate from the ‘nature’, ‘mentality’ or ‘ideology’ of 
the government, which has carved out an an unparalleled role for the public sector in 
national policy making platforms. By persevering an overwhelming role for the 
government, this ideological orientation appears to effectively delimit the scope of 
involvement of other actors. In addition, chapter 5 has indicated that the public 
sector has quite potent means at its disposal that enable it to enforce its sphere of 
influence.  Primarily, this potential power is seen to be enforced through the power 
of deterrence derived from legal frameworks that curtail the roles and influence of 
non-State actors in the setting, specifically, The Charities and Civil Society 
Proclamation. The following quote from a CSO participant further illustrates the 
influence of such powers of deterrence:  
I feel the room in this country for NGOs is increasingly getting narrowed, 
from time to time, it is curtailed by law, there are laws that have come out 
from time to time for this … so in a country where these laws are 
promulgated, when you are participating in some mechanism, you feel 
belittled even morally, and you feel the pressure so much… 
- CSO participant XI 
On top of these structural power resources, chapter 5 has shown that the public 
sector enjoys an advantageous position within the regulatory frameworks of the 
CCM (dispositional power). As discussed in the chapter, the public sector essentially 
represents the most potent voting bloc in the CCM. Whereas the main approach to 
decision making in the CCM is one of consensus seeking through deliberations, for 
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non-state actors, the lop-sidedness in representation effectively precludes the way of 
the vote as a viable means for pursuing their preferred decisions (chapter 5). Instead, 
this potential power of the public sector enables the sector to assume a more 
assertive role within the deliberation process and precludes more confrontational 
stances from the side of non-state actors. 
For their part, CSOs come with their own set of potential power resources drawn 
from both the regulatory frameworks of the CCM (dispositional power) and the 
deeper frames of reference in the setting (structural power). The potential power 
sources for non-State actors in general and CSOs in particular are seen to be drawn 
mainly from Global Fund requirements that necessitate the participation of these 
sectors in the CCM. Whilst these actors may have a subordinate role and position in 
the mechanism compared to that of the public sector, their involvement, at least at 
some basic level, is a necessary condition for the CCM to fulfil the Fund’s 
requirements of broad based participation and partnership. In other words, the 
viability of the mechanism depends on the non-state actors, especially those 
designated by the Global Fund as critical actors to be included in CCMs, such as, 
NGOs, faith based organisations and people living with HIV/AIDS associations, 
continuing to participate in the CCM. Their potential power is accrued from the 
threat of withdrawal from the mechanism in case they feel that their basic interests 
are not being served by their involvement in the mechanism. Actors are well aware 
of these preconditions set by the Global Fund, as illustrated in the following quotes: 
it was a structure that was created by the Global Fund and the Global Fund 
had certain requirements, that, and they said you don’t have to create a new 
body, you could use an existing one but it has to have this and this and this, 
well the existing bodies didn’t have for example the same representation for 
different diseases  or different civil society organisations and so on and so 
forth …the CCM is a bit more contrived I would say because it had to follow 
the Global Fund rules and so on … -­‐ Bilateral donor participant III 
… the PLWHA, for example, the PLWHA, if they are denied, they can go far, 
for example one time the head of Mekdim said to me that he would mobilise 
and line up all PLWHA, and orphans and vulnerable children for protest … 
	  
 
173	  
because when the funds come in there is an understanding, it is a 
misunderstanding, they say that it came in their names … -­‐ Multilateral donor participant III  
 
In summary, the section has used the concepts of potential forms of dispositional and 
structural power to explicate further, the ways in which the most powerful actor in 
the setting, namely, the public sector, enforces its will on other actors. In addition, 
the section adds to the analysis presented in the previous chapters by showing how 
actors in subordinate position also use their potential power resources, mainly 
dispositional power, to resist the power of domination deployed by the public sector.  
Now, the chapter turns to explication of manifestations of active forms of transitive 
power in actors’ interactions in and around the CCM. 
7.2.2  Active forms of transitive power 
 
This section presents an analysis of incidences in which active forms of transitive 
power (‘power of domination and resistance’) are seen to manifest in interactions 
between actors within the CCM. In other words, this section presents analyses of 
situations in which actors are seen to actively mobilise their power resources to get 
their preferred decisions or courses of action adopted. While the previous section 
reveals how dispositional and structural power resources, in their potential forms or 
without any active mobilisation, play a role in circumscribing the scope of choices 
that other actors have, this section analyses cases where these resources are seen to 
be actively mobilised by actors in order to influence particular decisions or courses 
of action. Specifically, the section discusses how transitive power is actively 
mobilised at the relational, dispositional and structural levels. 
The findings that relate to the manifestations of active power at the relational level 
refer to cases where actors are seen to be at loggerheads with one another in 
deliberations over particular issues of contention. In this regard, the findings that 
characterise interactions on occasions of contestations reveal a sentiment on the part 
of CSOs that they are subject to intense scrutiny and pressure from the side of the 
public sector. CSO participants intimated that their propositions endure far more 
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pressure and enhanced scrutiny in comparison to those forwarded by the public 
sector. CSO participants who spoke to this issue also said that public sector officials 
apply pressures on CSO participants on occasions of disagreement: 
There is an expert panel within the CCM that evaluates [propositions to be 
included in the proposals], made up of donors and other stakeholders, that 
fairly evaluates, although the government would also apply its own pressures 
in these mechanisms  
- CSO participant VIII 
 
You could also be told to drop certain activities, that we shouldn’t participate 
in certain areas, in the meetings, so everyone presents their sides, but the 
criticism is so strong when it comes to the NGOs because it is seen that our 
small activities could affect the huge budget submitted by the government. 
And so there are pressures in some ways and the process is stressful, you 
argue and disagree, so you have to justify every detail of your proposal, why 
you put certain things there, so there are many hassles, we do feel pressures 
in the process, always, from the other side [public sector]. 
        - CSO participant XI   
The above claims need to be understood in view of the type of officials that represent 
the public sector in these deliberations, and the level of authority they command in 
the setting. The public sector is represented by the Minister of Health, and the heads 
of key public sector offices, such as, the HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office 
(HAPCO) and the Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute (EHNRI). 
These offices play a critical role in the setting, not just in terms of formulating public 
sector policies and programmes, but also in regulation of the works of other actors 
such as CSOs and the private sector. Furthermore, HAPCO and the Ministry of 
Health are also involved in contracting out works to other actors such as CSOs. 
Hence, the level of authority carried by the heads of these offices in the CCM is 
bound to instigate a sense of deference from representatives of other actors. This has 
been highlighted in chapter 6 under the discussion of the ‘role of an influential 
personality’. In addition, as highlighted in chapter 5, CSOs are looking to donors to 
temper the influence of the public sector. However, donors are seen as not fulfilling 
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the expectations coming from CSOs in this regard as they generally assume a 
cautious stance in the setting, as discussed in chapter 5.  
On the other hand, CSOs also mobilise their own power resources in their endeavour 
to resist the public sector’s influence and expand the wiggle room that exists in 
interactions within the CCM. At the relational level, the CSOs are seen to deploy 
different strategies ahead of meeting such as solicitation of support from other 
sectors, especially donors. CSO participants intimated that they would solicit the 
backing of donor agencies prior to CCM meetings in respect of particular issues to 
be discussed in the CCM. The following quote from a CSO participant illustrates this 
approach on the side of CSOs, at the relational level of interactions:  
So as you can understand, sometimes you need to lobby. You need to get the 
assent of other partners on issues you want agreement over, before you go in 
for a meeting, you need to strategise and think through who would be able or 
inclined to support me on these issues  
- CSO participant V 
 
CSOs also actively mobilise their power resources from the dispositional and 
structural levels to influence decisions in the CCM. As indicated in the earlier 
section, a major source of dispositional power for CSOs relates to the provisions of 
the Global Fund that require representation of CSOs in CCMs worldwide 
(dispositional power). In this regard participants described occasions where the 
CSOs actively mobilised their resources in this regard in order to influence decisions 
in the CCM. The following quote illustrate this point: 
Sometimes there are disagreements, I remember once the representative of 
EIFDA refused to sign on the proposal, I remember the WHO representative 
and the Minister of Health had to cajole him, and he was basically restating 
that it wouldn’t be fair to conduct things the way it was intended at the time 
and that their role (FBOs’) should be recognised … they are empowered and 
that empowerment comes from the arrangement by the Global Fund because 
if one of the fifteen members doesn’t sign, that request won’t be sent 
- Multilateral donor participant III 
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Hence, the section has discussed how active forms of transitive power are deployed 
by the public sector and CSOs at the relational, dispositional and structural levels. 
Specifically, it has supplemented the discussion in section 7.1.1 and the earlier 
chapters regarding the significant clout that the public sector has both in the CCM 
and in the wider setting, by further explaining how the public representatives also 
exert influences at the relational level. For CSOs, the section has shown that the 
CSOs are engaged in different strategies at the relational level, such as building 
alliances with donors, as well actively making use of their dispositional power by 
threatening to leave the partnership process. In this regard, their dispositional power 
effectively consists in capitalising on the preconditions set by the Global Fund that 
preconditions funding of CCMs on participation of key stakeholders. 
The next section discusses the other form of power, namely, intransitive forms of 
power or power of ‘common action’.   
7.3  Intransitive forms of power – power of ‘common action’ 
 
While the previous section analysed manifestations of power in interactions of 
domination in the CCM, this section explores the manifestations of power in 
processes where actors are seen to be working in concert, on occasions of ‘common 
action’ (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004).  This section accordingly presents an 
analysis of cases where actors participating in the CCM are seen to be pooling their 
power resources under the framework of ‘common value perceptions and principles 
of order’ (Goehler 2000) or in view of the ‘joint practices of actors’ (Arts and Van 
Tatenhove 2004; P. 13). The findings presented provide insights into how actors 
pool their power resources from the different realms of power (relational, 
dispositional and structural) in order to engage in supportive relationships. 
The section starts by presenting a case where actors in the CCM appear to stand 
together to defend the CCM against external scrutiny. In this case, the different 
positions of actors are explored and the significant support rendered by CSOs to the 
public sector’s position specifically examined. Following from this, other areas in 
which the CSOs (EIFDA and NEP +) engage with the public sector in intransitive 
power games are explored. This symbiotic relationship between the public sector and 
the two CSOs (EIFDA and NEP +) is then contrasted with the case of the public 
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sector’s relationship with the other CSO in the CCM, namely CCRDA, where low 
levels of trust are seen to have diminished chances of such manifestations of 
intransitive power.  
Accordingly, the first case concerns an investigation by the Office of the Inspector 
General of the Global Fund (OIG) regarding the unauthorised overspend of budget 
on the part of the public sector. To provide some background to the incidence, the 
2012 audit reports from OIG had flagged up a case of unauthorised construction of 
health centres on the part of the public sector, which had in turn resulted in 
significant over spending of budget (Garmaise 2012, OIG 2012). As the statement 
from OIG indicates, a total of 1,309 health centres were constructed under the budget 
line, ‘renovation of health facilities and construction of health posts4’, resulting in an 
over expenditure of USD 57,851,941 (OIG 2012). In addition, the audit report (OIG 
2012) further noted that the technical review panel of the Global Fund had not 
approved this amendment:  
There was no formal approval from the Global Fund to expand grant 
activities for the construction of new HCs [Health Centres]. Further, the TRP 
[Technical Review Panel] did not review and approve this material change 
to the scope and scale of the proposal originally approved, and the 
performance frameworks were not revised to reflect this significant 
reallocation of funds. (OIG 2012) 
A critical issue here concerns the fact that the CCM had approved the amendment 
through its consensus based decision-making process discussed in chapter 5. 
However, as indicated in the above statement highlighted from the audit report, the 
CCM should have solicited the approval of the TRP for ‘this material change to the 
scope and scale of the proposal originally approved’ (OIG 2012). When this issue 
was picked up by OIG, the CCM is reported to have defended the overspend. Here is 
how a public sector participant explained how the CCM members reacted to the 
findings of OIG: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Health centres are bigger centres of health services delivery designed to serve a catchment area of 
15,000 - 25,000 people whereas their satellite Health Posts are smaller infrastructure catering for 
3,000-5,000 people FMoH (2010). Health Sector Development Programme IV 2010/11 - 2014/15. 
Addis Ababa, Federal Ministry of Health. 
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Interviewer: So who explained this to the Global Fund? Was it the CCM or 
the PR [Ministry of Health]? 
Participant: It was the CCM, saying that we know about this activity 
[reallocation towards health centres’ construction], it was the CCM and all 
PRs and this is because the partners could see the results and as this is an 
asset that would last and as they recognise its contributions to the intended 
outcomes and impacts of the Global Fund, the only thing we did wrong is 
that we did not ask the Global Fund for amendments. 
       - Public Sector Participant IX 
In a nutshell, the decision to approve the amendments of budget was taken by the 
CCM through deliberation, within the framework of the consensus based decision-
making process instituted in the CCM. The CCM is then said to have explained the 
merits of the amendments to OIG as well as defending the overspend. This section 
attempts to dig deeper into the particular orientation of actors’ positions and the 
dynamics of power relationships underlying this case of ‘common action’. The 
section starts by highlighting the prevalence of support for the decision amongst 
actors, before unravelling the intransitive power relationships at play in the 
formulation of the common CCM position. 
While the decision to approve the amendments appears to have been a decision 
reached through consensus, and the CCM has subsequently explained and defended 
the overspend to OIG, in unison, the interviews with participants suggest that the 
support for the amendment may not have been unanimous. Some actors from CSOs 
and donor agencies appear to harbour opposition to, and doubts over, the decision. 
For instance, a CSO participant was opposed to the construction of the health centres 
as they felt that the resources were effectively being diverted away from other 
activities. On the other hand, another participant from a donor agency observed that 
the MoH had been granted an easy way out of the problem, thereby questioning the 
premise for such a lenient treatment from the Global Fund. Here are the statements 
from these two participants: 
And I do believe that the funds have not been spent for the intended purposes, 
for example, if you look at allocations, say for community conversation and 
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health education, even though it’s not necessarily a bad thing, most of the 
funds have been spent to build hospitals and health facilities … -­‐ CSO participants XIII 
 
… this auditor general came and had his audit report and then again I think 
Ethiopia came away a bit easy with the criticism of the auditor general’s 
office and I am not saying, really I don’t believe that money was misused but 
substantial amount of money was not used for the purpose it had been given 
for, and I think they got away with it quite easily … -­‐ Bilateral donor participant V 
 
So if there lay differences in opinions regarding the issue, how was this common 
action possible? In other words, how was it possible for the whole CCM to come 
together to defend the decision during the audit? Some participants pointed out that 
there is a tendency of projecting a unified stance to outsiders, amongst CCM 
members, regardless of internal differences. These participants, drawn from both 
donor agencies and CSOs, assert that, in the face of external scrutiny, members are 
compelled to defend the CCM in view of the weight of issues that are at stake. These 
participants explained that discordance serves no actor once a decision has been 
taken by the CCM. The following quote by a donor participant illustrates this 
argument:  
…So in order to meet these requirements set for accessing funding, you go to 
the Global Fund as a group, by what we call in our culture, ‘dressing up 
whatever household affairs (internal affairs) you might have [‘Gemenahin 
Shefineh’ in Amharic]…There are countries whose funding has been 
suspended for related reasons. So, whatever problems lie within the system 
and in-country, it is within the country’s interests to conceal them and 
present a coherent story to the Global Fund. But to say that there are no 
problems and that we are adhering 100% to partnership standards would not 
be realistic and there are problems 
- Bilateral Donor participant VII 
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Further testament to this tendency of closing ranks comes from assessing how CCM 
members exhibit different senses of identity as they discuss issues pertaining to their 
sector relative to other sectors, on the one hand, and while dwelling on issues 
pertaining to the CCM in relation to external concerns, on the other. For instance, 
when discussing the achievements of the CCM, participants coming from the 
different sectors would often speak of themselves as belonging to a unit (the CCM), 
while reverting to their sectoral identities when discussing issues or differences that 
exist within the CCM. In fact, when raising issues pertaining to the CCM, 
participants make reference to it as a national scheme, often invoking sentiments that 
the scheme constitutes an issue of national interest. The successes of the CCM were 
also often discussed in comparison to other CCMs in other developing countries. 
The observation here reflects that involvement in the CCM accords members of the 
CCM with an additional identity, over and beyond their identities of representing the 
particular sector. In other words, there are levels where they sternly advocate for the 
interests of their respective sectors, as well as levels where they bury the hatchet, so 
to speak, to represent the CCM to ‘outsiders’. Irrespective of the internal differences, 
the power imbalances and any other reservations, actors generally imparted a 
sentiment that it is in their interest to see the CCM do well. The following quote 
from a donor participant exemplifies this observation: 
For me, we can make progress to choice, especially with the new financial 
model, probably, we will need, I say we, because I am in Ethiopia, we will 
need to open more the beneficiaries probably, in the new funding model 
- Bilateral donor participant IV 
Hence, the common action or consensus position has been realised when there are 
indications that not everyone was on board the decision. As discussed above some 
participants have pointed towards the feeling of solidarity that sets in when faced 
with external scrutiny. Now the discussion moves to supportive relationships or 
intransitive forms of power that may underlie this common position. In this regard, 
the data has revealed the existence of a more concrete compact for mutual support 
between the public sector and the other two designated PRs in the CCM, namely, 
EIFDA and NEP +. This understanding between these two sectors is understood to 
have materialised on this occasion to enable a unified position towards the OIG 
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report. Some CSO participants indicated that it was the intervention of these CSOs 
(EIFDA and NEP +) that had made the difference in staving off serious sanctions 
from the Global Fund in relation to this issue. A participant from one of these 
organisations vividly describes how they mobilised their power resources to defend 
the overspend and how they feel that it was this intervention from their side that may 
have saved the day, after all: 
So for example, regarding the health centres’ construction, the Global Fund 
people came and asked us, why did the government do this when it should be 
buying drugs for you and nutritional supplements? We responded that it was 
our interest as well, where would we get the treatment, where would we get 
diagnosed, and if the physicians are not trained who would give us treatment? 
If the health facilities are not expanded and are limited to the Black Lion 
Hospital and Zewditu Hospital [national referral hospitals found in the 
capital, Addis Ababa], who would treat the patients in the peripheries, in the 
Somali Region, are the drugs going to be supplied from a helicopter? That's 
how we convinced the auditors ...our justification actually reduced the 
amount that was supposed to be retrieved from government coffers, from 
around 50 million dollars to just 5 million ... 
- CSO participant III 
 
The participant explained that they regard the support they render to the public sector 
as constituting critical leverage that they could turn to in subsequent interactions and 
deliberations. In other words, for these CSOs, proving themselves helpful on such 
occasions is critically important as it bolsters their positions in subsequent 
interactions. The participant pointed out that the ‘strength of their voice’ is also 
derived from their inputs in supporting the process. They add that these interactions 
had in fact enabled them to graduate from ‘being viewed as opposition or competitor 
to the government’s agenda’ to being considered as ‘partners’.   
The support rendered from CSOs was said to extend to other areas as well. One 
occasion relates to the support rendered by the CSOs to the bid by the Minister of 
Health for the position of Chairperson of the Global Fund Board. A donor participant 
observed: 
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… historically there is this tendency to support each other, for example these 
PLWHAs have in turn supported the Minister is his bid to be the Global Fund 
board chairperson, not just  here, but they have lobbied their colleagues in 
Tanzania on his behalf... -­‐ Multilateral donor participant III  
The Minister was subsequently elected to serve as the Board’s chairperson for 2 
years between 2007 and 2009. A CSO participant confirmed how they had mobilised 
the leverages that come with their positions in global networks of civil societies 
(structural power) to advocate for the candidacy of the Minister for the position of 
Chairmanship of the Global Fund Board. The participant pointed out that they try to 
draw on their unique positions of representing patient groups and being embedded in 
a global network of PLWHA associations, to advance their position in relation to 
other actors in these interactions. 
Our voices matter, more than the Minister that sits there, or the UN Director, 
we are the beneficiaries, so our voice really touches people, so we use this 
wisely… We have multiple avenues, there are people who contact us from the 
global fund and inquire, from other donor agencies, they come to us, for 
example a team from the US congress came and asked us: how much do you 
benefit from the Global Fund? Do you benefit at all? Or is it just the 
government that benefits? They ask us, behind closed doors… -­‐ CSO Participant III 
The public sector is also seen to replicate this gesture of collaboration as it engages 
in this intransitive power relationship with the other two PRs, namely, NEP + and 
EIFDA. It does so by deploying its dispositional and structural power resources. At 
the level of the CCM, the data points towards the support rendered by the public 
sector towards the networks’ (NEP + and EIFDA’s) bid of becoming PRs. In this 
regard, the public sector is seen to deploy its dispositional power drawn from its 
strong position in the CCM.  
Accordingly, the support rendered from the public sector is seen to be instrumental 
for the networks’ designation as PRs in the CCM. Donor and CSO participants who 
described this support rendered to these networks discussed it in comparison to the 
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case of the other CSO in the CCM, namely CCRDA, where such support was not 
seen as forthcoming from the public sector. In the eyes of some donor and CSO 
participants, CCRDA represented the more natural candidate for the position of a PR 
owing to its organisational profile and substantial experiences of managing grants. 
For these participants the critical factor at play was the lack of a trust in the 
relationship between the public sector and CCRDA at the time of the decision. The 
following quotes from donor and CSO participants illustrate this phenomenon:  
This stand [the decision to defer acceptance of CCRDA and a consortium of 
other NGOs as an additional PR] was the stand of the CCM, it was actually 
the view of the chairperson, Dr. Adhanom [Minister of Health], and the rest 
acceded to that voice. WHO supported this view, saying there was need to 
evaluate the performance of the current civil society PRs before considering 
new PRs from that sector … Beyond that it’s personal factors such as lack of 
trust … I would think this accounts for 1/3rd of the reasons behind the 
decision.  
        - CSO participant I  
At the time CCRDA had better institutional capacity than EIFDA, who got 
legally registered only in 2006, CCRDA is an institution that has been there 
for a 30 years, so you could ask the question how EIFDA was selected 
brushing CCRDA aside … there was a little bit of the trust on religious 
institutions that played a part … 
- CSO participant XI 
 
You know how strong CCRDA is... it was not selected because of political 
differences with the government at the time  
- Bilateral donor participant VII 
 
Hence, the public sector is engaged in these intransitive power relations, which 
appear to manifest more strongly in its relationship with the designated PRs (EIFDA 
and NEP +) than is the case its relationships with other actors. As described in the 
quotes, the existence of support in the case of the two PRs (EIFDA and NEP +), 
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while lacking in the case of CCRDA, is due to ‘trust’ or ‘politics’. Specifically, when 
discussing what they see as an inexplicable decision of considering the two young, 
indigenous networks for the PR position, in place of CCRDA, the participants turn 
towards the notions of ‘trust’/‘politics’. In other words, ‘trust’/‘politics’ are seen to 
explain the levels in which actors engage in these intransitive power relationships.  
In the case of CCRDA’s omission from consideration for the PR position, 
participants provided explanations to the ‘politics’ involved in the relationship 
between the organisation and the government. They attribute this to the fallout 
between the organisation and the government, following the role played by the 
former in the national elections of 2005. The positions taken by the organisation 
during the elections, the roles it played, and the disagreements that ensued, constitute 
public knowledge in Ethiopia. The positions taken by the organisation during the 
time of the elections (often protesting government positions and actions) and its 
altercations with the government, have been documented in a study commissioned 
by the organisation itself (CCRDA 2006).  
The support extended by the public sector to the two indigenous CSOs is seen as 
extending beyond the realms of the CCM or beyond the realms of deployment of its 
dispositional powers. To begin with, as discussed in chapter 6, the public sector had 
championed the formation of the networks (both EIFDA and NEP +) from the outset. 
The public sector, through the Ministry of Health (specifically, through the Minister 
of Health), had effectively acted as an enforcer of the Global Fund’s requirements of 
sectoral representation, thereby championing the formation of the networks over the 
alternative membership requests coming from individual PLWHA Associations and 
faith based organisations. The Minster of Health was personally involved, whereby 
he is said to have mobilised the leverages that come with the office of the Ministry 
of Health (political and programmatic) in order to moderate these contestations and 
to ensure the formation of the networks in the process.  
When the network was established the commitment of Dr Tewodros (Minister 
of Health) and Ato Nigatu (HAPCO Director) was critical. The idea was to 
establish a network that would represent the voices of PLWHA associations 
as one voice, that would build their capacities and coordinate their actions ...  
- CSO Participant XII 
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The support of the Ministry of Health had followed the networks into their 
membership days. As discussed in chapter 6, the Minister had intervened to quell 
challenges lodged against the legitimacy of the constitution of NEP + as a ‘network 
of networks of PLWHA associations’. In this instance, the Minister is said to have 
mobilised the legal and administrative powers of government with a bid to ensuring 
that NEP + succeeded with their plans, effectively facilitating their expansion as a 
national level network, with branches in every regional state in the country. The 
Minister of Health is said to have convened the PLWHA associations as well as the 
CSO Agency (the regulatory body for civil society – chapter 4) so that a resolution 
on the matter could be reached and the viability of the network could be preserved.  
This deployment of the structural power of the public sector within this intransitive 
power relationship with the networks (NEP + and EIFDA) is said to extend to usa of 
its legal powers. Participants from donor agencies and CSOs pointed to areas where 
the public sector has essentially extended allowances to these indigenous networks in 
respect of the drastic provisions of the Charities and Civil Societies proclamation. 
For instance, participants point to a situation whereby NEP + have been exempted 
from requirements pertaining to one of the most restrictive provisions of this law, 
that is, the so-called ‘70 – 30’ rule. The law is widely regarded by advocates of 
CSOs and democracy activists as generally being restrictive and inimical towards the 
functioning of indigenous CSOs operating in the country (chapter 5).  
The rule basically limits administration related spending to 30 % of the total amount 
of CSO budgets, thereby reserving at least 70 % of the funds for direct programmatic 
expenditures. The rule also classifies ‘personnel costs’, both related to programme 
and administration personnel, under administration budget. This essentially limits 
expenditures on staff remuneration to the 30 % of total budgets that have been 
circumscribed as administration. In this regard, NEP + have been exempted from this 
requirement as long as the staff members that are employed are PLWHA. This 
effectively means that NEP + are not limited to just utilising 30 % of the overall 
budgets at their disposal in order to employ staff members, as long as the persons 
they employ are PLWHA.  
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A participant from NEP + further revealed that this flexibility and sense of 
exemption accorded to their organisation extends to other areas of the Charities and 
Societies Proclamation. According to the participant, NEP + is still able to engage in 
advocacy works related to the rights of PLWHA, which is an area that has been 
restricted for organisations that receive more than 10 % of their funding from 
external sources. The participant used the issue to highlight how the favourable 
relationship they have with the government is positively affecting their experiences 
of functioning under these restrictive legal provisions.  
The government is quite flexible when it comes to NEP +, the law has not 
created that much limitation, for example there is this provision that a local 
organisation cannot engage in advocacy works using foreign funds, it is 
there legally, theoretically, but for NEP + it is not a limitation, we have 
organised meetings with the parliament in the presence of this law to 
advocate about the gaps in the legal system in terms of international 
declarations of rights related to PLWHAs, ... there was no time they said that 
this was advocacy and that we couldn't work, our partnership with the 
government is strong so no problems there  -­‐ CSO Participant III  
 
This signifies that it is not simply the active mobilisation of power resources that 
actors use in these relationships of mutual support, but the assurances derived from a 
trusting, favourable relationship. This applies to the case of EIFDA as well. Whereas 
they have not been extended an exemption to any section of the law per se, they still 
are spared from drastic enforcements of the law. The following quote from a 
participant from the organisation is testament to this: 
So some laws such as the 70 – 30 provision have affected us, yet when we 
work under those conditions our circle is safe and in addition to this, 
working together over time increases your intimacy (CCM) 
       - CSO participant XI  
Indeed, the CSO participants (NEP + and EIFDA) are well aware of the privileged 
position they enjoy as a result of this selective treatment. The following extract from 
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an interview with a participant from one of the networks illustrates this. As described 
by the participant, the law (structural power) is used as a way of enticing desirable 
behaviour amongst actors. 
Participant: I can't say that the space for the participation of CSOs has 
become narrower [as a result of CSO law] but I can't also say that the space 
has not been narrowed in all cases, I believe that the government people are 
targetful, so they narrow the space where they want to and relax restriction 
where they want, for example they don't put pressures on us … so I think they 
exercise their power the way they want, there are those for whom it is much 
more tighter than what the law prescribes and there are occasions that they 
simply overlook ...  
Interviewer: Why do you think that is?  
Participant: For one I think it is because we represent the mass of the 
population and the second may be because they don't think we would get into 
negative political actions ...so when the government formulates such laws 
that's for tightening the grip on the civil society, so that you won't delve into 
politically sensitive matters.  
- CSO Participant IX 
 
As discussed in chapter 5, in the eyes of other actors (donor agencies and other 
CSOs), this relationship between the public sector and the other two PRs is 
considered too cosy, whereby it compels them to question the autonomy of the CSOs 
from the influence of the public sector. Here, the participants essentially question 
whether the CSOs are able to stand up to the public sector, while enjoying close 
relationships with the latter.  
In summary, the section has explored the manifestations of intransitive power or 
power of ‘common action’ in the CCM. In this regard, it has shown that the critical 
players in these relationships are the public sector and CSOs that have been 
designated as PRs. It has shown that the actors engaged in these relationships draw 
upon their dispositional and structural power resources to engage in these symbiotic 
relationships. Furthermore, by contrasting the case of the CSO that enjoy this type of 
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relationship with the public sector with a CSO that is seen to be less involved in 
these intransitive power games, the sections highlights the role of trust or ‘politics’ 
in determining these relationships.  
Next, the chapter turns to exploring the dynamic nature of power relationships. 
7.4  Power relations transformed as a result of involving in the CCM 
	  
This section explores the dynamic nature of power relationships; specifically, how 
power relationships are affected in due course of actors’ involvement in the CCM. It 
explores how involvement in the CCM bolsters the image and standing of 
indigenous actors that are included in the mechanism, thereby influencing their 
positions relative to other actors in the setting. In this regard, the section draws on 
the experiences of NEP +’s journey as a CCM members explore the critical issues 
related to changing positions of actors due to their involvements in the CCM. The 
case of NEP + was chosen as it was seen that the organisation’s inclusion in the 
CCM and its rise to a PR position was hotly contested amongst its constituencies 
(PLWHA associations), in turn offering a hotbed of data for exploring how 
partnership mechanisms such as the CCM could transform existing power 
relationships between actors, in a given setting.  
In contrast, the journey of the other non-state PR, namely, EIFDA, has been 
something of a smooth sailing, relatively speaking. Participants from the 
organisation indicated that although there had been competition amongst the 
different faith-based organisations in the country for the position of representing the 
faith based sector in the CCM, the work of EIFDA and its relationships with its 
member organisations has largely been less of a contested affair. The organisation 
was formed as a negotiated settlement between the different faith based 
organisations in the country, with the involvement of the leaders of the respective 
religious institutions. Participants claimed that having this negotiated settlement 
amongst the different religious institutions has enabled EIFDA to function smoothly 
as an umbrella organisation.  
In any case, highly informative data regarding the change of actors’ position and 
power, as a result of involvements in the CCM, emerged from the story of NEP +’s 
journey. Before discussing that, the section sets the scene by discussing the value 
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that local actors attach to involving in the CCM. This discussion draws on actors’ 
descriptions of what they anticipated to gain from their involvements in the CCM 
and what their actual experiences have been.  
7.4.1 The benefits of partnering in the CCM 
 
For policy level actors in Ethiopia, the CCM represents a key national platform for 
deliberating and deciding on a critically important source of support for interventions 
targeting HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria, and on the health system as a whole. Beyond 
facilitating access to resources, involvement in such a nationally instituted 
mechanism comes with promises of enhancing one’s image and standing within 
policy circles, as well as establishing and deepening valuable linkages and 
relationships. The data revealed that policy makers, especially indigenous 
organisations, consider the role of representing their respective constituencies at the 
CCM, as a critical opportunity for enhancing their standing in policy making circles. 
Participants from indigenous CSOs relayed an acute sense of awareness of the 
implications that involvement in the CCM has on their stake and positions as actors 
in the field of public health in the setting. 
During the fieldwork, it was observed that CCM seats are highly sought after by 
indigenous CSOs. In this regard, CSOs that are not members currently but are 
seeking membership enumerated a range of benefits they anticipate out of becoming 
members of the CCM. The benefits that were enumerated in this regard include the 
following: access to financial support to bolster organisational capacities in terms of 
human resources and budgets for programmatic interventions; gaining skills and 
experiences in cross-sectoral partnerships and managing funds as a PR; and 
establishing access to key decision makers in the setting, particularly, to public 
sector and donor officials. Generally, participants viewed the CCM membership as a 
critical opportunity for enhancing one’s portfolio as a policy actor in the field. The 
following quotes present testimonies from participants from organisations aspiring to 
become CCM members and existing members: 
Firstly, the respect we get out of participating in the mechanism is a huge 
factor, the other thing is that it gives us an opportunity to acquaint with the 
donors that come to the meetings and other agencies who come to observe 
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the meetings, it also gives us an opportunity to link up with the PRs and see 
how we could benefit by working with them as sub recipients... -­‐ Private Sector participant II  
 
The knowledge and skills transfer is not just the money, how to manage an 
international grant, how to monitor, how to report, how to follow-up, how to 
document, our data management system is good, they now appreciate the 
reports we produce and present, they are even prising away some of our staff 
these days … -­‐ CSO participant III 
The data further revealed that involving in a partnership mechanism such as the 
CCM was useful for indigenous CSOs by way of deepening the level of relationships 
and linkages with key actors, especially, the public sector. Participants coming from 
the CSOs that sit on the CCM indicated that their involvements in the CCM have 
helped them build ‘trust’, ‘intimacy’ and ‘understanding’ with public sector officials.  
These gains were regarded as assets they could take into their roles as actors in the 
broader realms of policy making in the setting. The participants emphasised that 
valuable understanding and trust was developed through the process of working 
together in the mechanism.  
So the process of working on the same project together creates a lot of 
forums and platforms, all of us principal recipients [PRs] have shared 
platforms, we exchange experiences, … so these have increased our intimacy, 
as we are all working towards the same objective, you get close and work 
together, and if others also get this opportunity it will enhance 
understandings for them with the government  
- CSO participant XI  
Having discussed the sense of importance with which the CCM is regarded by 
indigenous actors and the benefits that are said to be entailed by involvements in the 
CCM, the section now turns to exploring the ways in which involving in the CCM is 
seen to affect power relationships amongst actors in the setting. As mentioned in the 
beginning of this section, this mainly draws on the experiences of NEP +, whose 
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involvements in the CCM and subsequent designation as a PR, is seen to have been a 
hotly contested affair amongst constituencies of the PLWHA sector. Accordingly, 
the section now turns to the story of how this globally designed partnership 
mechanism (CCM) appears to affect the trajectory of an indigenous institution (NEP 
+), and how this in turn is seen to affect the power dynamics between actors in the 
setting.  
7.4.2 ‘Chuheten kemagn’: Emboldening the new at the expense of the old 
	  
This sub-heading, ‘chuheten kemagn’, is taken from an Amharic phrase that was 
used by one of the participants coming from a long standing PLWHA association, 
which sees the way NEP + has grown in prominence following its membership in the 
CCM, as amounting to displacement of its position and role as a national PLWHA 
association. The term literally translates to: ‘it [NEP +] has robbed us of our cries’. 
The participant explains how NEP + had initially been formed out of consultations 
amongst the prominent PLWHA associations at the time, namely, Mekdim, Dawn of 
Hope (DoH) and Tila, with the promise that it would constitute a network that would 
represent their interests at the CCM and other platforms nationally. However, this 
promise has not been realised, whereby in their eyes, the network has rather 
metamorphosed into a dominant force on to its own, whose interests clash with those 
of the national PLWHA associations. Here is how the participant described the 
phenomenon:  
DoH and Mekdim are long standing institutions that have contributed 
immensely to this country. They are the ones who broke the veil of silence; 
they are associations who enabled a lot of us to dare to come out with our 
status. However, while we were the ones who founded NEP + … it has turned 
out to be a case of ‘chuheten kemagn’ [Amharic referring to, ‘being robbed 
of one’s cries’] at the end, where NEP + is muffling our voices. In fact, we 
should have been the ones who should be representing PLWHAs in the CCM, 
because we are the foremost associations in the country and around 99 % of 
associations in Ethiopia were founded by people drawn from DoH and 
Mekdim … 
       - CSO Participant VI 
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As indicated in earlier sections, the formation of NEP + essentially constituted a 
highly contested process. At the time of setting up the CCM (2002), the voices of 
PLWHA were mainly represented nationally through 3 prominent PLWHA 
Associations, namely, Mekdim, Dawn of Hope (DoH), and Tila association of 
women living with HIV/AIDS. These associations, founded in 1997, 1998 and 2002 
respectively, were pioneer grassroots organisations founded by people living with 
HIV/AIDS who braved the scourging stigma and discrimination in the early days of 
the epidemic (ETHARC 2015). The founders of these associations, especially 
Mekdim and Dawn of Hope, are regarded as heroes nationally for breaking the 
silence against the epidemic; different documentary movies have sought to document 
their struggles in the face of a very inhospitable environment (Concentric Media 
20005).  
Against this backdrop, it was seen that these associations were less keen to cede the 
role of representing the sector in this key, national partnership mechanism. 
Consequently, the formation of NEP + caused significant contestations amongst 
these national PLWHA associations, who were all vying to represent the sector in the 
CCM. As indicated in earlier sections, it took moderation by the Minister of Health 
to ensure the formation of NEP +, with reorganisation of the national PLWHA 
associations as members of the network.   
However, it appears that the designation of the network (NEP +) at a mechanism that 
coordinates the largest funding for HIV/AIDS work in the country (CCM), was ill 
fated to run a collision course with the long standing associations that also operate as 
national associations of PLWHA. With NEP +’s designation as a PR, where it 
effectively secured direct access to Global Fund resources, the organisation sought to 
expand into a ‘network of networks of PLWHA Associations’, with branches in the 
9 regional states of the country. The national PLWHA associations considered this as 
a direct threat to their regional level structures, as it would effectively render them 
redundant. Prior to this change, NEP + could only reach regional associations 
through the structures of Dawn of Hope, Mekdim, Tila and other national PLWHA 
Associations. Accordingly, they lodged legal challenges to the proposed move by 
NEP +, which were only resolved through the interventions of the Minister of Health.  
	  
 
193	  
If you look at it currently, the capacity of NEP + is really growing, most 
resources are these days channelled through NEP +, because of the window 
of opportunity created by the government, but they are pressurising us so that 
we cease to exist, so the objectives which we set out with and what is 
currently done don’t match … -­‐ CSO participant IV 
 
In a nutshell, the PLWHA associations, who were vying for the CCM seat that was 
allotted for PLWHA associations at the outset, now find themselves looking into the 
CCM from the outside. Ironically, the network they had founded has taken a life of 
its own to curtail their long held predominance in the playing field. Participants from 
these organisations feel that the organisation has effectively overtaken their roles as 
the mouthpiece for people infected and affected by the disease, as a result of the 
position that the CCM has accorded it. The sentiments expressed by these 
organisations reveal a lot bitterness especially as they feel that they have been side-
lined despite the sacrifices made by their founders during times of significant 
hardships; hence, ‘chuheten kemangn’.  
The effects that NEP +’s enhanced role in the CCM has had on the other national 
PLWHA associations surpass issues related to just the Global Fund resources. The 
organisation appears to have bolstered its reputation, image and standing as a result 
of its involvements in the CCM, to the effect of overshadowing the other PLWHA 
associations nationally. The CCM appears to have provided NEP + with the platform 
to progressively establish itself as an umbrella organisation for PLWHA associations 
in the country.  Participants explained that other donors are nowadays opting to go 
via NEP + as opposed to directly considering the national associations for funding. 
The following quote from a participant from NEP + illustrates how much the 
network’s capacity and reach have been bolstered: 
…Indeed there was a lot chaos when the network was first formed, there 
were conflicts of interests…they [the pioneer associations] used to solicit 
funds on their own, however, once NEP + was formed, donors started 
demanding that the requests should come through the network of networks, 
because it is very convenient for them, as easier to gather one report than 
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chase ten or more reports, so the associations started thinking that after all 
we had created a competitor for our resources … 
- CSO participant V 
 
The section has discussed that membership in the CCM is highly sought after 
amongst indigenous organisations as it is seen as a good platform in order to 
facilitate access to financial resources and valuable linkages and contacts. 
Furthermore, by drawing on the journey of NEP +, the section has explored how the 
accession of local actors into such a national partnership platform can affect the 
power relationships between actors in the setting. 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
	  
This chapter has sought to explore the manifestations of different forms of power in 
actors’ interactions in and around the CCM. By adopting a conceptualisation that 
understands power as a multi-layered concept (relational, dispositional and structural) 
with different forms of existence (potential and active), the chapter has sought to 
explicate the complex power relationships that underlie the interactions between 
actors described in chapters 5 and 6. While some of the power relationships have 
been discussed in chapter 5, the chapter provides a more complete picture of the 
interlocking power relationships on occasions of domination and common action. 
In this regard, the findings have revealed that the power relationships, both transitive 
and intransitive, predominantly manifest in the relationships between the designated 
PRs: the public sector and the two non-state PRs, namely, NEP + and EIFDA. The 
chapter shows that the public sector and the two CSOs are interlocked in both types 
of power games, that is, power games of domination (transitive power) and power 
games for common action (intransitive power). The public sector is by far the most 
potent actor that is able to mobilise significant power resources from across the 
relational, dispositional and structural realms of power to engage in both transitive 
and intransitive power games. The CSOs also deploy their own power resources to 
engage in power games of resistance and collaboration. The intransitive power 
games are seen to be determined by a critically important factor that participants 
referred to as ‘politics’ and/or ‘trust’ 
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In addition, a theme that has emerged from the data demonstrates that the CCM 
represents a critically important platform for local actors in their endeavours to 
enhance their positions in a multitude of ways. In this regard, a reflection on the 
journey one of the PRs (NEP +) exposes the influence such mechanisms can have in 
the relative positions of local actors in the setting. Being a member of a national 
partnership mechanism such as the CCM can significantly bolster the positions of 
members in comparison to other actors. 
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Chapter Eight 
Discussion and Conclusions 
8.1  Introduction 
  
This chapter aims to situate and discuss the key findings of the study against the 
body of theoretical and empirical evidence on cross-sectoral partnerships. Prior to 
this, the chapter shall briefly recap the aims and objectives, the methods employed 
and the underlying theoretical orientations of the study. The aim of the study is to 
develop an in-depth understanding of cross-sectoral interactions between actors, in 
and around partnership mechanisms, in developing country settings.  
The following research questions were formulated in view of this aim: 
1. How are the factors that influence actors’ interactions in and around cross-
sectoral partnership mechanisms conceptualised in the literature? 
2. How do actors interact in and around cross-sectoral partnership mechanisms 
in developing country settings? 
3. Why do actors interact in observed ways?  
The third research question is further broken down into the following sub-
questions: 
a. What is the role of context in influencing these interactions? 
 
b. What is the role of factors related to the partnering process in 
influencing the manner of cross-sectoral interactions between actors? 
While the subject of cross-sectoral partnerships has been studied across different 
disciplines, there has not been much cross-disciplinary learning that enables a 
holistic understanding of how actors interact within these governance mechanisms 
(chapter 2). In addition, the normative focus of much of the empirical investigation 
in the area has prevented a deeper analysis and understanding of how cross-sectoral 
partnerships interact with the wider context. On the other hand, contemporary 
conceptions of cross-sectoral partnerships have resulted in the neglect of key 
concepts such as power. The study of cross-sectoral partnerships in developing 
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countries represents one of the least understood aspects of the field of study (Hein 
2003; p. 17, Marques 2014). 
Accordingly, this study sought to contribute towards filling the above identified gaps 
by undertaking a theory guided case-study of how cross-sectoral actors interact in 
and around a globally designed partnership mechanism, namely, the Global Fund’s 
county coordinating mechanisms (CCM) in Ethiopia. Considering that actors’ 
interactions in and around the CCM constitute the core interest of the study, it was 
important to adopt a suitable theoretical framework that can guide exploration of 
factors that influence actors’ behaviour and interactions within particular arenas of 
interactions (such as the CCM). Consequently, a theoretical framework that steers 
the focus of analysis towards the interplay between actors’ agency and the 
structured-context (CCM regulatory frameworks and deeper frames of reference) 
was adopted from review of the cross-disciplinary literature (chapter 3).  
The adopted theoretical framework embodies three main attributes: a focus on the 
dialectical relationship between actors’ agency and structure, a qualification that this 
dialectical relationship between agency and structure is mediated by ideas, meanings 
and narratives/discourses, and an understanding that the structured-context is multi-
layered. In terms of the latter, an adaptation of the conceptualisation of ‘multi-
layered context’ from policy networks theory (Marsh and Smith 2000) resulted in a 
definition of the multi-layered context as constituting the CCM regulatory 
frameworks and the broader context or deeper frames of reference in the Ethiopian 
setting. The analytical framework further embodies the notion of ‘methodological 
glocalism’, which in turn entails that studies of national level processes in 
developing countries need to consider global structures and processes, due to the 
latter’s pervasive influence in a globalising world (chapter 2). 
This is a qualitative study that draws on the critical realist paradigm, which in turn 
orients the study to interpret and explain the visible world of actors in reference to 
causal mechanisms emanating from the deep-lying context. The study follows a case 
study design that sets out to develop an in-depth understanding of the selected case 
in order to generate findings that could be transferrable to similar partnership 
mechanisms. This is a multi-method qualitative study that employs key informant 
interviews (43), observation, and documents review. The data was analysed 
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thematically whereby thematic categories were determined both apriori (theoretical 
framework) and as they emerged from the data. The findings, presented in chapters 5, 
6 and 7, focus on the interplay between the structured context and interactions (5), 
the process related factors that influence interactions (6) and the multi-dimensional 
and multilevel manifestations of power in actors’ interactions (7). 
The next sections present a discussion of the key findings, against the available 
theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence in the field. Section 8.2 presents a 
reflection on conceptualisations of the interface between national governance 
mechanisms and global structures and processes, based on the findings of the study. 
Section 8.3 discusses the findings of the study that relate to the contextual factors 
that influence actors’ interactions, against relevant conceptualisations and empirical 
evidence in the literature. Section 8.4 similarly discusses the findings of the study 
that relate to the role of process related factors by drawing on the conceptual 
understanding and available empirical evidence in the area. The chapter then 
presents a reflection on theory, whereby key findings of the study are used to reflect 
on key theorisations of the relationship between agency and structure. Specifically, 
the section discusses how the interplay between agency and structure is understood 
to occur within this study and the role of discourse in this interplay.  
Finally, the chapter moves on to a section entitled, ‘the thesis in perspective’ (8.5) 
whereby the potential contributions of the study, the implications of the study for 
policy and practice, and the potential limitations are discussed. The chapter brings 
the thesis to a close by putting forward some concluding remarks (8.6). 
8.2.     Adaptive needs instigated by Global processes on national level 
actors 
 
The study has sought to explain the observed trends in cross-sectoral interactions 
between actors by drawing on different causal mechanisms. One of the factors seen 
to be critical within this analysis of causal mechanisms relates to demands and 
influences emanating from global level structures and influences, mainly, Global 
Fund requirements and principles. This section reflects on the concept of the 
integration of the ‘national’ and the ‘global’ or the so-called ‘glocalisation’ 
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phenomenon (chapter 2), using the findings of the study related to the demands 
imposed by the Global Fund requirements on national actors. 
As discussed in chapter 2, different scholars of international relations and global 
public policy have sought to explain this concept of integration of national and 
global levels of governance in this age of globalisation. They essentially argue that 
there is a ‘pattern of glocalisation’ in this age of global governance, whereby the 
boundary between ‘national’ and ‘global’ levels is becoming less and less distinct 
(Hein 2002, Rosenau 2002). They further explain that the role of actors in 
developing countries is limited to one of responding and adjusting to, ‘claims 
generated and commitments produced by global health governance processes’ (Hein 
2003, de Leeuw, Townsend et al. 2013; p. 118). In other words, ‘the global and 
national are co-present, and interact and intersect in a range of ways’ (Holton 2008; 
p. 46, Kennett 2010; p. 21). The Global Fund’s principles and requirements are said 
to typify this growing trend of global governance mechanisms directly influencing 
national level policy processes in developing countries (Hein 2002). 
The discussion in this section provides a reflection on the above summarised concept 
of integration of the national into the global, by drawing on the findings of the study 
that highlight the effects of the Global Fund requirements on national actors in 
Ethiopia. As indicated in chapter 2, CCMs are said to constitute one of the ‘critical 
interfaces’ in the integration between these two levels of governance (national and 
global). As Hein explains, Global Fund structures and processes, including CCMs, 
fulfil the definition of ‘interfaces’ which are said to occur through ‘concrete projects 
of development cooperation… [including]  modalities of financial support’ (Hein 
2003; p. 47). Hence, by reflecting on the findings related to the effects of the 
requirements emanating from CCM regulatory processes and Global Fund principles 
on national actors (chapter 5), the section seeks to contribute towards the 
understanding of how the phenomenon of ‘glocalsation’ influences national level 
processes in developing countries. 
First of all, the section explains the extent to which the CCM is understood as an 
imported, novel strategy in the Ethiopian setting. As a global requirement, the CCM 
is essentially seen as setting a fairly novel trend of cross-sectoral interactions in the 
setting. To begin with, the demand for the partnership is not home grown in that it 
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does not reflect a situation of cross-sectoral actors coming together as a result of a 
proactive analysis of complex social ills that require joint action (the functionalist 
argument, chapter 2). From another angle, there is no indication that the observed 
trends of cross-sectoral partnerships in the CCM would stand scrutiny based on the 
theory of collaborative advantage (chapter 2); that is, whether the work being 
achieved by the CCM would be difficult or impossible to achieve without the 
partnership arrangement? Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the formation of 
the CCM can be explained, at least partly, by the political argument (chapter 2), that 
is, that there was evidence of local demands for cross-sectoral partnerships predating 
the Global Fund’s initiation of the partnership through the CCM. In fact, some actors 
(the private health care providers) were not even present in initial dialogues to lay 
claims to the seats allotted to them by global directives, let alone agitating for the 
partnership. Hence, neither the  ‘political’ nor the ‘functionalist’ explanations appear 
to be tenable in the case of the CCM in Ethiopia, in turn signifying that the cross-
sectoral partnership arrangement predominantly reflects a case of local actors 
responding to the requirements set by the Global Fund. 
One way to further corroborate this assessment is to review the patterns of ‘cross-
sectorality’ in other partnership mechanisms in the health field in the country. As 
discussed in chapter 4, none of the other mechanisms mimic the pattern of cross-
sectoral representation observed in the CCM. Particularly, CSOs are only marginally 
represented in the other structures while the private sector is virtually absent. Indeed, 
it was observed that propositions to amalgamate the CCM with these structures had 
been met with resistance for fear that doing so would dilute the enhanced 
representation of non-State actors achieved in the CCM. As highlighted in chapter 5, 
a representative from a donor agency had described the CCM as ‘somewhat 
contrived’ or ‘engineered’ for not reflecting wider trends in programme coordination 
in the health field in the setting. Hence, the CCM/Global Fund requirements of 
cross-sectoral representation are seen as new trends for cross-sectoral interactions in 
the setting. To add to this observation, it has been documented that the Global Fund 
had actually encouraged countries to utilise existing partnership mechanisms as 
CCMs, at the time of launching of the programme in 2002. However, most countries 
ended up establishing separate structures due to ‘[the] absence of pre-existing well-
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functioning partnership models’ across developing countries (Brugha, Cliff et al. 
2005; p. 10).  
Coming to the adaptive needs generated by the Global Fund requirements, the 
question becomes one of how the Global Fund requirements, which represent novel 
ways of cross-sectoral interactions in the setting, affect the different actors in the 
setting? The trend in this regard reflects a case of different actors responding 
variably to the opportunities and demands embodied in the requirements, due to their 
variable capabilities. Owing to its historical mandates and its position in the 
constellation of actors in the health field in the setting, the public sector is well 
positioned to assume a highly influential role.  In fact, in terms of how the processes 
of setting up the CCM unfolded, the public sector effectively served as the convener 
of the partnership mechanism. Though the partnership was initiated globally, the 
public sector effectively went on to serve as an initiator and host of the mechanism at 
the national level. This is seen to have significant ramifications for subsequent 
interactions in the CCM. This echoes Miraftab’s (2004) conclusion based on a case 
study of a cross-sectoral partnership mechanism for a national housing programme in 
South Africa, that the question of who initiates and seeks the partnership is of critical 
importance. 
Out of the pluriform of partnerships described by Glasbergen (2011)(1. government 
as initiator and dominant entity, 2. government involved as just one of the 
partnership members, and 3. exclusive non-state mechanisms), the case of the CCM 
is seen as leaning towards the first. Figure 5 denotes the observed features of the 
CCM in this regard: a globally designed partnership mechanism that has effectively 
accorded the public sector a central and unparalleled role. The public sector occupies 
the heart of the partnership. The linkages and networks amongst the other sectoral 
actors are seen to be much weaker and less important, as represented by the broken 
lines used to denote the interactions between these non-State actors. The public 
sector essentially constitutes the referent for all types of actors in the setting. 
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Figure 5: The conceptualisation of the CCM as a globally designed partnership 
mechanism  
(Adopted from Visseren-Hamakers et al’s ‘transactional model for 
partnership analysis’ (Visseren-Hamakers, Arts et al. 2007; p. 141) 
This observation contrasts sharply with conceptualisations of cross-sectoral 
partnerships in high income country settings, whereby: ‘…a plethora of forms of 
social organisation and political decision-making exist that are neither directed 
toward the state nor emanate from it’ (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006; p. 191, Kennett 
2010; p. 20 - 21).  In the case of this study of the CCM in the Ethiopian setting, the 
State represents a central institution and is the referent for other types of social 
organisations and decision-making. This is not just attributed to the presence of a 
strong interventionist State in the setting, but also to the lack of ‘a plethora of forms 
of social organisations’ that engage in social policy processes in the setting. Hence, 
the CCM is seen as reproducing this manner of relationship between actors in the 
setting, thereby playing into the hands of powerful actors in the setting, primarily the 
public sector. 
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In addition, the demands that emanate from the Global Fund requirements and 
principles are seen to further weaken or disrupt the organisation of non-State actors. 
As discussed in chapters 5 – 7, the inclusion criteria have caused non-State actors to 
undergo significant reorganisations. In the case of CSOs, the reorganisation has led 
to lasting divisions and conflicts amongst constituencies of the sectors. Similarly, 
Kapilashrami and O’Brien’s (2012; p. 442) report that the ‘reconfiguration’ imposed 
by Global Fund requirements on non-state actors in India had had differential effects 
whereby it bolstered the position of some actors whilst it ‘threatened the existence of 
others’.  
Moreover, the reorganisation of CSOs has allowed the public sector to have a say on 
how the reorganisation of the CSOs takes place. The public sector effectively acts as 
the enforcer of the requirements of sectoral level organisation and the moderator or 
arbiter of the conflicts that arise in the process. For CSOs, this exacerbates the risks 
of co-optation by the public sector, which is known to be entailed by participation in 
cross-sectoral partnership arrangements with the public sector (Meadowcroft 2007). 
These findings echo conceptualisations and empirical evidence that highlight the 
huge implications of design for cross-sectoral interactions between actors in and 
around partnerships (Miraftab 2004, Schäferhoff, Campe et al. 2009, Brown 2010, 
Kapilashrami and O'Brien 2012). Particularly, the findings of this study signify that 
the effects of design persist through out the different stages of the partnership.  As 
discussed in chapter 6, the requirements of sectoral level representation are found to 
hamper the effective representation of CSOs and donors in the deliberative processes 
in the CCM. For CSOs, this presents challenges of representing the wide range of 
voices that exist within their fluid and heterogeneous constitution, in turn creating 
tension and conflicts.  
In the case of donors, the way the different autonomous constituents are required to 
come together into a donor group with a view of formulating common positions does 
not suit the nature of their constituency, which is made up of autonomous entities 
that have quite variable positions on issues. Donors in the Ethiopian setting are 
generally known to have sharply contrasting positions towards the Ethiopian State, 
based on different ideological, diplomatic and policy considerations (Whitfield and 
Fraser 2008, Feyissa 2011). To illustrate this, Whitfield and Fraser (2008; p. 362) 
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point to the stark differences observed in donors’ responses to claims of vote rigging 
in the highly contested national elections of 2005: ‘Donors’ responses to the 
elections and aftermath diverged to the extent that the effect on aid flows was 
neutralized’. Hence, the daunting task of amalgamating such wildly divergent 
positions into a unified voice in the CCM weakens the potentially powerful influence 
of donors. In contrast, the different public sector representatives do not suffer similar 
drawbacks as a result of these arrangements as they draw upon common ideological, 
political and policy directives.  
Beyond this requirement of sectoral level representation, other requirements 
emanating from the Global Fund, such as the principles of country ownership, 
performance based funding and zero tolerance to fraud, were seen as having an effect 
of further entrenching the strong position of the public sector (chapter 5). The way in 
which these requirements are taken-up and upheld in the context of existing power 
relationships (chapter 7) and the relative positions of actors is effectively seen as 
exacerbating existing inequalities in the setting. This in turn resonates with Hajer’s 
(2003; p. 107) observation that it is important to understand not just the content of 
such discourses but how they ‘are taken up in a process of mutual positioning’.  
In any case, the findings related to the effects of the requirements emanating from 
the CCM resonate with conceptualisations and empirical findings that suggest that 
cross-sectoral partnerships do not have an equalising effect on power relationships, 
whereas they can further intensify existing inequalities (Lister 1999, Bartsch and 
Kohlmorgen 2006, Biermann, Man-san Chan et al. 2007; p. 254, Visseren-Hamakers, 
Arts et al. 2007). Visseren-Hamakers et al (2007) report that the inequalities that 
were most prominent within their case study of an international partnership 
mechanism were between the different sectors within the developing country 
involved in the partnership, than between in-country and international actors. This 
further signifies the critical role of historical and contextual relationships between 
actors in a given setting, for how power relationships play out within partnership 
processes. Visseren-Hamakers et al (2007; p. 166) go on to conclude that it is 
‘extremely difficult’ for international partnerships to ‘emancipate civil society in the 
South’ unless the partnership ‘is proactively managed with this emancipatory goal in 
mind’. 
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The empirical evidence on CCMs in other developing countries similarly highlights 
the dominance of the public sector in cross-sectoral interactions within the CCMs 
(Brugha, Donoghue et al. 2004, Grace 2004, Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005, Stillman and 
Bennett 2005, Banteyerga, Kidanu et al. 2006, Biesma, Brugha et al. 2009, Spicer, 
Aleshkina et al. 2010). Brugha et al (2004) report a similar trend of public sector 
offices being accorded a central role in the constitution and running of CCMs, 
whereby, in 3 out of the 4 countries they studied, the public sector offices were 
found to be dominant, to the extent of being involved in the selection of particular 
organisations that would represent other sectors.  
In summary, the findings from this study emphasise that the adaptive needs entailed 
by the ‘co-presence’ of the global and the ‘local’, the so called ‘glocalisation’ 
phenomenon, have variable effects on different types of national actors. The findings 
reinforce Hein’s (2003; P. 39) observation that the integration between these levels is 
not a ‘harmonious process of cooperation’. The effects on national levels need to be 
understood in view of the relative positioning of actors within particular settings. 
The findings echo Long’s (2001; p. 72) explication of the ‘multiple realities’ of 
development projects, which relate to ‘the different meanings and interpretations of 
means and ends attributed to the different actors… as well as the struggles that arise 
out of these differential perceptions and expectations’. 
The next section discusses the findings related to the deep-lying causal mechanisms 
(deeper frames of reference in the setting) that are seen to influence trends in 
interactions between actors, by drawing upon reviewed conceptualisations and 
empirical evidence in the literature. 
8.3  The deep-lying causal mechanisms (the deeper frames of reference) 
 
This section discusses the prominent features of the deeper frames of reference that 
are seen to influence actors’ interactions in the CCM. In this regard, the relative 
positions of different actors in the setting, which are in turn contingent upon 
different factors (chapter 5), are seen to constitute the causal mechanisms that 
underlie actors’ interactions in the CCM. Accordingly, the findings related to the 
relative positions and roles of the different sectoral actors will be discussed in this 
section by drawing upon relevant conceptual understandings and empirical evidence.  
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As discussed in chapter 5, the factor that is seen to be at the core of the deeper 
frames of reference shaping the manners of interactions within the CCM is the nature 
of the Ethiopian State, specifically, the ideology of the government. The ideology of 
the government (Revolutionary Democracy), instilled over more than 2 decades of 
rule under the ruling party, and the type of State it aspires to (the Developmental 
State), are seen as not only influencing the behaviour and actions of the public sector, 
but as influencing the roles of other policy actors in the setting. Out of all the 
relevant factors emanating from the deeper frames of reference, this was considered 
to be the defining feature of the Ethiopian setting. It is considered as a ubiquitous 
factor that has major implications for all actors. 
As highlighted in chapters 4 and 5, Revolutionary Democracy essentially constitutes 
a worldview that is antithetical to neoliberalism (Bach 2011, Feyissa 2011, Hagmann 
and Abbink 2011, Vaughan 2011). The ideology pervades all aspects of life in 
Ethiopia, whereby the social, political and economic choices that result from the 
ideology are felt in different aspects of life in the setting (Bach 2011, Feyissa 2011, 
Hagmann and Abbink 2011). On the other hand, as discussed in chapter 2, 
neoliberalism pervades the new global order, whereby it is said that ‘we live in, and 
against a neoliberal world order’ (Deacon 2007; p. 16). Moreover, partnerships are 
considered to be an expression of neoliberal principles that underlie contemporary 
global governance, whereby they are seen as ‘neoliberal solutions in disguise’ 
(Börzel and Risse 2005; P. 15). Hence, it can be considered that partnership 
principles embodied in the CCM are bringing neoliberal ideals in global governance 
to a setting where social, political and economic relations are based on an ideology 
that is antithetical to neoliberalism. 
Crucially, where partnerships represent an agenda of pluralisation of decision 
making spaces to accommodate an enhanced involvement of the private sector and 
CSOs, the developmental state champions a dominant, unparalleled role for the 
public sector in the national development agenda (Bach 2011, Feyissa 2011, 
Hagmann and Abbink 2011). The ideology, derived from ‘the Marxist-Leninist 
traditions’ of the ruling party has given rise to a ‘state-centred and state driven’ 
model of development, despite the rhetorical commitments to broad based 
participation (Hagmann and Abbink 2011).  
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As discussed in chapter 5, the ideology does not simply involve specification of the 
nature of the state, but naturally, it influences the positioning of the state vis-à-vis 
other actors (the private sector, CSOs and donors). In this regard, the ideology touts 
the State as ‘the only one [type of actor] able to maintain a real autonomy in a 
globalised world’ (Bach 2011; P. 651), whereas the private sector, CSOs and donors 
are framed as vehicles of the competing, neoliberal ideology (Feyissa 2011). In a 
nutshell, the cross-sectoral partnership mechanism, the CCM, was rolled out in a 
context where the State unabashedly sees its role to be front and centre in the 
national development agenda, and where the other actors (donors, CSOs and the 
private sector) have grown accustomed to living with this reality. It was seen in the 
study that actors across the sectoral spectrum were well sensitised to these ambitions 
of the State and what it meant for their role in the national development agenda. As 
exemplified by the description from a CSO participant stating that the government 
plays the pack leader’s role (‘Ye awrawin mina’ in Amharic), this ordering of actors 
is not just a motto of the State but constitutes an accepted reality for other actors 
operating in the setting. 
Hence, the ideology of the State is found to be of central importance in order to fully 
grasp the interactions observed between different actors within the cross-sectoral 
partnership (CCM). However, the role of the State within cross-sectoral partnership 
mechanisms constitutes a highly under conceptualised issue within the partnership 
literature, due to the contemporary emphasis on ‘networks, flows and fluid 
[processes]’ as ‘organizing principles’ in the postmodern literature (Arts and Van 
Tatenhove 2004, Mol 2007; P. 226). Similarly, most empirical studies on partnership 
mechanisms in developing countries, including the studies on CCMs, do not go 
beyond highlighting the observed dominance of the public sector in interactions 
within the partnerships. Only one of the reviewed empirical studies, the multi-
country Global Fund tracking study by Brugha et al (2005; p.11), suggests the 
importance of ideology as an underlying factor for the tense relationship between 
CSOs and the public sector: ‘conflicting views around the meaning of partnership 
[which in turn] reflect fundamental ideological differences around legitimacy and the 
role of government’. 
The context in Ethiopia was also seen as constituting an environment that constrains 
non-State actors. In this regard, it is seen as a highly restrictive operational 
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environment for CSOs, as exemplified by the Charities and Civil Societies 
Proclamation. As per the study by Dupuy (2014; p. 18) it is estimated that CSOs 
have suffered ‘potentially high organizational mortality as a result of the 
proclamation, in that the number of federally registered local CSOs fell by 45%, 
from 3800 in 2009, to 2059 in 2011’. This hostility towards CSOs also appears to be 
related to the ideology the government whereby ‘in all developmental states, civil 
society experienced weakness, flattening or control at the hands of the State’ (Bekele 
and Regassa 2011; P. 6).  
Beyond the influences of the State, the findings also echo the widely recognised 
organisational and coordination challenges faced by CSOs (Reinicke Wolfgang and 
Deng 2000, Keohane 2002, Börzel and Risse 2005, Ngoasong 2009, Brinkerhoff and 
Brinkerhoff 2011, Glasbergen 2011). Similarly, the lack of capacity of local CSOs 
that is widely recognised the literature (Lister and Nyamugasira 2003, Spicer, 
Harmer et al. 2011, Harmer, Spicer et al. 2013) is also found to be pertinent in this 
study. Hence, the critically important factors in relation to CSOs constitute the 
regulatory frameworks in the setting of operation, in turn determined by the ideology 
of government, and the inherent organisational challenges faced by the sector. 
As for donors, as discussed in chapter 5, their position in the CCM largely mirrors 
their behaviour in the setting (cautious). From case studies of the negotiating power 
of 8 African Countries, Whitfield and Fraser (Whitfield and Fraser 2008) rank the 
Ethiopian government amongst the top 3 countries that have strong control over their 
policy space in negotiating aid with donors (along with Botswana and Rwanda). 
They explain that the countries that are said to have strong control have enjoyed 
‘favourable political, economic, ideological, and institutional conditions’(Whitfield 
and Fraser 2008; p. 364). Feyissa (2011; p. 809) concurs with this assessment and 
enumerates the Ethiopian State’s strong negotiating capital as follows:  
These are comprised of the humanitarian card (the eligibility of Ethiopia to 
aid with a 40% population below the poverty line); the historical card 
(Ethiopia’s non- colonial past); the relatively lower debt from the major 
international financial institutions in the 1990s; state effectiveness; the 
geopolitical card (Ethiopia as a key ally in the war on terror); donors’ 
reputation risk by pressing a leadership which has gained a high stature in 
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the international arena; and the ‘‘Chinese card’’ (the leverage EPRDF has 
got from the new players in the Ethiopian economy). 
As highlighted in chapter 2, there is critical lack of empirical evidence on the role 
and positions of donors in CCMs and other partnership mechanisms in developing 
countries. However, other studies have also documented the call by CSOs, evidenced 
in this study, for an enhanced engagement of donors, including the Global Fund 
secretariat, in order to moderate the influences of the public sector (chapter 5) 
(Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005, Bartsch 2007; P. 156). Bruga et al (2005; p. 11) 
recommend that an enhanced involvement by donors would help ‘support 
government and civil society forge partnerships …’.  
As discussed in chapters 5 and 7, the private sector is considered to be ‘missing in 
action’ in the partnership process and is particularly seen to have very poor 
relationships with the public sector. As discussed in chapter 5, it was seen that the 
private for profit sector are not seen as having much legitimacy in the eyes of other 
actors to involve in poverty alleviation and national development efforts. A review 
of the conduct of GHIs in developing countries (Biesma, Brugha et al. 2009) reports 
that government dominated CCMs in developing countries appear to be particularly 
inimical to the ‘private for profit sector’. In this regard, a study assessing the system 
wide effects of the Global Fund in 3 countries (Benin, Ethiopia, and 
Malawi)(Stillman and Bennett 2005) had indicated that the position of the private for 
profit sector is particularly precarious in Ethiopia, compared to the other countries of 
study: 
However, in countries where there was a lack of trust between public and 
private sectors, government-dominated CCMs had been reluctant to include 
strong private for-profit stakeholders. This was particularly the case in 
Ethiopia… (Stillman and Bennett 2005; p. 36) 
In summary, this section has discussed the critical findings related to the deeper 
frames of reference in the setting, namely, the relative position of policy actors in the 
setting and the factors that underlie these. In this respect, the ideology of the State is 
found to be the most critical factor underlying observed trends in the relative 
positions of actors and the relationship between actors in the setting. In addition, the 
relationship between actors in a specified field such as health or in the CCM need to 
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be understood in view of the wider set of agenda between the actors, such as the 
geopolitical considerations that underlie the relationship between the government 
and donors. The section also highlights some of the analytical explanations offered 
by the study to explain observed ways of actors’ interactions, which could be tested 
in future research in other settings. These include but are not limited to the 
explanation that a developmental state tends to curb the participation of non-State 
actors in partnership mechanisms, that the ideological position of the State is the 
most critical factor that orients the behaviour of other actors in the setting, and that 
the positions of other potentially powerful actors such as donors are influenced by a 
whole host of factors beyond the issues that represent the immediate concerns of 
partnerships.  
The next section discusses the process related factors that are seen to influence actors’ 
interactions in this study by drawing on the available empirical evidence in the field 
of study. 
8.4 Process related factors that influence the actors’ interactions in 
and around partnership mechanisms 
 
This section discusses factors related to the partnering process and how they are seen 
to impinge on the observed trends in actors’ interactions. As discussed in chapter 6, 
the themes identified in this regard include: The making of ‘partners’ (recruitment 
process); capacity to partner (CCM deliberation process); suboptimal participation 
despite procedural safeguards (CCM deliberation process); the role of consultants 
(proposal development process); the proposal development rush (proposal 
development process); the role of an influential personality (across all processes); 
and the challenges of representing constituencies (CCM deliberation process and 
proposal development process).  
These process-related factors have been widely identified by studies of CCMs in 
other settings (The Alliance 2002, Brugha, Donoghue et al. 2004, Doupe and Flavell 
2004, Grace 2004, Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005, Starling, Brugha et al. 2005, Stillman 
and Bennett 2005, Banteyerga, Kidanu et al. 2006, Biesma, Brugha et al. 2009, 
Spicer, Aleshkina et al. 2010). This study has sought to develop a contextualised 
understanding of these process related factors (chapter 6). As per the adopted 
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research paradigm and the theoretical framework, this constitutes an effort towards 
‘[locating] policy actions and practices in geographically specific governance 
contexts and [connect] the phenomenology of micro-practices to wider structuring 
forces’(González and Healey 2005). The findings generated in this regard are now 
discussed, with reference to the evidence from the empirical studies highlighted 
above. 
The process-related factors are explained in reference to the context. For instance, 
whereas the procedural safeguards for optimal participation appear to be in-place, 
non-state actors widely expressed sentiments of suboptimal participation or that the 
agenda were tightly controlled by the public sector (chapter 6). As Brown (2010) 
explains, such sense of control felt by actors, even when procedural safeguards have 
been put in place, reflect the colonising character of power in deliberative practices. 
Where ‘power’ refers to the ability of donors to ‘blackmail’ developing country 
representatives at the Global Fund’s executive board in the study conducted by 
Brown (2010), in the case of the Ethiopian CCM, it refers to the ability of the 
government to mobilise a range of power resources from the different levels of 
constitution of power (chapter 7) to enforce its preferences. In this regard, donor and 
CSO participants highlighted some contextual factors that impede optimal 
participation, despite the procedural safeguards: the restrictions on freedom of 
expression in the setting, the threats posed by restrictive regulatory laws (the 
Charities and Civil Society Proclamation) and the culture of deference towards 
authorities in Ethiopia. Hajer (2003; p. 99) alludes that merely establishing 
interactive policy practices does not guarantee ‘more democratic and more open 
form of policy making’. He adds that ‘they might as well lead to a ‘Foucaultian 
subjectivisation…’ whereby deliberative practices are merely used to perpetuate 
existing power asymmetries.  
The capacity of actors is discussed throughout the other studies on CCMs in other 
settings (Doupe and Flavell 2004, Grace 2004, Brown 2010; p. 529, Spicer, 
Aleshkina et al. 2010; p. 10, Harmer, Spicer et al. 2013; p. 306). In this study, as 
well as the other cited studies, lack of capacity was predominantly raised in reference 
to CSO and private sector participants. As discussed in chapter 6, the capacity 
differences between actors are understood as a reflection of the relative ordering of 
actors in the setting. The fact that the partnership brings together actors with varied 
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capacities and skills constitutes one of the core challenges of cross-sectoral 
partnerships (Huxham and Vangen 2005). Harmer et al (2013; p. 306) call upon the 
Global Fund to put aside funds for building the capacities of CSOs to engage with 
the public sector effectively, while Doupe and Flavell (Doupe and Flavell 2004) 
outline specific areas that PLWHA representatives would require capacity building 
support in, to be able to engage effectively with the partnering process. This study 
joins such calls for appraising the different capacity needs of the respective actors 
and engaging proactively to address critical capacity shortfalls that impede optimal 
participation. 
The practical challenges associated with the task of representing constituencies at the 
CCM have been discussed in relation to the fluidity of the constituency of CSOs 
(chapter 6). This also goes on to show that process related factors have selective 
effects across different actors in the setting. This factor has been discussed by other 
studies of CCMs (Brugha, Donoghue et al. 2004, Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005). The 
practical challenges related to representing constituencies in cross-sectoral 
partnerships are well recognised (Huxham and Vangen 1996). In the multi-country 
Global Fund tracking study, Brugha et al (2005) emphasise the problems of conflicts 
of interests of CCM members; highlighting the tension between representing 
constituencies and advancing the interests of one’s own organisation. Similarly, in 
this study, donor participants had questioned the autonomy of CSOs in the CCM for 
seeking to represent their constituencies while receiving money from the mechanism.  
One of the key factors and a widely cited issue by participants relates to the role 
played by the ex-Minister of Health, Dr. Tedros Adhanom. As discussed in chapter 6, 
the Minister’s roles appear to have left their marks on numerous aspects of the 
partnership process, including: critical decisions in the CCM (who would be partners? 
Who would make PRs?) and the deliberation processes in general (a commanding 
presence). Interestingly, only one of the reviewed studies on CCMs discusses the 
role of the chairperson. A Global Fund multi-country CCM assessment (GFATM 
2008) highlighted the critical role played by CCM chairpersons. However, the report 
states that: ‘It was less important whether the chair was from government, civil 
society or NGOs; his or her personal qualities alone determined efficacious CCM 
functioning’(GFATM 2008; p. 5). In contrast, the interpretation in this study consists 
that it is the multi-faceted credentials of the Minister including his affiliation to the 
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public sector, and the fact that he is a member of the central committee of the ruling 
party, that has enabled him to play the highly influential, multifaceted role.  
Another important factor relates to the role of consultants in the partnership 
mechanism. In their discussion of contemporary global governance and transnational 
policy communities, Patricia Kennett (2010; P. 27) and Diane Stone (2008; p. 30) 
emphasise the increasing role of ‘transnational policy professionals’, which in turn 
serve as ‘carriers of global policy processes involved in the diffusion of ideas, 
standards, and policy practice’. According to Borzel and Risse, the rationale for the 
establishment and proliferation of cross-sectoral partnership mechanisms, predicated 
on the complex nature of problems that cannot be tackled by just on type of actor 
(functionalist explanations), has fuelled the growing role of ‘epistemic’ or 
‘knowledge communities’ (Börzel and Risse 2005). 
As discussed in chapter 6, the consultants’ advice is not always in congruence with 
the objective reality in the setting. Similar findings were reported in other studies of 
CCM processes (Grace 2004, Starling, Brugha et al. 2005, Biesma, Brugha et al. 
2009). The findings in this study further highlighted that the CCM, specifically 
public sector officials, were assertive in their dealings with consultants in the 
Ethiopian setting. While the reviewed empirical evidence does not describe the 
balance of power between consultants and CCMs, one study suggested that the 
consultants wielded significant power. A case study of the CCM in Tanzania 
(Starling, Brugha et al. 2005, Biesma, Brugha et al. 2009) (part of the multi-country 
Global Fund tracking study (Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005)), found that the influence of 
WHO consultants had made the country apply for support for ART programme, 
when the ‘locally identified need’ lay with getting support for work on orphans and 
vulnerable children.  
Another process-related factor relates to the ‘proposal development rush’ whereby 
the participants said that the limited amount of time allotted for preparing proposals 
and the reactive nature of proposal preparations resulted in routinisation of certain 
activities to the exclusion of new, innovative works. A similar trend was reflected in 
Banteyerga et al’s (Banteyerga, Kidanu et al. 2006) study of the Ethiopian CCM:  
Some suggested that the allocation of most of the funds to the purchase of 
drugs and commodities was done in order to make planning quick and easy 
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without considering the real pattern of needs or problems that might be 
encountered in procuring such drugs and commodities. (Banteyerga, Kidanu 
et al. 2006; p. 20) 
Other country experiences reflected in other studies also resonate with this finding 
(The Alliance 2002, Brugha, Donoghue et al. 2004, Doupe and Flavell 2004, Grace 
2004, Spicer, Aleshkina et al. 2010).  
A related factor was the lack of readily usable evidence in the setting. Not only is 
this lack of access to evidence in the setting understood to be affecting the 
innovativeness within proposals, but also has implications for the power 
relationships between actors. In the absence of a wide array of evidence, the 
deliberations are more prone reflect the underlying power relationships discussed in 
chapter 7, than being guided by the merits of the evidence. Harmer et al (2013) 
similarly identified the lack of ‘evidence gathering skills’ as one of the impediments 
for CSOs’ advocacy efforts and their engagements with the public sector. 
This section has discussed the findings related to the process related factors that are 
seen to influence actors’ interactions by drawing on relevant conceptual 
understandings and empirical evidence. In this regard, the findings in this study offer 
a contextualised account of the process related factors, while reflecting on the 
reviewed empirical evidence on CCMs in developing countries.  
The next section uses the findings of the study to reflect on theories on the 
relationship between agency and structure. 
8.5 Reflections on theory 
 
This section reflects on the theoretical and conceptual understandings highlighted in 
chapter 2 in relation to the relationship between agency and structure. As discussed 
in chapter 3, the theoretical framework adopted in the study orients the study to 
focus on exploring how actors’ agency interplays with the CCM regulatory 
frameworks and the deeper frames of reference in the setting to give rise to observed 
ways of interactions. The first part of this section (8.5.1) essentially discusses the 
way this ‘interplay’ is understood to occur in actors’ interactions within this study, 
by drawing on existing conceptualisations of the same in the literature. The second 
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section (8.5.2) then focuses specifically on the role of discourses in this interplay. 
Similarly, theorisations of how discourses influence interactions between actors will 
be drawn upon in the discussion. 
8.5.1  How the interplay between actors’ agency and structure is understood to occur 
in cross-sectoral interactions in the CCM in Ethiopia 
 
This section discusses how the interplay between actors’ agency and structure is seen 
to manifest in this study, by reflecting on some of the key observations of the study. 
One of the key observations in the study that is seen to demonstrate the way this 
interplay between actors’ agency and structure occurs is the routinisation of a 
consensus seeking approach in the decision-making processes of the CCM. As 
discussed in chapter 5, while the option of adopting decisions through the vote has 
been assured within the regulatory frameworks of the CCM, decisions are routinely 
made through ‘consensus’. This occurs even when there appears to be reservations 
and dissensions amongst CCM members regarding the adopted decisions. Why is the 
voting route not instigating more often, given the occasions where actors did not 
hold shared positions regarding the adopted decisions? How is this routinisation of 
‘consensus-making’ explained in light of existing theories of the relationship 
between actors’ agency and structure?  
The understanding drawn from findings related to this routinisation of the consensus 
seeking approach points towards conceptualisations of ‘calculating actors’ that 
‘reflexively interpret and internalise’ their context (both the CCM regulatory 
frameworks and the deeper frames of reference), as they interact within interactional 
arenas (Long 2001). Actors are seen to come to the arena of interactions (CCM) not 
just with their intentions, worldviews, capacities and other agential characteristics, 
but mindful of the constraints and enablers that are presented by the CCM regulatory 
frameworks and the deeper frames of reference in the setting. As Marsh and Smith 
(2000; p. 7) explain: ‘At the same time, they [agents] do interpret that context and it 
is as mediated through that interpretation that the structural context affects the 
strategic calculations of the actors’. 
The observation here is not one of structural factors acting as fixed, immovable 
external factors that absolutely determine the actions of agents, but an internal 
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relationship (in actors’ cognitive processes) whereby ‘they [actors intentions and 
structure] are mutually dependent, indeed mutually constitutive’(Hay 2002; p. 118). 
As Powell and Dimaggio (1991; p. 13) argue, institutions ( defined as ‘frameworks 
of norms, rules and practices’(González and Healey 2005; p. 2058))  ‘penetrate the 
organisation, creating the lenses through which actors view the world …’. Hence, 
when CSO actors are consistently going along with the consensus-decisions, even 
when they have misgivings about them, they are not just acting by their intentions, 
but reflexively adjusting their intentions in view of the structured-context.  
In this regard, some of the most pertinent aspects of the structured-context, from the 
perspective of CSOs, include the strength of the public sector as a voting bloc in the 
CCM and the importance of maintaining a good relationship with the public sector in 
the Ethiopian setting (the government). For CSO participants, the strength of the 
public sector as a voting bloc in the CCM does not inspire hope for usurping 
consensus decisions backed by the public sector through the vote. On the other hand, 
being seen as abrogating the consensus approach entails the risk of harming their 
relationship with the most potent actor in the setting. Hence, contesting consensus 
decisions that are backed by the public sector, represent neither a viable nor a 
politically prudent option for CSOs.  
These considerations also need to be looked at within the context of the complex, 
evolving relationships between the different sectoral actors in the partnership process. 
These evolving relationships or ‘actors’ interlocking projects’ form part of the 
structured-context (Long 2001; p. 61). As seen in chapter 7, the public sector and 
CSOs are involved in complex sets of both transitive (power of dominance) and 
intransitive (power of mutual support) power games. These interlocking projects and 
power relationships also embody actors’ anticipations of and hopes for future 
interactions, beyond what is occurring at a particular point in time. For example, one 
can see an improvement in the quality of the relationship between CSOs and the 
public sector observed in this study, over what was revealed in Stillman and 
Bennet’s (2005) assessment of the same, back in 2005.  While they (Stillman and 
Bennett 2005) described the relationship as characterised by acute lack of trust and 
tension, the observations in this study entail a more complex picture whereby they 
are engaged in both transitive and intransitive power games, and the CSOs have 
since been promoted to PR positions. Participants in this study have also cited a 
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number of other improvements in their relationship with the public sector, which 
they say, are due to the continuous interactions, over time. Hence, the interactions 
and interlocking projects also embody actors’ aspirations for the future within this 
dynamic world of interactional settings. The importance of actors’ ‘interlocking 
projects’ as structure is captured by Long (Long 2001; p. 61): 
They often involve the development of interlocking actor ‘projects’, 
lifeworlds and circumstances that give rise to the situations where self-
reflexive strategies mesh to produce a measure of accommodation between 
the actors concerned… 
Hence, beyond the futility of pursuing the vote, given the composition of the CCM, 
CSO actors are also reflecting on the relationships they are building with the public 
sector, as they accede to the consensus based decision-making process. In this 
respect, being seen as supportive of the consensus-seeking process is crucial for non-
State actors, as the approach is framed in the setting as constituting a responsible 
approach of mutual accommodation with a view of safeguarding the national interest. 
As Hajer (2003; p. 107) explains, discourses (‘national interest at stake’, in this case) 
can be deployed to routinise a particular ‘parlance of governance’ (consensus 
seeking, in this regard) thereby ‘excluding or marginalising alternative ways of 
seeing’ (voting or more confrontational stances). The role of discourse in the setting, 
and how it is understood within the context of the relative positions of actors, is 
discussed in detail in the next section.  
Hence, the observations reflect a case of actors’ interaction where they reflexively 
interpret the structured-context.  However, the conception is less of a case of the 
structured-context acting as a static, immovable factor that absolutely determines 
actors’ interactions. Rather the structured context constitutes ‘boundary markers’ 
embodying options for viable decisions, which are at the same time ‘targets for 
negotiation, reconsideration, sabotage and/or change’ (Marsh and Smith 2000, Long 
2001; p. 63, Hay 2002, Wagenaar and Cook 2003). In other words, actors’ actions 
and behaviour are not entirely predictable in view of structures, but rather reflect 
outcomes of negotiations and settlements around the frames of reference provided by 
the structured-context. For instance, chapters 5 and 7 have revealed that actors from 
weak positions do deploy strategies to resist domination. To cite one instance to 
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exemplify this point, a CSO actor is said to have held out on signing off on the 
country proposal until other actors reached out to negotiate a settlement (chapter 7). 
The power relationships discussed in chapter 7 also reflect similar trends. The power 
relationship between actors is not seen as one of sheer domination or dictation of 
one’s will over another, but rather, a complex power play in the context of the 
different power resources available to the different types actors. For instance, the 
most powerful actor in the setting, the public sector, deploys its power resources not 
to totally dominate the decision making process, but to maximise its gains from the 
interactions while ensuring that the other actors are also happy enough to remain in 
the process. The actions in this regard resemble a kind of oscillation around the 
equilibrium point, which is constituted by the minimum set of conditions in which 
all actors would see value in continuing to participate in the mechanism.  
This essentially reflects the nature of cross-sectoral partnerships, which are known to 
bring to a head, different actors with different ‘capabilities for mobilising their 
resources in these interactions’ (Meadowcroft 2007; p. 200, Brinkerhoff and 
Brinkerhoff 2011; p.13). In these interactions, even those actors who are highly 
subordinate ‘exercise some kind of power’ (Long 2001; p. 17). As Giddens (1984; p. 
16) notes, ‘all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are 
subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors’.  
The above section provides a discussion of how the interplay between actors is seen 
to occur in the study. By using the case of one of the critical observations in the 
study, routinisation of consensus-making in the decision-making process, the section 
discusses how the interplay between actor’s agency and structure is understood to 
occur in this study. In a way this represents an attempt to vicariously experience the 
world of actors.  
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8.5.2 The role of discourse in cross-sectoral interactions within the Ethiopian CCM 
	  
This section discusses the findings that highlight the role played by discourse in 
actors’ interactions in the CCM. Two of the main findings that highlight the role of 
discourse relate to how the ‘effective system’ argument appears to influence actors’ 
interactions, and the case of how the apparent shift in opinions regarding the relative 
merits of clinical interventions versus community based health promotion 
approaches is seen to influence the relative positions of actors in the CCM (chapter 
5). These findings will be used as examples to explicate the understanding of the role 
of discourses in this study, and situate this within the wider body of knowledge on 
the subject.  
As indicated above, one of these critical discourses is the ‘effective system’ 
argument. To be sure, narratives describing the execution of development projects in 
Ethiopia as ‘effective and financially prudent’ are not just made in reference to the 
CCM’s successful applications to successive rounds of Global Fund grants but 
generally in reference to the government’s track records of executing development 
programmes (chapter 5). A statement extracted from a study undertaken by the DAG 
(Donors Assistance Group) group in Ethiopia states (DAG 2010):  
‘Comparatively stable, Ethiopia has a capable government that is 
demonstrably committed to addressing poverty and promoting development, 
with an impressive record of pro-poor spending, relatively sound financial 
management and sustained economic growth over recent years.’(DAG 2010; 
P. 1) 
Such narratives, highlighting the effectiveness of the Ethiopian public sector in terms 
of delivering results and its credence related to financial probity, are seen as further 
entrenching the statuesque. Particularly, the interpretation of results in chapter 5 has 
explored how they contribute to legitimising extant ways of doing business within 
the CCM; how they are used to justify the sustenance of a public sector dominated 
CCM on grounds of ‘functionality’. The findings have shown that the effectiveness 
and financial probity arguments trump other considerations such as inclusiveness 
and meaningful involvement of non-state actors (chapter 5).  
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This trend of exalting the ‘effectiveness’ of the system, over and beyond other 
concerns such as inclusiveness and meaningful participation of actors is not an 
exception to the CCM, but a trend generally reflected in Donor-State relations in 
Ethiopia. As Hagman and Abbink (2011) observe, in the case of Ethiopia, donors are 
willing to live with ‘a heavy dose of authoritarianism’, in exchange for what they 
regard as an effective and stable government situated in a turbulent region. This is in 
turn interpreted as a reflection of the myriad issues that underlie the relationship 
between the Ethiopian government and donors, such as geopolitical concerns 
(discussed above in section 8.3 and in chapter 5). In any case, the crucial observation 
that is made in this study concerning this discourse relates to how it entrenches 
existing ways of interactions, and how its effects in this regard are further 
accentuated in the case of the CCM, as a result of being reinforced by Global Fund 
principles and requirements (chapter 5). These are related to the Fund’s performance 
based funding system and its principle of zero tolerance to fraud. 
In his study of how the language of nature development processes influence the 
relative positions of actors within policy spaces, Hajer observes that ‘each discourse 
comes with its own power effects as it shapes the knowing and telling one can do 
meaningfully’ (Hajer 2003; p. 107). In the case of actors’ interactions in the CCM, 
the strength of the voices of those actors calling for inclusiveness and more 
meaningful involvement is indeed seen to be proscribed by the dominant discourse 
of ‘an effective system that delivers’. The power of discourses, such as the ‘effective 
system’ argument, does not just emanate from the ideas they represent, but relates to 
how they are deployed within the relative ordering of actors in the setting (Hein, 
Bartsch et al. 2007; P. 228).  
Accordingly, the dominance of the discourse of an ‘effective system that delivers 
results’ and the effects this has in terms of entrenching the public sector dominated 
system, need to be seen in light of the relative positions of actors and their power 
resources (chapter 7). In other words, this discourse is able to affect interactions as it 
is reproduced and upheld within the context of the differential power resources 
available to actors in the setting (chapter 7). In their description of the clashes of 
institutional logics that typify cross-sectoral interactions, Bryson et al (2006) state 
that the dominant logic (effective system argument in this case) gets to define the 
organization-level behavior (CCM). It does so by ‘focusing the attention of decision 
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makers on issues, outcomes, and sources of power that are consistent with the 
dominant logic and away from those that are inconsistent with that logic’ (Bryson, 
Crosby et al. 2006; p. 50). 
Hence, the ‘effective system’ argument is understood as further entrenching existing 
ways of interactions. It does so by delimiting competing discourses that speak about 
deficiencies in the level of meaningful and broad based participation of actors. The 
effect of the discourse is even more accentuated in the case of the CCM due to the 
guiding principles of the mechanism that exalt performance and financial probity 
over other considerations. The discourse derives its power of influence as it is 
sustained and reproduced by the relative positioning of actors in the setting.  
Another discourse that is seen to be influencing interactions between actors relates to 
the framing of AIDS as a medical condition, which in turn represents a stark shift in 
the prevailing attitudes in the setting in comparison to trends in the pre-anti retroviral 
therapy (ART) era. Here too, the observation in the CCM is understood as 
constituting a reflection of a wider trend in the setting (chapter 5). As discussed in 
the chapter, there seems to be a shift away from community-based health promotion 
and care and support services, following the rapid and massive scale-up of ART 
services in the setting. In this regard, the observation entails that the national ART 
service has effectively rendered HIV/AIDS, historically seen as an incurable disease 
with multifaceted societal effects, a treatable condition; in turn swaying opinions 
towards clinical care interventions.  
This shift in perspectives is consequential in terms of actors’ interactions in the CCM 
as it is seen as reinforcing the lopsided allocation of funds to clinical care 
interventions. As the latter are in turn designated as the responsibility of the public 
sector, the positions adopted in these debates are seen as having ramifications to the 
relative positioning of actors and their access to resources. Bartsch (2007; P. 169)  
makes similar observations that the huge resources mobilised by the Global Fund for 
treatment of AIDS had affected the global ‘prevention versus treatment’ discourse 
‘because its grants helped turn the treatment of HIV/AIDS patients in developing 
countries into an approach feasible in the foreseeable future …’ . 
The contrasting narratives carried by participants from the different sectors are 
understood to be reflective of the different stocks of competing discourses or 
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institutional logics that prevail within the wider setting. Public sector and donor 
participants tended to favour a biomedical approach while CSO participants argued 
for community based health promotion activities. Indeed, it is recognised that the 
personal attributes of the participants that were associated with the different 
positions, such as their professional backgrounds, would also inform their thinking in 
this regard. Still, the observed trend in this study reflected a tendency on the part of 
public sector and donor participants to suggest that the case for the ‘multisectorality’ 
of HIV/AIDS is not as significant as before the national scale-up of ART in the 
country. 
As Long (2001) observes, discourses employed by actors within a given arena (such 
as the CCM) ‘do not arise out of the blue but are drawn out of a stock of available 
discourses (verbal and non-verbal) that are to some degree shared with other 
contemporaries and predecessors’. In other words, while particular institutions such 
as the CCM serve as ‘discourse arenas’(Hein, Bartsch et al. 2007), the discourses are 
not inherent to actors but rather ‘form a part of the differentiated stocks of 
knowledge and resources available to actors of different types’ in the wider context 
(Long 2001, Risse 2002; P. 606). As discussed in chapter 5, participants’ views in 
this regard reflected their experiences with the effects of the ART programme in 
their work in clinical and community settings. In addition, the views of some public 
sector and donor participants in this regard, were seen to carry value judgements on 
the works of CSOs and their role in the health sector (chapter 5).  
This finding also signifies the effect of the feedback from policy action, in this case, 
the rapid scale-up of ART in the setting, on prevailing views and perspectives; 
emboldening some stances while weakening others. It is akin to Marsh and Smith’s 
explication of the dialectic that exists between policy outcomes on the one hand and 
the constitution of policy networks on the other: ‘policy outcomes may have an 
effect on the broader social structure which weakens the position of a particular 
interest in relation to a given network’ (Marsh and Smith 2000; P. 9).  
Similarly to the ‘effective system’ argument, the significance of this discourse needs 
to be considered in view of ‘how discourses are taken up in a process of mutual 
positioning’(Hajer 2003; p. 107). They do not exert power by themselves but form 
part of the world of ‘intersubjective’ interactions and orderings that occur amongst 
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actors (Hajer 2003; p. 107). The discourses do not affect issues on their own, but in 
view of the constellation of actors and the distribution of power within the context in 
which they are produced and reproduced. In this respect, while the dominant 
discourse appears to reinforce a treatment focused approach, the actors with weaker 
positions also deploy counter claims and narratives. As described in chapter 5, a 
CSO participant, while appreciating the core importance of ART in the setting, 
argued that the community based social care and support interventions are equally 
important and that they are as sensitive as ART to fluctuations of funding. This 
exemplifies Long’s (2001) explanation of the contestation that occurs around 
discourses: 
while some actors ‘vernacularise’ dominant discourses in order to legitimate 
their claims upon the state and other authoritative bodies, others choose to 
reject them by deploying and defending countervailing or ‘demotic’ (lit. ‘of 
the people’) discourses that offer alternative … 
In summary, this section has discussed the understanding of how discourses 
influence actors’ interactions by drawing on key conceptualisations on the subject. 
Accordingly, the discourses are seen to be reflective of wider trends in the setting. 
The dominant discourses influence the actors’ interactions and the relative 
positioning of actors in the CCM. At the same time, they derive their power of 
influence from the way they are produced and reproduced within the relative 
positioning and power dynamics amongst actors in the setting.  
8.6 The thesis in perspective 
 
This section presents a reflection on the potential contributions of the thesis to the 
existing body of knowledge on cross-sectoral partnerships and the limitations that 
need to be considered in gauging these contributions of the study. To this end, 
section 8.6.1 outlines the key contributions made by the study. The second part, 
section 8.6.2, highlights the implications of the findings of the study to policy and 
practice in the field of global health governance, while section 8.6.3 discusses the 
limitations emanating from the nature, design and execution of the study. 
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8.6.1 Potential contributions of the thesis 
	  
The potential contributions of this thesis mainly stem from the efforts made to 
undertake a context orientated, theory driven exploration of a least studied typology 
of cross-sectoral partnerships (cross-sectoral partnerships in developing countries). 
As discussed in chapter 2, while there has been proliferation of studies on cross-
sectoral partnerships, the studies are conducted across different disciplines in quite 
disparate manner (Crosby and Bryson 2005, Mol 2007, Visseren-Hamakers, Arts et 
al. 2007). For instance, while sociological studies focus on institutional factors, the 
organisational management literature predominantly report analysis of process 
related factors (Bryson, Crosby et al. 2006).  
In addition, most of the studies have been atheoritical due to inherent normative and 
managerial focus in the way study questions are formulated (McQuaid 2000, 
Brinkerhoff 2002, Selsky and Parker 2005, Biermann, Mol et al. 2007). Particularly, 
the embeddedness of partnership projects in particular contexts represents the less 
explored aspects of these mechanisms (Huxham and Vangen 1996, Osborne and 
Murray 2000, Selsky and Parker 2005). Moreover, the conceptualisations that 
predominantly inform the exploration of cross-sectoral partnerships are influenced 
by the post-modernist discursive turn in policy analysis whereby they have 
effectively neglected analysis of some crucial concepts such as power (Arts and Van 
Tatenhove 2004; p. 340, Barnett and Duvall 2005, Huxham and Vangen 2005, 
Bartsch, Hein et al. 2007; p. 30).  
Against this background, one of the main contributions of the study is the 
exploration of contextual factors that underlie observed trends in cross-sectoral 
interactions in and around partnership mechanisms. In this regard, the critical realist 
perspective and the theoretical framework employed in the study have enabled the 
interpretation of causal logics underlying the observed trends in interactions. In other 
words, the analysis guided by these orientations represents an effort to ‘peel away 
the surface of interactions’ (González and Healey 2005; p. 2062) or to ‘seek for the 
underlying reality through the dark veil that hides it’ (Easton 1995; p. 79, 81, Sobh 
and Perry 2006; p. 1201).  
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Accordingly, the exploration of underlying factors in this study contributes to filling 
the highlighted gap of understanding the role of context in the manner of interactions 
between actors in cross-sectoral partnerships. For example, while the different 
studies of CCMs in other settings have highlighted government dominance as an 
important observation, none of the studies have explored the ways in which the 
underlying, contextual factors give rise to this phenomenon in the settings that are 
studied (Brugha, Donoghue et al. 2004, Grace 2004, Brugha, Cliff et al. 2005, 
Stillman and Bennett 2005, Banteyerga, Kidanu et al. 2006, Biesma, Brugha et al. 
2009, Spicer, Aleshkina et al. 2010). This study accordingly deepens understanding 
of this, and the other observed phenomena, by offering analytical explanations in 
relation to the underlying, causal mechanisms.  
The case of dominance by the public sector has been explained as being an outcome 
of the ideology of the government, the culture of sovereignty in the setting, and the 
wider set of issues that define the relationship between donors and the Ethiopian 
State, such as geopolitical considerations. In addition, these contextual factors are 
seen to interact with Global Fund related factors to reinforce the dominant position 
of the public sector. Consequently, the study provides a holistic account of causal 
processes that give rise to observed ways of interactions in the CCM. In this regard, 
the causal logics offered by the study, by way of explanations of how the multiple 
factors interact with each other to give rise to the observed phenomena, serve as 
testable propositions for future empirical investigations in the field. 
The other critical contribution relates to the understanding of how national level 
governance mechanisms are integrated into global structures and processes. By 
adopting the conceptualisation of the CCM as a ‘critical interface’ between national 
and the global levels (Hein 2003; p. 47), the study offers insights into the differential 
effects of adaptive needs generated by the global structures and process, on different 
national level actors. This in turn makes a contribution to the way national level 
governance processes are understood vis-à-vis global governance processes, which 
in-turn constitutes an under-researched area of governance (Hein 2003; p. 17, 
Marques 2014). 
Furthermore, the study has explored the process related factors that influence cross-
sectoral interactions between actors in and around the CCM. While the analysis of 
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process related factors is preponderant in the literature, the fact that the contextual 
factors and the process related factors have been explored in the same study enables 
the study to make a situated analysis of the identified process related factors. Hence, 
beyond identifying the process related factors that are understood to be critical, the 
analysis provides analytical explanations of these factors in reference to the context 
in which they occur. For instance, the effect of the ‘proposal development rush’ on 
the level of innovation reflected in the country proposals is explained with reference 
to how it plays out within the context of lack of access to readily usable evidence, 
and how it plays into the prevailing power relationships between different actors. 
The suboptimal participation of actors is similarly explained with recourse to 
contextual factors that impede the capacity of specific actors to participate, such as 
the presence of restrictive laws that impede suboptimal participation. This holistic 
analysis enables the study to bring together the divergent focus reflected in different 
disciplines, such as, the focus on ‘micro-processes’ in organisational management 
studies, and the primacy of ‘macro’ or institutional factors in sociological studies. 
Finally, the use of a theoretical framework to guide the study and the reflections on 
theory at the end enable the study to contribute towards filling gaps in relation to 
understanding the ‘messiness of partnership practice in more complex models’ in  
‘theoretically precise’ ways (Selsky and Parker 2005; p. 866, Bryson, Crosby et al. 
2006). Furthermore, the deployment of a social science theoretical framework that is 
drawn from multiple fields of study situates the empirical findings within the realm 
of ‘wider bodies of knowledge’ (Giacomini 2010; p. 125), thereby expanding the 
relevance of the finding to different fields of study.  
8.6.2 Implications of the study to policy and practice 
 
This section outlines the implications of the findings of the study for policy and 
practice in relation to cross-sectoral partnerships, especially in the field of global 
health governance. First of all, the study refutes the wholesale, uncritical adoption of 
partnership mechanisms as virtuous mechanisms, which reflects a trend that has 
characterised the proliferation of cross-sectoral partnerships as governance 
mechanisms. Instead, the findings point towards the need to make informed 
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decisions in relation to the context of intervention and the potential areas of 
interaction between the design of partnerships and contextual factors.  
Such a holistic, political economy approach is now beginning to be adopted by key 
actors in the field global health as noted in a practice note developed by DFID 
(DFID 2009). While acknowledging that it is only recently that a holistic, political 
economy approach is being taken up by development practitioners in designing their 
strategies and programmes, the document emphasises the importance of undertaking 
such an analysis as follows:  
Political economy analysis is particularly useful for development 
practitioners since it helps us to understand what drives political behaviour, 
how this shapes particular policies and programmes, who are the main 
“winners” and “losers”, and what the implications are for development 
strategies and programmes.(DFID 2009; p. 4) 
As revealed through the findings of this study, this emphasis on a holistic 
understanding of contextual factors is nowhere more pertinent than in interventions 
that involve cross-sectoral interactions, as they bring together different types of 
actors with different ‘realties’. Consideration of these critical issues in the design of 
cross-sectoral partnerships is ever more urgent now as they are bound to continue to 
paly a significant role in global development initiatives, as indicated by deliberations 
of the post-2015 development agenda: 
The implementation of the post - 2015 development agenda should include a 
multi - stakeholder approach, effectively engaging civil society, business 
sector, philanthropic organizations and other actors. (UN 2014) 
Accordingly, the findings that relate to how contextual factors interact with design 
features of partnership modalities highlight the importance of incorporating analysis 
of context in the design of partnership modalities. In the case of programmes planned 
in Ethiopia, the in-depth analysis of contextual factors offered by this study can be 
directly utilised in the design of programmes. Similar programmes in other 
developing countries could use the thick description of context provided in this study 
and the explanatory logics forwarded in this regard to make intuitive judgements on 
the transferability of findings to their settings.  
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Crucially, this study adds to the empirical evidence base on CCMs worldwide, 
thereby providing further feedback that could be used to inform the future strategies 
and actions of the Global Fund and other stakeholders. The Global Fund was 
founded as an innovative mechanism that aspires towards a vision of a learning 
organisation that is able to adapt in view of new developments and feedback from 
the field (Schocken 2005). Hence, it is hoped that the findings in this study will be 
considered as part of the evidence synthesis undertaken by the organisation to inform 
its future actions.  
8.6.3  Challenges and potential limitations of the study 
	  
In this section, some of the challenges I faced in the research process and the 
potential limitations that emanate from these challenges will be discussed. Some 
challenges relate to the key informant interviews (policy elites) and the data 
generated through this method. In this regard, although the recruitment of 
participants has been highly satisfactory, there were differences regarding the 
openness of participants to share their experiences. On the whole, the mix of 
participants reflects a good representation of participants from across the sectoral 
spectrum, as shown in chapter 3. Except for 2 people who could not be located and 
another 2 who were unwilling to be interviewed, all people shortlisted for interview 
participated in the study. Despite the ups and downs related to postponement of 
interviews, cancellations, and missed appointments, the recruitment effort could on 
the whole be regarded as successful. It indeed surpassed the expectations I had prior 
to embarking on the fieldwork. 
Having said this, it was a whole different matter when it came to the actual 
interviews. The interviews reflect quite variable sense of engagement and interests 
across the different sectoral participants. Particularly, there was discernable 
difference between public sector participants on the one hand, and CSO and donor 
agency participants on the other. The latter were found to be more forthcoming with 
their views, while public sector participants mostly gave carefully guarded 
descriptions of the process. CSO and donor agency participants tended to represent 
the critical voices in the data while the public sector participants mostly saw the 
mechanism in good light. Private sector participants were limited in their 
contributions owing to their limited involvement within the mechanism and in the 
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health field in general (chapter 5). Hence, the preponderance of views presented 
within the data tilts towards that of CSO participants and donors.  
The other challenge relates to my own role and capacity as an interviewer. Although 
I was coming to this interview with experiences of interviewing policy elites in the 
past in Uganda, I found I was still very anxious about how the first interviews would 
go. Particularly, I was unsure about the best ways to frame the questions without 
sounding inquisitive or threatening. I found that asking questions about a sensitive 
issue such as the object of the study, about which different stakeholders hold 
contrasting views and harbour different interests, was not an easy task. I believe that 
the first set of interviews could have gone much better due to this reason and for the 
lack of adequate insights from my side to be able to probe certain areas more 
effectively. As the interviews progressed and as I got quite accustomed to the main 
issues at stake, I was able to steer the dialogue better to areas of interest.  
On the other hand, as discussed in chapter 3, although I had planned to undertake 
three observations of CCM meetings, I was only able to observe one meeting as the 
others got postponed. This has limited the data that could be have been generated 
from interviews to inform the findings of the study. Hence, the main limitations of 
the study mainly emanate from the way the elite interviews went and the missed 
opportunities in terms of the cancelled meetings. The findings of the study would 
need to be gauged with these practical challenges in mind.  
8.7 Concluding remarks 
 
This study makes the above highlighted contributions to the field of study of cross-
sectoral partnerships. Specifically, the study has attempted to make a contribution 
towards the understanding of cross-sectoral partnerships designed that operate at the 
national level, in developing countries. In this regard, the study contributes important 
findings in relation to the adaptive needs generated by the globally designed 
mechanisms on national actors. In addition, the study makes a critical contribution to 
the study of cross-sectoral partnerships in developing countries by providing an 
exploration of how contextual factors influence cross-sectoral interactions in and 
around partnerships. These explanations in turn offer testable propositions that could 
be tested through future empirical investigations. I addition, the study adds to the 
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relatively richer evidence base related to process related factors that affect cross-
sectoral interactions. Beyond bolstering the evidence that comes predominantly from 
studies conducted on CCMs, the study offers contextual explanations of these factors. 
Finally, through reflection on theoretical insights, the study contributes to the 
understanding of how the agency-structure interplay occurs in cross-sectoral 
partnerships.  
In conclusion, the study contributes to critical areas of the field of study of cross-
sectoral partnerships. The use of theory to guide the analysis in this respect helps 
integrate the findings within wider bodies of knowledge and enhances the 
transferability of findings. A theory-guided analysis of a poorly understood typology 
of cross-sectoral partnerships, with strong emphasis on context, is regarded as the 
critical contribution of the study to existing body of knowledge. In addition, the 
implications for policy and practice in relation to cross-sectoral partnerships are 
numerous. These contributions need to be gauged in view of the limitations of the 
study related to practical aspects of generating findings from exploration of the 
views and conducts of policy elites.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: The Interview Guide 
	  
1. Type	  of	  Organisation?	  
2. How	  long	  have	  you	  been	  a	  member	  of	  the	  CCM?	  
3. How	  did	  your	  organisation	  become	  a	  member?	  Describe	  the	  process?	  
4. Network	   mapping	   exercises	   (where	   participants	   agree	   and	   if	   found	  
convenient	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  exercise)	  
5. Do	  you	  have	  any	  particular	  function	  or	  role	  within	  the	  CCM?	  
6. How	  do	  you	  describe	  the	  following	  CCM	  processes?	  
§ Nomination	   of	   the	   Principal	   Recipient:	   How	   is	   this	   decided	   and	  
agreement	  reached?	  
§ Country	   proposal	   development:	   How	   are	   relative	   shares	   of	  
resources	  decided?	  How	  are	  priority	   activities	   agreed	  upon?	  How	  
do	  organisations	  make	  the	  case	  for	  their	  activities?	  
§ Review	  of	   individual	  applications	  and	  disbursement	  of	  funds:	  How	  
are	  roles	  assigned?	  How	  are	  funding	  decisions	  reached?	  
§ Monitoring	   and	  evaluation	  of	   the	  ongoing	  programmes?	  How	  are	  
roles	  assigned	  and	  work	  divided?	  How	  is	  the	  process	  organised?	  
7. Are	  there	  issues	  that	  are	  recurrent	  points	  of	  differences	  between	  actors	  in	  
these	  processes?	  Please	  describe?	  
8. Have	   there	   been	   occasions	   where	   there	   were	   differences	   in	   actors’	  
positions	  during	  the	  above	  processes?	  Please	  describe?	  
9. Do	   organisations	   form	   strategic	   alliances/coalitions	   and	   formal	   and	  
informal	  groupings	  of	  some	  sort	  to	  influence	  decisions?	  
10. How	  do	  you	  describe	  your	  own	  involvement	  in	  the	  CCM?	  	  
§ Level	  of	  participation?	  
§ Do	  you	  feel	  you	  have	  ‘enough’	  say?	  
§ What	  factors	  constrain	  your	  level	  of	  participation	  and	  involvement?	  
11. How	  do	  you	  describe	  the	  CCM	  Meetings?	   	  
§ Who	  sets	  the	  agenda	  for	  the	  meetings?	  
§ Are	  you	  notified	  in	  advance?	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§ Is	  there	  enough	  time	  allotted	  for	  discussion	  of	  raised	  issues?	  
§ Are	  members	  usually	  present?	  Active?	  
§ Are	  all	  issues	  discussed	  ‘freely’?	  
12. What	  do	  you	  understand	  of	  the	  Global	  Fund’s	  stated	  commitment	  towards	  
country	  ownership?	  
13. Do	  you	  think	  this	  is	  well	  represented	  by	  the	  way	  the	  CCM	  is	  set	  up	  and	  the	  
way	  it	  functions	  in	  Ethiopia?	  
14. What	   about	   the	   Global	   Fund’s	   commitments	   towards	   broad	   based	  
participation?	  
15. Do	   you	   feel	   all	   sectors	   are	   represented	   and	   have	   opportunities	   to	  
participate?	  	  
16. Do	  you	  feel	  that	  all	  members	  involve	  meaningfully	  in	  the	  CCM	  Mechanism?	  
17. What	  are	  some	  of	  the	  impediments	  for	  involvement	  of	  members?	  
18. Would	  you	  recommend	  the	  CCM	  approach	  for	  other	  funding	  strategies?	  
19. What	  would	  you	  improve?	  
20. Any	  additional	  views?	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Appendix 2: Field Report, July, 2013 
	  
A preliminary discussion of major Issues/evolving themes: 
The major themes and the focus of the research revolve around understanding the 
‘real-life’ conduct of partnership for health in the specific context under study: 
the social, political, cultural and economic realities in Ethiopia. While the focus 
and interests of the project have continually shifted across related areas of focus 
around the long standing desire to develop in-depth understandings of the 
processes of partnership around global health initiatives to meet global targets, 
the data collection process and the preliminary analysis therein has put the focus 
squarely on developing an empirical understanding of the real-life conduct of 
partnerships for health vis-à-vis existing conceptual and theoretical 
understandings of the concept/phenomenon. Here is a very preliminary 
discussion of the emerging themes and issues from the data: 
The role of the ideological orientation and behaviour of the Ethiopian state 
(revolutionary democracy) in determining the configuration of actors in the 
health sector in general and the specific forms of interactions observed 
within the partnership mechanism (CCM) 
A close reading of the revolutionary democracy doctrine and philosophy entails a 
vehement refutation of the tenets of neolibealist ideals that prescribe smaller 
governments while reserving more enhanced roles for the private sector and civil 
society organisations. In contrast, revolutionary democracy argues that the status 
quo in developing countries (underdeveloped political and social systems) calls 
for strong, ubiquitous, heavy handed governments that do not limit their role to 
simply regulating the private sector in economic and social sectors as is often 
prescribed under neoliberal views and especially as propagated after the 
Washington Consensus and during the structural adjustment years of the 1980s 
and 1990s in international development and diplomacy discourse. Instead, the 
revolutionary-democratic state makes unabashed interventions in the economic 
and social lives of people. These include beefing up public sector investments in 
social and economic sectors  (infrastructures such as roads, power plants and 
telecom, and education and health sectors) as well as maintaining public 
ownership and management of some economic enterprises: Power and telecom 
agencies are exclusively owned and managed by the government, which also 
owns and runs some service provision enterprises such as commodity whole sale 
enterprises and finance and hospitality services (banking, hotels and tourism). 
The government argues that these aspects of revolutionary democracy do not 
contravene free market and free enterprise principles, but that they rather 
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represent a balanced and contextual adoption of free market ideals as opposed to 
acceding to the whole sale imposition of unfettered capitalism and ultra free-
market ideals as prescribed by neoliberalism (more analysis to be done...) 
With this background, a recurrent theme in studying the CCM has been a 
prominent, proactive government that predominantly sets the agenda and 
reserves mere ‘feedback and commenting roles’ to other actors: the civil society, 
the private sector and even donor agencies. Although the CCM (Country 
Coordinating Mechanism) is seen to have representation from major sectors (the 
Public Sector, local NGOs, faith based organisations, multilateral agencies 
(WHO and UNAIDS), and bilateral donors), the influence of the government is 
found to outweigh that of other sectors, even those of bilateral and multilateral 
donors. This trend in interactions between the actors where the data produces 
incidences of overwhelming influence from the government’s side, even 
surpassing that of resource rich actors (donors), is one recurring theme and an 
interest area to explore which will in turn involve an analysis of the governing 
philosophy of governance (revolutionary democracy), as well as wider issues and 
factors that underlie observed relationships between the government and other 
actors (international diplomacy, the country’s standing as a ‘regional police’ in 
the global war on terrorism, legal frameworks that enforce constraints on civil 
society and the private sector and so forth). 
Some revealing quotes: 
‘Civil society in other countries is about challenging the status quo, in Ethiopia, 
no adversarial relationship with government, government not really challenged’  
‘Good participation [in the CCM] – but no robust negotiation’ 
‘The ruling party is coherent from top to bottom, most organised group I have 
ever come across, and the health sector, most coherent of any country I have 
worked in...’ 
Governance structures instituted for regulating optimal participation – 
however, no optimal deliberation  
Explicit governance structures and regulations have been established as part of 
the requirements instituted by the Global Fund and aim to optimise the level of 
participation and involvement from all sectors. These include requirements of 
representation from all sectors, a decision making process that requires signing 
off on decisions by all members, requirements of transparent mechanisms for 
developing country proposals, nominating principal recipients and allocating 
resources, as well as regulations aimed at facilitating transparency in addressing 
any grievances.  However, there is a recurring theme that there is lack of ‘robust’ 
deliberation’ even though these ‘supposedly empowering regulations exist’. 
Revealing quote: 
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‘Without equal footing, you can’t go into argument’  
The role of deeply entrenched values and beliefs  
Descriptions of civil societies and the private sector by public sector participants 
and policy makers often paint pictures of mistrust. The stance appears to be: that 
inclusion of the civil society is a necessary but not desirable action – it is 
necessary for fulfilling the requirements of the fund that calls for full inclusion of 
all sectors, which is in-turn critical for ensuring access to the critical resources at 
stake.  The inclusion of the civil society is seen as a small price to pay (rather 
than as a helpful, gap filling option), as the resources channelled to them anyway 
just amounts to a meagre proportion of the resources mobilised for the whole 
country. 
On the other hand, the non governmental agencies’ perceptions of the 
government’s engagement in partnership and collaboration mechanisms is 
characterised but suspicion that the government is merely using these fora in-
order to legitimise its unilaterally predefined goals and objectives rather than to 
engage in deliberations that eventually result in consequential changes in plans, 
strategies and approaches. One revealing quote in this respect describes such 
multisectoral meetings and dialogues as, ‘ the government shares information, 
participants are called on to comment, then the government gets to say, ‘thank 
you for participating’! 
So, understanding the role played by long standing, deeply entrenched views, 
perceptions and predispositions that characterise the relationship between the 
actors beyond the particular partnership mechanism (the CCM) would be of 
major interest. 
The Performance based funding model and the resultant emphasis on 
activity coverage figures 
An interview with one interviewee and a large part of the observation data reveal 
that activity performance and coverage figures occupy the focus of project plans 
and reports thereby affecting reflective, evidence based practice, and innovations 
in programme design and execution. This was also documented in the data from 
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observation of the CCM meeting, whereby organisational reports were seen to be 
filled with a plethora of figures representing performance. 
The Fund being a multi-lateral, public private endeavour and it’s effects on 
donor relationships 
A recurring theme has been that the donors within the Global Fund do not 
necessarily see eye to eye on how they conduct their work and advance their 
respective agenda in developing countries. This uneasiness has resulted in no 
unified agenda that is strongly pursued by the donors (a ‘non-agenda donor 
group’), which in turn has influenced their role in influencing the relationship 
between different actors.  
The CCM and other aid coordination mechanisms and health policy 
networks 
The CCM exists alongside other aid coordination mechanisms in the country, 
such as the joint consultative forum (JCF) and the health, population and 
nutrition network (HPN). Civil society organisations are seen to have better 
representation within the CCM while the other networks are mainly seen to be 
platforms for high-level engagement between the donors and the government. 
The CCM is not formally linked to any of these mechanisms and if any sharing 
of information between these networks exists at all, it is facilitated through the 
overlapping participation of some agencies in both forums (a happenstance not 
by design).  While the CCM focuses on the three diseases (HIV/AIDS, TB and 
Malaria), the resources mobilised through the mechanism from the Global Fund 
represents the largest contribution to the health sector of any other funding 
mechanism. However, it seems to be enclosed away from wider health policy and 
systems platforms. 
While there have been calls for integrating the CCM with these forums going 
forward, there are also other voices who resist these calls. Some of the issues are 
that the CCM has engendered representation of civil society in the health sector, 
which some participants believe would be thwarted if it is integrated with the 
other mechanisms. Equally, others have also opposed the move towards 
integration as they feel that the requirements of broader participation instituted in 
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the CCM would impose an artificial representation of actors in the other policy 
networks, thereby dissipating their effectiveness in dealing with critical problems 
facing the health sector. Analysis of these views lead to considerations of the 
tension between utility and representation in such partnership forums. 
Relationship between the government and civil society organisations  
How independent are civil society organisations (CSOs) – from both 
governments and donor agencies? Are there universal features that distinctly 
define the composition and make up of CSOs as well as their roles and the 
manner of their relationship with other actors, especially the government? The 
observations within this study entail that wider political, economic and legal 
factors within such contexts govern the behaviour of CSOs. Some bilateral 
donors described the relationship between many of the participating CSOs and 
the government as blurred. A related, crucial observation was that CSOs would 
seek the government’s arbitration in cases of conflicts amongst themselves 
before going down the legal route! The role of the Minister of Health in 
mediating between different people living with HIV/AIDS Associations 
(PLWHAs) vying for membership in the CCM was explored in this study.  
This close relationship between the CSOs and the government and dependence of 
CSOs in the government needs to be scrutinised within the context of broader 
legal frameworks (notably the newly promulgated CSO law that limits the 
mobilisation of resources from abroad by local NGOS to 30 % of their budget 
and limits advocacy and human rights related work only to local NGOs). This is 
seen to have limited the options for CSOs in-terms of ensuring their viability in 
the country, to maintaining favourable relationships with the government, which 
could easily affect their revenue sources.  
Restating the Aim of the Study: 
-­‐ To develop an in-depth understanding of the ‘real-life’ conduct of a 
partnership mechanism in the Ethiopian context and put to test current 
theoretical and conceptual understandings of the concept of partnership  
Specific Objectives 
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o To develop a rich description of the configuration of policy 
networks and organisation of actors in the Ethiopian health system 
o To develop an in-depth description and analysis of actors’ 
interactions within partnership mechanisms 
o To analyse the role played by the distinct ideological orientation 
of the government (Revolutionary Democracy) and the social and 
economic policies bourne out of this ideology in determining 
observed ways of actors’ interactions  
o To analyse the influence of long established values and beliefs on 
the way partnership mechanisms function  
o To describe and analyse the power dynamics between actors and 
how they influence the relative roles of actors in the partnership 
mechanisms 
o To reflect on the theoretical and conceptual understandings of 
partnership and make an empirically based contribution to 
existing theories and conceptual understandings    
So, the earlier narration of emerging themes and issues is of course a very 
preliminary attempt at introducing the range of issues covered in the interviews. The 
next 3 months would be dedicated to analysing the data through the framework 
analysis method involving all explicit stages of: identifying a thematic framework, 
indexing, charting and mapping and interpretation. The interpretation stage will 
involve using explanatory theories from the literature to help explain the study 
findings. Such theories would include theories on organisational behaviour and 
networking, partnership, the role of power in health policy-making, governance and 
participation, and deliberative democracy. 
Hand in hand with the data analysis, the next three months would see a revision of 
the literature review of the study based on the current focus on the ‘workings of 
partnership mechanisms in real life contexts’. This will ensure a synthesis of the 
literature already included beforehand and beyond, to develop a critical assessment 
of which disciplines have informed the theoretical and conceptual understanding of 
partnership, what issues have been identified as critical factors in the partnership 
processes, what empirical evidence exists (in developing countries), what has been 
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neglected and left out (i.e. building up on previous review documenting the gap in 
understanding how the process of partnership interacts with the wider context in 
health systems, how power relationships manifest themselves in real life and 
demystifying assumptions that you could engineer ‘equal participation and equal 
partnerships’). 
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  health	  aid	  and	  health	  systems:	  Case	  studies	  from	  Ethiopia	  
 
Dear Research Participant: 
This	  research	   is	  being	  conducted	  as	  part	  of	   the	  fulfilment	  of	  a	  PHD	   in	  Health	  and	  Related	  
Research	  at	   the	  School	  of	  Health	  and	  Related	  Research	   (ScHARR),	  University	  of	   Sheffield.	  
The	   aim	   of	   the	   study	   is	   to	   generate	   an	   in-­‐depth	   understanding	   of	   the	   process	   by	  which	  
global	   targets	   for	   health,	   namely,	   the	  Millennium	   Development	   Goals	   (MDGs)	   are	   being	  
pursued	   in	   Ethiopia.	   It	   mainly	   focuses	   on	   the	   efforts	   and	   interactions	   of	   national	   and	  
international	   stakeholders,	  and	   to	  understand	  how	  processes	   for	  meeting	   the	   targets	  are	  
influencing	   the	  health	   system.	   	  The	  particular	  areas	  of	   interest	   concern	  global	   targets	   for	  
HIV/AIDS,	  TB	  and	  malaria.	  
The	  specific	  objectives	  of	  the	  study	  are:	  
·∙ To	  develop	  a	  detailed	  understanding	  of	  the	  configuration	  and	  organisation	  of	  global	  
and	   national	   health	   system	   actors	   around	   efforts	   aimed	   at	   achieving	   the	   global	  
targets	  for	  health.	  	  
·∙ To	   investigate	   the	   interactions	   of	   global	   and	   national	   actors	   as	   they	   involve	   in	  
collective	   mechanisms	   set	   up	   to	   enhance	   the	   achievement	   of	   global	   targets	   in	  
Ethiopia	  
·∙ To	  appraise	  how	  these	  interactions	  and	  configurations	  around	  the	  achievement	  of	  
global	  targets	  are	  influencing	  health	  policy	  making	  processes	  and	  the	  health	  system	  
as	  a	  whole	  at	  different	  levels	  in	  Ethiopia	  -­‐	  i.e.	  national	  and	  district	  levels	  
·∙ To	   identify	   and	   study	   specific	   within-­‐country	   cases	   (case	   studies)	   that	   can	  
illuminate	   these	   interactions;	   looking	   in	   particular	   at:	   	   the	   power	   relationships	  
between	  actors,	   the	   institutional	   spaces	   that	   exist	   for	   agenda	   setting,	   the	   role	  of	  
different	   bodies	   of	   knowledge	   and	   evidence,	   and	   the	   role	   of	   trust	   and	   other	  
‘human	  relationship	  aspects’	  in	  shaping	  modes	  of	  interactions.	  
	  
	  
 
266	  
In effect, the interviews and the observations to be undertaken in the field shall focus on 
soliciting information along the following lines:  What determine particular ways of actors’ 
interactions? Which are most important contextual factors?  Are observed processes open to 
incorporating new ideas and innovations? Which actors are missing out and which are key 
players? and how the particular types and configuration of actors and the institutional set up 
of the Global Fund mechanism are affecting the pursuit of global targets? The	  final	  report	  is	  
expected	  to	  be	  submitted	  to	  ScHARR	  in	  October	  2014. 
You	  have	  been	  chosen	  as	  a	  participant	  as	  you	  are	  considered	  a	  key	  stakeholder	  in	  national	  
efforts	   to	   fight	  HIV/AIDS,	  TB	  and	  malaria,	  and	   in	  work	   related	   to	   the	  development	  of	   the	  
national	  health	  system	  in	  Ethiopia.	  
Participating	  in	  the	  study	  will	   involve	  taking	  part	   in	  an	   in-­‐depth	  interview	  that	  will	   last	  for	  
around	  an	  hour.	  In	  this	  interview,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  about	  your	  perceptions, experiences and 
views concerning the collective efforts aimed at achieving global targets in the areas of 
HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria,	  and	  you	  are	  encouraged	  to	  answer	  in	  any	  way	  that	  you	  wish.	  If	  
you	  do	  not	  want	  to	  answer	  any	  questions,	  you	  are	  free	  to	  do	  so.	  Your	  interview	  (as	  well	  as	  
that	  of	  others	  -­‐	  about	  25	  -­‐	  40	  in	  total)	  will	  be	  analysed	  with	  the	  sole	  objective	  of	  generating	  
answers	  to	  satisfy	  the	  research	  aim	  mentioned	  above.	  
It	   is	  up	   to	  you	   to	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	   to	   take	  part	   in	   the	   research.	   If	  you	  do	  decide	   to	  
take	   part,	   the	   PhD	   researcher	   will	   contact	   you	   to	   discuss	   your	   potential	   participation	   in	  
more	  detail,	  and	  give	  you	  an	  opportunity	  to	  ask	  any	  questions.	  If	  you	  are	  happy	  to	  take	  part,	  
you	  will	  then	  be	  asked	  to	  read	  and	  sign	  a	  consent	  form,	  which	  will	  provide	  testimony	  that	  
you	  are	  willing	  to	  be	  a	  participant.	  Whatever	  decision	  you	  make,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  impact	  on	  
you	  personally	  or	  your	  organisation,	  and	  you	  will	  be	  free	  to	  withdraw	  from	  participating	  at	  
any	  time,	  without	  giving	  a	  reason.	  	  	  
If	   you	   have	   any	   questions,	   please	   feel	   free	   to	   raise	   it	   with	   the	   Researcher,	   Mr.	   Henock	  
Taddese	   at	   h.taddese@sheffield.ac.uk	   or	   00251(0)911249729	   (in-­‐country	   number	   in	  
Ethiopia)	   or	   0044(0)7500901115	   (UK	   number)).	   In	   the	   event	   that	   your	   queries	   have	   not	  
been	  satisfactorily	  addressed,	  you	  can	  contact	  Mr.	  Graham	  Jones,	  Lecturer	  at	  the	  School	  of	  
Health	   and	   Related	   Research	   (ScHARR),	   University	   of	   Sheffield,	   UK,	   at:	  
graham.jones@sheffield.ac.uk	  or	  (+44)	  (0)114	  222	  0771.	  
All	  the	  information	  collected	  during	  the	  research	  interview	  will	  be	  kept	  strictly	  confidential.	  
Any	   reference	   to	   the	   points	   or	   statements	   you	   make	   will	   only	   be	   reported	   in	   broad	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reference	  to	  the	  sector	  you	  work	   in,	  whereby	  statements	  will	  use	  descriptions	  such	  as:	   ‘a	  
participant	  from	  a	  multilateral	  agency’,	  ‘a	  traditional	  healer’,	  and	  ‘a	  local	  non	  governmental	  
organisation	  representative’.	  
The	  audio	  records	  will	  be	  maintained	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  PHD	  project	  and	  beyond	  that,	  
for	  2	  years,	  which	  in	  turn	  will	  be	  time	  whereby	  journal	  publication	  materials	  are	  expected	  
to	  be	  generated	  from	  the	  collected	  data.	  While	  the	  audio	  records	  will	  be	  destroyed	  within	  
this	   described	   timeline,	   the	   interview	   transcripts	   will	   be	   maintained	   in	   secure	   password	  
protected	  format,	  digitally,	  for	  up	  to	  5	  years	  after	  the	  submission	  of	  the	  PHD,	  so	  that	  thee	  
researcher	  will	  be	  able	  to	  work	  on	  the	  data	  to	  publish	  different	  scientific	  papers.	  
The	   research	   has	   been	   approved	   through	   the	   University	   of	   Sheffield	   ethics	   approval	  
procedures	  and	  by	  the	  Ethiopian	  National	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Ministry.	  
The	  researcher	  declares	  that	  there	  is	  no	  conflict	  of	  interest	  and	  the	  research	  exercise	  is	  an	  
academic	  research	  (PHD	  project)	  funded	  through	  scholarships	  for	  the	  PHD	  tuition	  and	  living	  
expenses	  cover,	  received	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Sheffield.	  
The	  research	  results	  will	  be	  submitted	  to	  the	  University	  of	  Sheffield	  and	  to	  relevant	  journals	  
for	  publication.	  You	  will	  receive	  a	  copy	  of	  this	   information	  sheet	  and	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  signed	  
informed	  consent	  sheet.	  	  
Thank	  you	  very	  much	  for	  considering	  whether	  to	  take	  part	  in	  this	  study.	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Appendix 7: Participant Consent Form 
	  
 
Title	  of	  Research	  Project:	  A	  trilogy	  of	  global	  targets,	  health	  aid	  and	  health	  systems:	  Case	  
studies	  from	  Ethiopia	  
Name	  of	  Researcher:	  Henock	  B.	  Taddese	  
Participant Identification Number for this project:            Please initial box 
 
1. I	  confirm	  that	  I	  have	  read	  and	  understand	  the	  information	  sheet	  dated	  
03/05/2012	  explaining	  the	  above	  research	  project	  and	  I	  have	  had	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  ask	  questions	  about	  the	  project.	  
	  
2. I	  understand	  that	  my	  participation	  is	  voluntary	  and	  that	  I	  am	  free	  to	  withdraw	  at	  any	  
time	  without	  giving	  any	  reason	  and	  without	  there	  being	  any	  negative	  consequences.	  In	  
addition,	  should	  I	  not	  wish	  to	  answer	  any	  particular	  question	  or	  questions,	  I	  am	  free	  to	  
decline.	  	  
	  
3. I	  understand	  that	  my	  responses	  will	  be	  kept	  confidential.	  I	  give	  permission	  for	  
members	  of	  the	  research	  team	  to	  have	  access	  to	  my	  anonymised	  responses.	  The	  only	  
reference	  to	  me	  or	  my	  organisation	  will	  only	  be	  made	  by	  way	  of	  broad	  reference	  to	  the	  
category	  of	  actors/stakeholders	  that	  we/I	  belong	  to.	  	  
	  
4. I	  understand	  that	  my	  name	  will	  not	  be	  linked	  with	  the	  research	  materials	  or	  reports	  
that	  result	  from	  the	  research.	  	  	  
	  
5. .	  I	  agree	  for	  the	  data	  collected	  from	  me	  to	  be	  used	  in	  future	  research	  	  
	  
6. I	  agree	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  above	  research	  project.	  
	  
7. I	  agree	  for	  audio	  recording	  of	  the	  interview,	  which	  shall	  be	  destroyed	  in	  due	  
time,	  2	  years	  after	  the	  PHD	  project	  report	  has	  been	  submitted	  to	  the	  
University	  of	  Sheffield,	  whereby	  the	  researcher	  shall	  use	  the	  data	  to	  publish	  
the	  findings	  in	  academic	  journals.	  The	  transcripts	  generated	  from	  this	  exercise	  will	  on	  
the	  other	  hand	  be	  maintained	  within	  password	  protected	  digital	  systems	  for	  up	  to	  5	  
years	  whereby	  the	  researcher	  will	  use	  the	  data	  to	  publish	  research	  papers.	  
	  
________________________	   ________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________________	  
	  
 
269	  
Name	  of	  Participant	   Date	   Signature	  
(or	  legal	  representative)	  
	  
_________________________	   ________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________________	  
Name	  of	  person	  taking	  consent	   Date	   Signature	  
(if	  different	  from	  lead	  researcher)	  
To	  be	  signed	  and	  dated	  in	  presence	  of	  the	  participant	  
	  
_________________________	   ________________	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________________	  
	  Lead	  Researcher	   Date	   Signature	  
To	  be	  signed	  and	  dated	  in	  presence	  of	  the	  participant	  
Copies:	  
Once	  this	  has	  been	  signed	  by	  all	  parties,	  the	  participant	  will	  receive	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  signed	  and	  
dated	   participant	   consent	   form,	   the	   letter/pre-­‐written	   script/information	   sheet	   and	   any	  
other	   written	   information	   provided	   to	   the	   participants.	   A	   copy	   of	   the	   signed	   and	   dated	  
consent	   form	   (the	  original)	   should	  be	  placed	   in	   the	  project’s	  main	   record	   (e.g.	  a	   site	   file),	  
which	  must	  be	  kept	  in	  a	  secure	  location.  
 
